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Summary 
This thesis contrasts the litigation of disputes in intellectual property rights 
between China and England. China is comparable with England in its substantive 
IPR law, but less so in terms of its enforcement. The thesis examines the judiciary’s 
role in IPR litigation and analyses the guidance on anti-piracy and unfair 
competition implied in IPR judicial enforcement. The thesis attempts to draw some 
basic criteria to achieve a clear just IPR protection in China. 
The thesis investigates in actual legal practice how, and to what degree from a 
similar legal base, IPR protection varies greatly between China and England. This 
involves: an analysis of case management, the discovery of evidence, the 
ascertainment of facts and issues of law, the legal finality, and the evaluation of 
judgment. The thesis considers whether there is a basic, just and practical standard 
of enforcement that might be followed for China. 
The main nature of my thesis lies in its originality in taking the first hand IPR 
cases to do comparative research on IPR enforcement through the lens of res 
judicata, overlapping multi-claims and issues of case management. It reveals the 
correlation between case management, judicial ascertaining of facts and issues of 
law, legal finality and issue estoppel, and arriving at a just result. By reviewing 
jurisprudential theories and their practical influence in English appellate cases, the 
study tries to show that transparency, equality of treatment and consistency form the 
basic core standard in enforcing IPR protection in China, and in providing a solid 
powerful foundation, from bottom to top, to promote and reform the structure of the 
Chinese legal regime.
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Preface 
This thesis examines the contrast between the litigation of IPR law in China 
and the UK
1
, with an emphasis on its practical implementation. China is comparable 
with England in substantive IPR, but less so in respect of its enforcement. The thesis 
examines the judiciary’s role in IPR litigation and analyses the guidance on anti-
piracy and unfair competition implied in IPR judicial enforcement. Meanwhile, it 
attempts to draw some criteria to help achieving a transparent and consistent IPR 
protection in China. 
1. Research Background  
In substantive law terms, China cannot be said to lag behind England.2 Like 
England, China has acceded to most of the international IPR-related conventions and 
treaties3, such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal 
Copyright Convention, the International Convention for the Protection of New Plant 
Variety, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, etc. Figure 8 show that China has also incorporated the basic requirements of 
these conventions and treaties into its domestic laws. China's substantive IPR regime 
now provides a broad range of protection, covering not only trademarks, copyrights 
and patents, but also including computer programmes, audio and video products, 
new varieties of plant, layout of integrated circuits, domain names, internet and 
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enterprise names, trade secrets, etc. In general, substantive IPR law in China has 
largely caught up with England in a relatively short time. 
In terms of actual enforcement, however, the position is very different. Pirated 
goods exist in every field, from food and commodities to drug, software and 
industrial products4. Counterfeiting usually involves unknown small producers and 
main street sellers, making unauthorised copies of others’ trademarks or logos on an 
identical or similar product, and passing them off as the genuine products
5
. 
Consequently the extent of piracy, and counterfeiting levels, has remained high, 
even worsened in some areas (for example, the rampant counterfeiting of consumer 
products that poses a direct threat to the health and safety of people). 6  Anti-
counterfeiting reaction from related administrative authorities seems very strong; 
each year sees an action to counter this problem. Government officials often state 
that they have made substantial efforts to improve and strengthen China’s IPR 
protection and enforcement systems. China often lists: how many laws it has passed; 
how many administration orders and campaigns it has launched to reinforce IPR, 
and how many cases are held in IPR courts.7 But infringers know that once the anti-
counterfeiting initiative has passed, they will go back to counterfeiting again
8
. Lack 
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of consistency and continuity in enforcement, and its demonstrative function, serve 
to give little confidence and submission towards IPR law. Common people and 
companies continue to lack confidence in IPR litigation, and have less trust in its 
enforcement. Many common litigants have experienced disappointment with actual 
judgments, with the arbitrary nature of decision-making, and the lack of equal 
accessibility in the trial process.9 The enforcement litigation in China has not sent to 
public a clear traceable authority of what is wrong or unacceptable business 
behaviour in honest competition, especially in respect of anti-counterfeit of brand 
names.10  
The Government’s stance does not always help. In 2007, when the US brought 
the issue to the WTO to form a panel to scrutinise the loopholes and weaknesses in 
China’s legal system for protection and enforcement of copyrights and trademarks, 
the Chinese government regarded filing a case to the WTO as a condemnation and 
confrontation of its integrity, and harming trade ties,11 rather than as a way and a 
chance to evaluate its enforcement manner in order to achieve an accountable legal 
protection. The question how the Chinese legal system solves the counterfeiting 
issue, and enforces IPR, and whether it gives efficient protection of IPR, are 
increasingly important for foreign investors and for Chinese. After thirty years 
economic reform, the Chinese are increasingly aware of their legal rights; they are 
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requesting an accountably consistent explanation of the IPR law to which they are 
affected in specific cases
12
. 
There are many articles and research reports analysing the reason why IPR 
enforcement in China is not efficient in constraining IPR infringement and pirating 
behaviour. Some focus on Chinese culture and tradition, in respect of which 
widespread indifference to legal rights, procedures and remedies is a common 
feature of the Chinese legal landscape13; some highlight the lack of rule of law, and 
judicial independence14; some point out the complexity of Chinese circumstance, 
including corruption and local protectionism 15 ; some analyse the legal system 
blocking and discouraging serious punishment of pirating behaviour16; some realise 
that the Chinese government seems only interested in the promulgation of new IPR 
laws to meet the WTO requirements without any wider interest in reforming its legal 
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system to give effective protection 17 . Relying on government campaigns and 
administrative orders to protect IPR and to maintain a fair competitive market is 
difficult: ‘Hallmarks of a system that offers legal certainty include consistent and 
cognisable rules of law, observance of the law by civilians and companies, an 
independent judiciary, legal education and research, and a free press.’18.  
There has been considerable literature on IPR enforcement in China. Searching 
Google Scholar under the title, ‘serious product piracy in China’, shows 21,000 
related articles about this issue19. Nearly all of this research begins with reform of 
Chinese IPR law to adapt to the WTO requirements, covering what measures or 
intuitions are set up. Much of the research has considered the difficulties in 
achieving a fair and just trial in China20. This body of research has drawn a bigger 
picture of IPR enforcement in China, which has stressed that IPR protection must be 
addressed within the cultural and socio-economic setting, and that ‘ignoring the 
existential cultural socio-economic realities that frame IPR in China is likely to 
produce unsatisfying results’ 21 
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Most analysis so far has been based on secondary sources. After reading these 
views and noticing the deteriorating piracy phenomena in China, one cannot help 
wondering how an IPR infringement trial works in the Chinese courts; whether and 
in what way these system problems and defects, listed by academic research, have 
affected a fair judicial enforcement in anti-counterfeiting litigation; and whether the 
judicial process has given a clear consistent guidance in enforcement of IPR law, in 
such a rapidly changing society. 
The validity of intellectual property protection depends heavily on judicial 
performance. ‘IPR without an effective judicial support and remedy turns out to be 
an expensive fantasy. When judicial support for these specialized rights is feeble, 
mobilization of that natural resource falters, with considerable losses to the 
country’.22  
My study relies on the detailed first-hand translation of present IPR cases to 
find what the real practical difficulties for IPR litigation in China are. The study 
reveals how a Chinese judge uses his or her judicial powers to arrive at judgments. 
My study is based on a comparison between similar cases23 in England and China, 
focusing on detailed case examination of compliance practice, to analyse their 
judicial technique. The thesis investigates in actual legal practice how, and to what 
degree, IPR protection from a similar substantive law base varies between China and 
England. This involves an analysis of case management and evidence discovery, 
ascertainment of facts and law, legal finality, and judgment evaluation. This analysis 
is mainly concerned with the judicial management and discretion in procedural 
justice in England and China. The thesis considers whether there is a basic 
accountable and practical standard, and what enforcement path should be followed 
in China, bearing in mind that ‘realization-focused comparison’ is more powerful 
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than ‘transcendental institutionalism’ in removal of manifest injustice in the world 
which we see 24.  
2. Methodology and limitation of cases covered 
The work is limited to a small part of IPR cases, passing off, trademark and 
copyright infringement. The work is not purport to be a comprehensive study of IPR 
law but rather to do the comparison in judicial enforcement between England and 
China. It reveals big differences from which it is possible to generalise about the 
judicial manners, in the two countries, of enforcing IPR. In order to identify the 
main pirating and passing off cases in England and China, the Westlaw, Chinacourt 
and Google Search engines were mainly used. China IPR cases are mainly from 
Beijing, Shanghai and provincial IPR courts.25 Searches were undertaken using the 
terms “intellectual property piracy in China”, “counterfeiting, confusion of goods”, 
“unfair competition”, “passing off ”, “prior rights”, “trademark similarity”, “well-
known marks”, “injunction or interim measures”, ‘‘case management ’’, ‘‘arbitrary 
discretion’’, ‘‘legal finality’’ and “IPR infringement or remedy”. Having observed 
the problems surrounding these in the Chinese cases, I then searched their 
counterparts in English cases. All the cases used in my research were published and 
attracted a high public profile. Moreover, the research extends to all cases in which 
the trial process was an arguable factor in the determination of an IPR infringement 
issue between the parties in dispute. 
Searches mainly cover the civil cases published in period of 2000-2011, around 
the aspects of case management, finality of judgment, overlapping claims and justice 
evaluation raised in IPR litigation. It is hoped that by looking at these various facets 
of litigation, the reader will have a clearer representation of the failing nature of IPR 
litigation in China. The fundamental problem of pirating can be seen as the failure of 
its litigation regime, which could not give clear and consistent reasoning and 
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remedies for specific infringement, and could not guide society in facing the pirating 
suits
26
.  
Case studies are chosen as analysis background and my research motivation 
because they are self-contained, accessible and necessarily employing the relevant 
substantive IPR law and procedural rules
27
. Case studies also can provide a better 
comparison of judicial attitude toward similar facts and expose the role and function 
of the court in the two countries.28 Moreover, the real issues and causes affected by 
judicial discretion cannot be understood or experienced by reading IPR laws and 
procedure code. The method of case study allows us to experience the two countries’ 
litigation processes, and discover the departures in the understandings and views of 
the same rules in IPR laws. The case studies also reflect that UK Law Reports 
always provide full and sufficient litigation information, when compared with 
Chinese simple and general law reports.  
The starting point is an assumption that China has primarily established a 
relevant and complete legal framework protecting IPR, which complies with the 
requirements of the WTO29. However, given low levels of trust in its enforcement 
and common faking phenomena of IPR infringement, the problem becomes how to 
develop an accessible justice route to evaluate its effectiveness. In each chapter my 
writing style follows the same logic probing: first my understanding and notes on 
basic issues and precedents involved in this area, which provides the standard for 
case analysis; secondly comparison and analysis of the techniques dealing with these 
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issues in China and England; finally there is a conclusion and suggestions for 
improvement of enforcement IPR in China.  
Each chapter of the thesis will centre upon one aspect of IPR litigation, to show 
how UK courts employ concepts of procedural justice and precedents to manage a 
case, restrain arbitrary decisions, and adjudicate a case openly, consistently and 
fairly. In contrast, examination of the Chinese judicial decision-making reveals 
arbitrary decisions without interim decision review, inaccessibility of reasoning and 
of ascertaining of facts, and lack of transparent and equal treatment to parties. There 
is a lack of consistent rules to ensure legal finality, even though sometimes the 
Chinese court does reach similar final judgment to that of English court.  
My overriding analysis is based on judicial process and legal reasoning, 
reflected in judicial discretions over IPR infringements. I will suggest, through a 
general overviews of jurisprudential theories, that the basic standard of transparency, 
equality of treatment and consistency as mechanisms to improve public confidence 
and trust in IPR enforcement is needed in China.  
3. Research structure  
My thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1: This is an introduction to the intellectual property trial process and 
to enforcement procedures in England and China. This outlines with figures an 
overall picture of IPR substantive law, interim measures, court jurisdiction and trial 
systems in England and China. The chapter provides a platform for further analysis 
of legal practice compliance, allowing a comparison of the structures applicable to 
the actual practice of judicial decision-making in the IPR area. The work is based on 
the existing legal regimes of both countries. 
Chapter 2: This reviews how the courts in both countries exercise their judicial 
powers in managing the trial process, giving judicial notice, correcting procedural 
mistakes and ensuring that parties are on an equal footing. It considers the judicial 
inference and reasoning from discovery of evidence. The above stages reveal how 
transparency and equality of treatment are fundamental to achieve natural justice. 
Chapter 3: This considers how the courts deal with the claims from overlapping 
intellectual property rights, and infringement compensation in England and China. 
The legal analysis is based on the application of trademark law in brand name 
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infringement, in specific cases. The chapter will suggest that a fair and consistent 
judgment not only adheres to formal equality in procedural treatment, but also 
focuses on substantive consistency through precedents rules. 
Chapter 4: This discusses what legal finality and binding force might be, 
inferred from a final judgement to bind subsequent litigation in China and England. 
It considers the relationship between the civil objectives and causes of action, res 
judicata and abuse of process. The main task is to identify the similar issues in prior 
and later cases, between the same litigants, in order to bar relitigating, and to 
identify precedents to minimise unnecessarily extended arguments, and to avoid 
inconsistent judgments in similar fact cases. 
Chapter 5: This concerns how to evaluate a judgment. I will explore jurispru-
dential theories in order to develop a profile of just and fair judicial assessment. I try 
to show that transparency, equality of treatment and consistency form the basic core 
standards to enforce IPR protection in China, and also a solid powerful foundation, 
from bottom to top, to promote and reform the structure of Chinese legal 
institutions.  
The main nature of the thesis is its originality in taking the first hand IPR cases 
to undertake comparative research on IPR enforcement through the lens of res 
judicata, overlapping multi-claims of IPR and case management. I also try to set up 
a bottom line justice standard by reviewing typical jurisprudence theories, analysing 
their practical influence by testing their guidance through appellate cases. My 
research is issue-targeted and guided, from comparison of the techniques between 
two countries in dealing with these main issues in IPR trial. The research approach 
is normative, but also built on empirical and legal technical foundations. The 
available views of academic commentators are intensely explored and relied upon 
throughout this thesis, and significant emphasis is placed on the primary materials 
contained in the reported cases.  
The thesis is not to argue whether China should adopt English legal norms or 
system. From the function of any courts to solve conflict and dispute as the final 
end, it addresses the question how much China can choose to allow judicial 
management to differ while enforcing the general principles in IPR substantive law 
and meeting the international conventions adopted. This thesis emphasises that, 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
15 
under the similar IPR principles and substantial content, the English litigation lets us 
see the correlation between the rights and the manner in enforcing them, while its 
Chinese counterpart just fails in reflecting such correlation in its legal practice, and 
lets litigants, academics and the public doubt its judicial decision, even on the basis 
of Chinese law itself. This thesis simply argues that China court should let its 
adjudication be transparent, let what is happening in specific cases be open and 
clearly reflected in its trial process, should equally impartially treat both sides’ 
claims and evidence, should let all relevant information associated with claims be 
responded and heard, and should consistently apply its law and let important values 
and principles be set up and maintained in its judgments without essential conflicts. 
I trust that the thesis has achieved the main tasks as planned namely to 
discover: how, and to what degree, IPR protection from a similar substantive law 
base varies between China and England, and to explore a practical standard for 
China in moving towards an acceptable and just IPR enforcement. 
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Chapter One: Substantive IPR Rights and Judicial 
Structure in England and China 
1.1 Judicial Structure in England and China 
The general court system of China has four tiers of vertical jurisdiction and 
three distinctive court procedures in horizontal jurisdiction
1
. Figure 1-1 shows that 
the four tiers of jurisdiction include basic people’s courts, intermediate people’s 
courts, high people’s courts and the Supreme People’s Court; the three different 
court procedures include civil procedure, criminal procedure and administrative 
procedure
2
. A case should be considered in terms of its litigants, the matter in 
dispute and the complexity of the claims, in order to determine in which court it 
should be heard. A civil court hears civil disputes under civil procedure between 
individuals or companies; an administrative court deals with administrative disputes 
employing administrative procedures between individuals, or companies in dispute 
with government agents engaged in administration or public service. For an 
administrative dispute, the defendant is always a government body. A criminal court 
tries criminal offences prosecuted by the state, against an individual or company, 
using criminal procedure.  
Most civil cases are filed in an intermediate court or a district local court. In 
order to strengthen the harmony and cooperation of IPR protection in the whole 
country, special IPR trial chambers have been set up in most intermediate or higher 
courts to deal with all types of intellectual property disputes, including ownership 
disputes and infringement disputes related to patent and trademark rights, and 
copyright. Now most IPR cases should be heard by intermediate courts or higher in 
China.
3
 At first instance an IPR claim in a civil case may be taken to the high court’s 
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by a plaintiff if the value of the claim is over RMB 10 million yuan and in the area 
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong; or over RMB 3 million in the high court for 
other provinces.
4
 A first instance case filed in the Supreme Court is only heard on a 
discretionary basis; the matter should be extremely important and the issues should 
have major impact on the whole country. To date there has been no first instance 
civil case heard by the Supreme Court, but this jurisdictional arrangement gives the 
Supreme Court both trial and appellate functions at the same time. There are two 
trial tracks: ordinary common procedure lasts for six months, and summary simple 
procedure for three months. Most civil cases in the district local court are held under 
summary simple procedure. 
Figure1- 2 shows that the court system of England has two tiers of vertical 
jurisdiction and two distinctive court procedures in horizontal jurisdiction. Two tiers 
of jurisdiction are trial courts: county courts and the High Court of Justice. The 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are only appellate courts, not trial courts. 
The High Court is organised according to case type and has specialist divisions, 
Family Division (dealing with cases involving divorce, children care), Chancery 
(dealing with property, trusts, finance and company issue), and Queen’s Bench 
(dealing with cases involving contracts, patent and negligence). As first instance 
trial the High Court only deals with the more complex cases or those where the 
claim exceeds £50,000. Most IPR cases, especially the patent cases are tried in the 
Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court. The Divisional Courts of the High 
Court also have some appellate function, hearing appeals from decisions of the 
magistrates’ and county courts5.  
After filing a civil IPR case, a judge in England assigns the claim to a system of 
three tracks according to the value and complexity of the case: the small claims 
track, for cases worth less than £5,000, at an informal hearing by a district judge; the 
fast track, for cases from £5,000 to £15,000, with a fixed timetable from allocation 
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to trial; the multi-track, for cases worth over £15,000 or of unusual complexity, 
which are supervised by a judge and given timetables tailored to each case.
6
 
The jurisdiction of a specific IPR case in China and England are similar. The 
initial money claimed, or the complexity of a case, decide the tier of the court of the 
defendant’s domicile, or of the place where the alleged infringing action takes place, 
in which the infringing products are manufactured or sold, seized, or used. The 
financial value of the claim is a decisive factor in the vast majority of cases for both 
countries’ jurisdiction.7 
England has two different litigation procedures, civil procedure and criminal 
procedure. A dispute between individual and government bodies is also heard under 
civil procedure, regarded as no more special than the disputes between individuals, 
when the court reviews the decisions made by government. There is no separate 
administrative procedure as in China, other than for judicial review
8
, even though 
the nature of claims in dispute may be different from that civil dispute between 
individuals. That means the opponent in England must employ a civil procedure as 
opposed to administrative procedure ,against a decision made by an administrative 
authority (e.g. the British Office or the Trade Marks Registry), where there is an 
objection to validity or grant of a patent or trademark. Treating government bodies 
as equivalent to civilians in procedural terms reflects the high importance of the 
procedural justice. Dicey pointed out in promoting the advantage of UK 
constitutional structure: ‘the ordinary law courts can deal with any actual and 
provable breach of the law committed by any servant of the Crown still preserves 
that rule of law which is fatal to the existence of true droit administratif.’9 
So in England, all arguments concerning IPR are dealt with under the normal 
civil or criminal procedures.
10
 There is no need to distinguish issues between 
administrative offices and individual parties or companies. There is no procedural 
choice for civil cases, rather a jurisdictional choice. But in China, in a trademark 
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argument, the issue of validity or grant should be heard by an administrative court 
under administrative procedure, while the issue of infringement of a trademark right 
should be heard by a civil court under civil procedure, because a Chinese court can 
only examine the validity of a trademark or patent on grounds of legitimacy under 
administrative procedure, though infringement claims are dealt with under civil 
procedure on grounds of legitimacy and appropriateness. Such Chinese procedural 
arrangements may also lead to the staying of proceedings in an infringement trial, 
pending an interim decision on the validity of the trademark right in an 
administrative court. The arguments in a case may require different courts with 
different procedures to hear. That may be one reason why Chinese civil courts 
hardly grant any requests for staying of proceedings
11
.  
1.2 Overview of Trial and Appeal in China 
In China, plaintiff (the IPR owner or an exclusive licensee of IPR) files an IPR 
suit to a court, usually at the court of the defendant’s residence. The court first 
determines whether the case will be accepted within seven days from the filing of 
the complaint. (Sometimes a complaint might be rejected by the court; if the plaintiff 
is dissatisfied with such a ruling, it may file an appeal to the next higher level of 
court.) Then the court shall serve a copy of the claim form on the defendant within 5 
days of the filing of the case, and the defendant has 15 days in which to serve an 
answer
12
.
 
(Art. 43 of the CPR 2007 provides that failure to serve an answer does not 
restrict the ability of the defendant to proceed with its defence. This is quite similar 
with English rule 10.2 of the CPR 1998)
13
  
The next step after filing a case in the court is the process of evidence 
exchange, according to the Supreme Court’s legal interpretations on disputes 
involved in patent, trademark and copyright. The judge decides the time limit for 
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evidence exchange, which shall be about 30 days from receipt of the notice of a case 
before hearing. The parties may apply for special pre-trial evidence exchange. Such 
exchange is limited to no more than two occasions. 
14 
The purpose of evidence exchange is to ascertain the evidence provided by the 
parties, and to clear up disputed points and claims. The party may cross-examine the 
evidence with regard to relevance, legitimacy and weight or degree of credibility, so 
as to establish whether such material has probative value, and whether the probative 
force is strong enough. Any material or statement that has not been subject to cross-
examination cannot be used as evidence to determine the facts of the case. The court 
should identify the evidence fairly and objectively according to procedure, observe 
the law, follow the demand of professional ethics, and use logic and daily life 
experience independently to evaluate the evidence‘s validity and credibility.15  
According to China’s CPR, the court not only has power to conduct evidence 
exchange, to make an evaluation on evidence‘s validity and credibility, but also to 
collect evidence by itself. In cases where the parties have objective obstacles to 
obtaining evidence, the court may obtain evidence at the request of one of the parties 
or at its own initiative
16
. This is a huge difference compared with the power from a 
UK court, as this suggests there is no practical possibility for parties to challenge 
such evidence investigated by the Chinese Courts, acting as an evidence investigator 
and fact recognisor at the same time. In a later chapter, I will discuss the effect of 
this on case management showing why there is no proper and fair fact recognition 
process. 
17 
Three days prior to trial, the trial court must notify the parties and other 
participants of the date and location of trial, informing the parties of their litigation 
rights and obligations. The proceedings in the court hearing are conducted in the 
following manner: presentation of statements by the plaintiff and his agent; response 
by the defendant and his agent; presentation or response by the third party and his 
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agent; argument between the parties or their agents; final statement from plaintiff, 
defendant and third party in that order. The trial of first instance must be completed 
within 6 months from date of acceptance of the case for ordinary procedure
18
. As 
indicated by Figure 3, if a further extension is needed it is subject to the approval of 
the next superior court.  
After the hearing, the trial court makes its judgment normally composed of 
three parts: fact statements by both parties; ratified facts by the judge, and the 
application of statutes regarding the facts and decision. The court will make at least 
three determinations namely: which party (claimant or defendant) should take 
liability for infringement dispute, the amounts of damages, and the allocation of 
litigation costs. The Chinese judge only needs to give reasons according to 
substantive statute law for the judgment. Precedent cases are not a source of law for 
Chinese judgments
19
. In contrast, in England the lower courts are constrained to 
follow the binding precedents.
20
 There is neither binding nor persuasive force of 
precedent in the interpretation of interpret China’s statutes law 21 , though some 
lawyers are always trying to persuade the judge to follow previous decisions
22 
1.2.1 Appeals in China 
The judgment of the first trial is provisional while that of the second instance is 
binding, because China adopts two instances of trials - the first instance trial and the 
second appellate trial. All judgments of first trial except that of the Supreme Court 
are subject to appeal in China. The judgment from the first trial court may easily be 
appealed to the higher level court, unless the parties accept the judgment or decision 
made by the first instance court. This means the first trial judgment becomes legally 
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effective only if there is no appeal during the appeal period. The judgment of the 
second instance and the Supreme Court are final.
23
  
The second instance court forms a panel to completely rehear the evidence, and 
the applicable law, rather than merely examine the law applied in the first trial 
process. After the trial the second instance court may affirm, amend or set aside the 
judgment or ruling of the first trial or order the first trial court to retry the case. The 
trial of cases on appeal must be finished within three months after accepting the 
appeal. There is no judicial review process in civil procedure. Any ruling decisions 
in the first trial cannot be appealed instantly to the second instance court, except that 
decisions rejecting suit or challenging jurisdiction are subject to appeal.
24
 The 
litigants have to finish the whole full trial journey to know the judge’s decision on 
each interim issue. That is one reason why in China, few IPR disputes are in fact 
settled, dismissed or withdrawn prior to full trial in the shadow of interim decisions. 
This inevitably means that the serious errors in the first trial process which would 
impair a fair just judgment could not timely be corrected by appellate courts 
25
. It is 
difficult to understand why China procedure does not allow a litigant instantly to 
appeal an interim decision, since an error or unfair final judgment may be avoided if 
there is an instant process of correction. Further, if the interim decision is corrected 
instantly, it may be possible to curtail later procedure, or at least substantially reduce 
the length of any further trial, as with English situation.  
Another structural difference from England is that there is a time set for trial in 
China ---the first trial should be finished within six months, and the second instance 
trial should be three months from accepting the file. In England, there is no such 
general time limit for trial. The trial time in England is based on each case’s 
allocation as recognized in case management. For example, the court will not 
normally allow more than one day for the hearing of small claims, and most are 
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dealt with in an hour or so
26
; a typical timetable which the court may give for a fast 
track case, is 30 weeks
27
; and there is no proscribed period for multiple claims
28
. 
 The role of appellate court in England is different to that of the trial court. The 
trial court mainly deals with exposition of fact and law finding rather than 
discussion and interpretation the ambiguities of applicable law. The appellate court 
obviously focuses its discussion and analysis of the relevant law based on the 
findings by the trial judge. But in China, primary trial and appellate courts are 
repetitive and overlap; both not only find facts but also offer the statements of 
applicable law. There is no clear distinction between the trial court and appellate 
court, the appellate court often take the form of a complete rehearing . Such 
structures produce an obvious result: exposition of the facts is not detailed enough in 
the first trial, and interpretation and reasoning of law is no deeper, wider nor 
necessarily consistent in the appellate court
29. 
Reading the judgments of the Chinese 
appellate courts, one can easily find new facts and findings, accepted by the appeal 
courts, which were not even mentioned in the first trial
.30 
 
1.3 Overview of Trial and Appeal in England 
As in China, originating civil proceedings in England also start by issuing a 
claim form. When a case is filed in a court with appropriate jurisdiction, the judge 
usually assembles both parties in the court to discuss the disputing issues and 
evidence. After both parties exchange their document lists or questionnaires, the 
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judge summarises the issues after consideration of the briefs submitted by both 
parties, then allots the case to a particular management track: small claims, fast track 
and multi-track, according to its the financial value of the claim and its complexity. 
A different trial track will lead to different hearing times and procedures. As can be 
seen from Figure four, the small claims procedure is both simpler and quicker than 
the fast track, which is in turn simpler and quicker than the multi-track. There is no 
time limit for the multi-track procedure, so the trial time will depend on the 
particular case.
 31 
English legal system has two layers - the trial court and the appellate court. The 
appellate court has a hierarchy, with the Court of Appeal below the Supreme of 
Court. The judgment of the first trial is final if appeal to the appellate court is 
denied. For most cases, the appeal hearing is in the Court of Appeal under 
permission or by application. If a case involves a point of law of general public 
importance (for example, it is concerned mainly with statutory interpretation, or 
some other compelling reason leading to serious injustice), the judgment or decision 
of the first trial may be appealed more than once to the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court, even by missing out the Court of Appeal and leapfroging to the 
Supreme Court with the leave of both courts.
32
  
This is very different from a Chinese appeal. Any decisions or rulings in the 
process of the trial court in England can be appealed or reviewed by the higher 
court, (even thought leave to an appeal is required in some cases). This means 
litigants do not need to await the final judgment to appeal if they disagree with the 
judge’s rulings on any procedural measures or decisions in trial which materially 
affect later direction or determine the issue at or after trial. A litigant may appeal 
from a district judge to a circuit judge and from a circuit judge to a High Court 
judge, from a High Court judge to the Court of Appeal.
33
 The difference between 
Chinese appeal and English appeal can be seen clearly from Figures 3 and 4. In 
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England , there are many cases have ended with an interim decision, on the basis of 
which decision there is enough information for litigants to settle without proceeding 
to final judgment. In England, the interim decision helps clear the doubts on the 
preliminary issues, and justifies with reasons the interim remedy, thereby promoting 
negotiations to settle.
34 
Generally, appeals in England are limited to a review rather than a complete 
rehearing, and the appeal will only be allowed if the decision of the lower court was 
wrong or unjust due to serious procedural irregularity, or that the trial judge has 
drawn wrong inferences from the facts.
 35
 Because the general rule is that it is, in its 
reasoning, necessary to obtain permission to appeal, the result is that the opportunity 
to appeal a decision made by a lower court is rather more restricted, compared with 
high rate of second instance hearings in China. Therefore, it is vital in England that 
practitioners be properly prepared for the initial hearing. Such a jurisdictional 
arrangement allows the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court to mainly 
concentrate on legal argument rather than factual argument, and guarantees the 
proper legal resources for an efficient judicial and appellate review.
36 
It seems that, from the trial system, the litigants in China have more chance to 
argue their disputes and to evaluate the final judgment. In the first instance and 
second instance, the panel trial usually follows the normal procedure and has more 
than three judges to hear the case, with the panel being led by the presiding judge. 
Only under Special Procedure is there one judge hearing the case. Does this really 
create more opportunity to correct mistakes in trial? This is discussed in later 
chapters, through a study of the cases; to demonstrate that more panel trials do not 
necessarily present more chance to correct injustice if the panel trials are partial and 
none-transparent in findings of fact and law.
37 
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1.4 Re-Opening of Final Judgment  
An appeal decision or final judgment without appeal may be reopened and 
reconsidered by the court which made it if this is necessary to avoid real injustice in 
exceptional circumstances. England and China may have similar notions of an 
erroneous judgments: there is error in application of the law; there is error in the 
ascertained fact; there is fault in the judge’s exercise of discretion; there is 
outstanding procedural error, which may affect the correctness of the judgment; 
there is malpractice by the judge, who has acted for personal benefit and perverted 
the course of justice
38
. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, there is also an 
error of judgment in England if the lower court has failed to follow a binding 
precedent.
39 
But in a UK civil case, there is hardly any chance to reopen its final judgment. 
In Re Uddin and Couwenbergh v. Valkova,
40
 the Court of Appeal indicated that this 
power can only be invoked where it is demonstrated that the integrity of the earlier 
litigation process, whether at trial or at the first appeal, has been critically 
undermined. Permission is needed to make an application to reopen a final 
determination of an appeal. Such permission is final according to Part 52 of the 
CPR. There is no right of appeal or review from the decision of the judge on the 
application for permission
41
. In England, the reopening of final appeals most often 
occurs in criminal cases. While the criminal is still under sentence, if new evidence 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
27 
is found proving that the conviction was bias and unsafe, he can apply to the judge 
to reopen his case
42
. 
In contrast, a Chinese civil case is easily brought to retrial and reconsideration 
of a final judgment, according to procedure for trial supervision.
43
 It is a different 
process from the appeal grounds and procedures, as showed in Figure 5. If a party 
considers that a legally binding judgment or decision on a civil case contains 
substantial error or injustice, he may apply to the trial court or the next higher court 
for retrial or for petition. While an application for retrial or for petition is made, the 
execution of the judgment or decision is not suspended. When a party to a civil case 
applies for retrial, the application should be made within two years of the judgment 
or decision becoming legally effective. There are no time limits for retrial 
application in these two years. In handling the retrial, the people's court should form 
a new trial panel. No application for retrial can be made against the legally effective 
judgment of a divorce case.
44
  
The retrial supervision may be initiated by a court at its own initiative. If a 
people's courts at a higher levels find that the judgments or decisions made by the 
people's court at lower level contains substantial errors, it may bring the cases up for 
retrial or instruct the people's court at the lower levels to retry the decided issues. 
There is no time limit for the court to initiate a supervision procedure to reopen a 
case. But such a process of initiation is rare, and most of retrial cases are applied for 
by litigants themselves in the two years after the judgment become effective.
45
  
There is considerable controversy in China about unlimited applications for 
permission for retrial. Most scholars
46
 suggest limiting retrial application to only 
once in two years in order to maintain the finality and dignity of legal judgment. 
There is no doubt that such a suggestion sounds quite correct in order to maintain res 
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judicata. But we should first ask what kind of finality and dignity it will bring for 
litigation if malpractice and error occurs at trial but cannot be corrected by the 
appellate court.
47
 In any case, there is no doubt that, reopening a new trial of final 
judgment too easily has been damaging the reputation of the legal system and the 
legal binding force of a judgment, unless there is detailed interpretation and case law 
precedents offering guidance on the possible re-opening of trial proceedings.
48 
 
1.5 Enforcement Measures in England and China 
Under TRIPS, Art. 50, it is mandatory for every member to have provisional 
procedures for preventing infringement of intellectual property rights and preserving 
relevant evidence.
 49
 Procedural remedies should offer instant protection to the party 
concerned before the court makes a ruling to prevent an infringement from 
occurring, and to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement. In 
Arts. 44 – 47, TRIPS sets out a number of remedies to be provided for in the 
national laws of the member countries, including injunctions, damages, the right to 
require infringing goods (or materials and equipment used in their creation) be 
disposed of outside the channels of commerce or destroyed. There is also a right of 
information on how to obtain these remedies. In order to join WTO, since 2000 
China has introduced all TRIPS measures in the Patent Law, the Trademark Law 
and Copyright Law. 
50
 
In China, the Patent Law 2000, and the Trademark Law and Copyright Law 
2001, all stipulate the preliminary nature of an injunction and the content of 
‘evidence preservation or property preservation’. 51  As for the detailed 
implementation of provisional measures, the Supreme Court has made a detailed 
stipulation through judicial interpretation, for example, concerning the qualification 
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of the applicant, the applicable procedure and evidence, security, review, 
compensation for damage when court proceedings are not initiated, etc. The owner, 
the registered proprietor of, or interested person in a trademark, patent or work may 
apply to the people's court for evidence preservation, and property preservation, 
before he brings the action for the purpose of preventing the infringement under the 
circumstances where the evidence could be lost or is difficult to obtain afterwards. 
After the confirmation of the infringement of rights, based upon the request of the 
party concerned, the court can order the defendant to compensate by way of 
damages any infringement of the rights. 
The civil liability for IPR infringement in China normally includes cessation of 
infringements, compensation for losses, elimination of harms and dangers, and the 
making of an apology. Administrative liabilities of IPR infringers includes: 
immediate cessation of the infringing act, confiscation, destruction of infringing 
goods and tools specially used for manufacturing the infringing goods, and fines. 
Offenders who have committed IPR crimes may be punished with imprisonment of 
no more than seven years or criminal detention in China, along with a fine.
52
  
As for England, Figure 6 shows that courts have power to grant interim and 
other injunctions. They have power to grant orders to freeze assets and for the 
seizure of infringing articles. Administrative measures mainly concern customs 
prohibition, and the possibility of arresting the movement of pirated and counterfeit 
goods through the intervention of customs authority at borders. The Customs 
Authority receives and decides on applications for border protection. The Trading 
Standards Authority has powers to make test purchases and to seize goods and 
documents to protect competitors against unfair practices, and to protect consumers’ 
interests. The Independent Television Commission and the Radio Authority 
supervise the broadcasting and comparative advertising and sponsorship.
 53
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But the two countries differ in the process to obtain provisional protection; as 
mentioned above, there is no instant review or appeal in the trial process in China. 
Therefore, if the claimant applying for such provisional measures fails before the 
trial judge, he cannot apply for review to the higher court on such interim decisions. 
This affects the function of interim measures, compared with England. Furthermore, 
in China, all interim measures and injunctions are temporary orders on condition of 
the applicant’s guarantee of undertaking, rather than based on balance of 
convenience to both parties’ loss and interests if not granted54. That is to say, once 
the applicant provides suitable money in its claims to guarantee its application, he 
can get an order to freeze the assets or the infringing undertaking; then he must file a 
case in 15 days after granting of the order. If he does not file a case in 15 days, the 
order automatically becomes invalid and he must pay over the guaranteed money for 
any damages caused to the defendant. The applicant can only get a permanent 
injunction to stop the defendant’s infringement after the final judgment with a full 
trial
55
. On the contrary, English applicant may get a permanent injunction once he 
gets an interim order to stop immediate infringing, if the infringer later does not 
challenge this injunction order by filing a suit. That is why most civil cases in 
England can be ended by the interim injunction. Interim application and appeal of 
interim decision can clearly influence the direction of the whole argument and lead 
to the final settlement. The China interim measures are not mainly to stop immediate 
infringing against the defendant. China interim measures mainly play a role in 
providing evidence for later trial. If IPR owners really want to stop infringing by the 
wrongdoers, they have to report and apply to an administrative authority to 
investigate and stop it
56
. 
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English court experience suggests that interim measures, especially interim 
injunction are a rapid and relatively cheap way of procuring temporary redress. The 
reason is clear:
 
 
 ‘First, the types of remedy, in particular the injunction (interim and permanent) 
and damages are more useful than punishment in the name of the state. There is no 
possibility in criminal procedure of securing an interim order to desist from conduct 
pending the trial, which will take weeks or months to mount; nor are there pre-trial 
procedures, such as discovery, for the extraction of information from a defendant.’ 57 
But in China, the IPR owner mainly relies on administrative bodies to stop the 
manufacture or sale of the infringing products. They take civil action to resolve 
infringement disputes and seek compensation
58
. In particular there is no search order 
available in civil litigation. There is not any detail guidance for litigants to apply for 
a search order in China. The freezing injunction or charging order is only applied for 
and enforced in the execution period after the final judgment.
59 
1.6 Special Administrative Procedure of China 
There are many different administrative agencies that handle different types of 
IPR, including : the patent office ; the administrative bureaus for industry and 
commerce; the trade mark office; the copyright administration, the customs; the 
public security; the bureau for publication, culture and media; product-specific 
agencies, like drug administration in dealing with IP relating to pharmaceuticals
60
.  
The central government administrative agencies are SIPO, SAIC, NCA and 
AIC. SIPO (the State Intellectual Property Office) is dealing with examination of 
patent applications, approval, termination and invalidation with the patent re-
examination board responsible for review of any opposition. These administrative 
organs also supervise patent activities and can mediate in cases of patent 
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infringement under the party’s request. The Trademark Office under the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) is responsible for trademark 
registration, renewal, and assignment and licensing of registered trademark. It also 
has power to search, investigate, mediate any disputes concerning registered 
trademark including infringement. The National Copyright Administration (NCA) is 
responsible for the nationwide administration of copyright, including investigation 
and the imposition of administrative sanctions in the case of copyright infringement. 
Rights holders can register with the General Administration of Customs (AIC) in 
order to attempt to halt infringing goods at the border. This authority is granted by 
Article 53 of the trademark law 2001, which confers the power to handle disputes 
involving the infringements of another person’s exclusive right to the use of a 
registered trademark. All these state agencies have broad powers to deal with IPR 
infringements. 
China has set up a ‘unique’ model by which, alongside the judicial approach, 
IPR infringement cases can also be proactively dealt with by the above IPR 
administrations. This special model was first set up for patent cases in 1985 when 
the first Patent Law came into force. Eventually it has been extended to cover all 
kinds of IPR case. (Such solution only exists in IPR civil cases rather than other civil 
cases. The other civil cases should generally be brought to courts.)
61 
For example in Trademark Law, Art. 52 stipulates that the dispute caused by 
any act of infringing the exclusive right to the use of a trademark, listed in Art. 52 of 
this Law shall be settled by the parties concerned through mediation. If the parties 
concerned are unwilling to submit to mediation or mediation is unsuccessful, the 
registered proprietor or interested person in the trademark may bring an action 
before the people's court or may also request the industry and commerce 
administration department for disposition. If the industry and commerce 
administration department finds the existence of the act of infringement, it can order 
the immediate cessation of the act of infringement, confiscate and destroy the 
infringing goods and equipment for producing the infringing goods or forging the 
signs of the registered trademark, and may impose a fine. A party concerned who 
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disagrees with the decision of disposition may bring an action before the people's 
court within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice of disposition, according 
to the Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China. If the 
infringer fails both to bring an action and to comply with the decision as scheduled, 
the Industry and Commerce Administration Department may apply to the people's 
court for compulsory enforcement. The industry and commerce administration 
department may, upon the request of the party concerned, mediate the compensation 
for the infringement of the exclusive right to the use of the trademark. If the 
mediation is unsuccessful, the party concerned may bring an action before the 
people's court according to CPL.
62
 
The Industry and Commerce Administration Departments are entitled to 
investigate and dispose of the actions of infringing the exclusive right to the use of 
registered trademarks and shall transfer the possible cases to the judicial authorities 
for disposition. The registered proprietor or interested person in a trademark, who 
has evidence to establish that another person is committing or will commit 
infringing act, may apply to the people's court. The court may adopt measures such 
as prohibiting the relevant act and ordering property preservation pending legal 
action.
63
 
Administrative methods are powerful, even including compensation as in a 
civil remedy. As Figure 7 shows, the administrative authorities are empowered to 
inspect, review, order, dispose, license, and supervise individuals to obey the 
regulations and rules. The main administrative measures which they use are 
warnings and monetary fines, which can be ordered together with additional 
measures, such as revocation of a licence, confiscation of proofs and materials used 
for the infringing act, or compensation for damages. Where an act of counterfeiting 
is suspected in violation of the Criminal Law, the administrative authority shall 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
34 
transfer the case to the judicial authority to be prosecuted for criminal liability, at 
most for seven years sentences
64
.  
Whether such administrative intervention to protect IPR is just, fair and 
efficient, is a matter of controversy. One side claims that the administrative 
enforcement carries the weight of government support and makes use of the police’s 
ability to gain entry and investigate premises from which private parties can be 
excluded. Administrative enforcement is seen as the most cost-effective option and 
as much quicker than pursuing the infringer through the courts.
65
 As this suggests, 
the investigative powers that the administrative agencies can exercise is seen as a 
major advantage of the administrative enforcement path
66
. Some rights holders 
choose administrative enforcement as part of a wider strategy of IPR protection 
‘because they are required to issue written penalty decisions and provide copies to 
complainants’.67  
But the doubters agree that only big companies, foreign companies and those 
IPR owners in special relationships with officials can initiate an administrative 
measure to stop infringement and recover compensation. By initiating administrative 
enforcement, the cost of pursuing an action through administrative agencies can be 
more expensive than it originally appears
68. It is reported that ‘a common practice 
among local enforcement officials is to ask for payments, case fees, or donation, 
such as computers and mobile phones from trademark owners in exchange for 
conducting enforcement actions’. Many trademark owners are uncomfortable with 
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paying these fees, as they can be seen as falling into a grey area between bribes and 
legitimate official fees
69
.  
Most administrative organs lack funds, staff and proper working conditions to 
carry out their duties fully. Some argue that administrative measures for trademark 
protection have the side-effect of deterring further trademark infringements, and 
permitting the effective investigation of many serious cases. So reliance on very 
limited resources to stop rampant IPR infringement largely results in showy periodic 
campaigns, and much worse official corruption and government interference in 
judicial process.
70
 
The administrative authority plays an important role in handling IPR infringe-
ments in China
71
. These expansions of power arguably influence the IPR protection 
system. IPR law is mainly private law, and the main function of administrative 
authorities should be administration of public affairs, not private ones. Thus the 
government agencies should not be the main authorities to provide interim remedies, 
although the government agencies have an obligation to secure fair competition in 
the market by preventing infringement. To date, most IPR interim measures in China 
have resulted in and from administrative measures to address infringement.  
‘Relying on too much on administrative measures alone may be detrimental to the promotion 
and development of more stable legal institutions capable of fostering consistent decision-making 
regarding the protection of intellectual property rights, guided not so much by government 
pragmatism as by the rule of law.’72  
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Especially note that there is no any legal connection between requesting 
administrative protection and seeking a civil remedy. In Chapter Two, many cases 
showed that prior administrative measures attacking infringement do not necessarily 
provide fact support in civil remedy. Even if there was an administration bureau 
search result, civil cases have not be given any hint about its nature and how might 
use the evidence obtained from the administration bureau. So far they are treated 
differently and often inconsistently in most cases. 
73
  
 
1.7 Execution Measures 
In terms of legal methods for execution,  Arts. 207-236 of CPR of China, and 
relevant interpretation from the Supreme Court stipulate the procedure of 
enforcement from four angles: application for enforcement action; measures; 
suspension; and termination of enforcement.  
Both countries start with a similar execution process: the winning party must 
take an enforcement application to the court enforcement officer for an order or writ 
of execution. So the judgment will not be enforced by the court automatically if the 
losing party fails to honour the judgment. Both China and England have set out 
various methods of enforcement. But in England it is for a judgment creditor to 
decide how to enforce the judgment, and which method of enforcement is most 
suitable to his case. Satisfaction is unlikely to be recoverable from the judgment 
debtor if using the wrong method. In China, the execution court will discharge all 
execution mechanisms to enforce the judgment once the winning party pays the 
execution fee. 
In England, CPR Parts 70-73 refer back to the RSC and CCR, which mainly 
regulate the enforcement methods. RSC Ords. 46 and 47, and CCR 26 lay down the 
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procedures of execution and seizure. Items necessary for a debtor’s essential life and 
existing business cannot be seized. Persons must not make a forcible entry to any 
premises and must not take goods from the debtor’s person. This balance between 
rights of creditors and debtors also differs from China. Figure 6 also shows that 
Chinese enforcement measures look more powerful to protect the interests of the 
judgment creditor than those of England in scope, strength and execution fee. But in 
terms of the effects, English enforcement rate is much higher than that of the China, 
because England has set up a credit system to trace the debtors’ property, compared 
with the lack of credit system in China.
74 
1.8 Substantive Rights in England and China 
The IPR regime is now becoming a fashionable legal means of protecting 
intellectual results and other original ideas in China
75
. The UK is a developed 
country and IPR protection has been developed over more than three hundred years, 
China is a rapidly developing country, and the history of a relatively complete IPR 
protection in China goes back less than thirty years. Some Chinese textbooks list a 
few examples to prove that ancient China provided some kind of trademark and 
copyright protection during the Sung Dynasty (AD 960-1279)
76
. However, this was 
more a kind of privilege to do business by rewarding an enfranchising license from 
the imperial state, rather than an individual intellectual property rights. 
Since the early 1980s the modern legal system including the IPR substantive 
law has been in force in China. Before 1949 when the People's Republic of China 
was established, there did exist a couple of IPRs statutes promulgated by the 
Nationalist Government (i.e., the so-called Kuomingtang Government), but they 
were cancelled by a shift of government. After the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, the new government issued some regulations to protect copyright 
and trademarks. Unfortunately, all these efforts for establishing a modern IPR 
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system in China came to a standstill after 1957, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976. In 1978, China adopted a remarkable policy known 
as "the policy of reform and opening up" and started to set up sweeping modern 
legal system including an IPR law system. China began re-drafting its IPR laws in 
the early 1980s as a response to new policies geared towards modernizing science 
and technology, towards developing a market economy and attracting foreign 
investment into China.
77
 The first modern patent law in China was passed by the 
National People’s Congress in 1984, as amended by the Standing Committee of 
NPC in 1992 and 2000; the first copyright law was stipulated in 1990 and amended 
in 2001; the first trademark law was adopted in 1983, and amended in 1993 and 
2001. The latest three major IPR laws and other regulations came in the year of 2000 
to conform to international standard to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
So far, China like England has acceded to most international IPR-related 
conventions and treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
the Universal Copyright Convention and the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Plant Variety, etc. Figure 8 shows that China has also 
incorporated the basic requirements of these conventions and treaties into its 
domestic law. China's IPR regime now provides a broad range of protection, besides 
trademarks, copyrights, patents, also including computer programmes, audio and 
video products, new varieties of plant, layout of integrated circuits, domain names, 
internet and enterprise names, trade secrets, etc.
78
  
In order to meet the requirements of joining the WTO and give effective 
meaning to Chinese substantive rights, the law relating to each form of intellectual 
property also defines the nature of the exclusive right in terms of content and 
business activity. For instance, that an invention is the subject of a patent is defined 
principally in Patent Law. This prescribes the various ways of infringements to 
make, sell, and offer to sell, import or use that invention. In general, the ambit of 
what IPR protects in China is as same as that of England, even though the various 
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aspects of the subject may differ in terms of labels and in detailed rules. (See Figure 
8) For example, English Patent law applies to inventions and novel designs which 
are functional in nature and introduce new technical innovation. In China, Patent 
Law protects three objects: invention; utility model; and industrial design. In 
contrast, England uses the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act to protect an 
industrial design or unregistered design. 
79 
In order to resolve possible conflicts between domestic law and the provisions 
of international treaties, China also has provided, in accordance with article 142 of 
the general principle of the Civil Law, that any international treaty would take 
priority over Chinese domestic law in application. If China is a contracting party to 
or accedes to the treaty, ‘in the event of a difference between the provisions of an 
international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China and 
the civil law of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the international 
treaty shall apply…’ 80. From regulation itself, it is clear that China’s procedural law 
permits organizations or individuals to challenge laws and regulations which they 
believe contradict international conventions, but the procedural law does not 
prescribe the way in which, in a specific case, domestic law may be challenge as 
offending an international treaty. Until now lawyers and litigants still have little or 
no opportunity to use this rule in litigation as an applicable ground to change the 
content of domestic law. 
So far, the China’s IPR legal protection structure has basically caught up with 
international standards
81
. In substantive law terms and the scope of protection, China 
cannot be said to lag behind England. It is commonly recognized that China has 
achieved a legal framework for protecting IPR that is comparable to many advanced 
countries, and complies with requirements under TRIPS. Several analyses from 
substantive IPR statutes and regulations have supported the above conclusion with 
the similar result that, even though there are many loopholes and uncertainties in its 
legal context. China has basically set up an international standard of protection on 
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IPR, which provides a broad range of protection in trademarks, copyrights, patents, 
know-how, and against passing off.
82
 In 30 years, the main three IPR laws have been 
amended at least twice, and now China is more active and determined in wielding 
IPR laws to protect domestic economic interests, and to meet the new technology 
challenge such as internet protection
83
. Hence, it seems that a strong IPR regime is 
now in China’s interest.  
1.9 Conclusion 
Both England and China have quite a similar structure for IPR substantive law, 
but there is a fundamental difference between the nature of trial and appeal and the 
administrative enforcement measures. 
China adopts two instances of trial - the first instance trial and the second 
appellate trial, which employs also a full trial procedure to rehear the facts and re-
apply the law, rather than merely being an examination of the law applied in the first 
trial process, as in England. All appeals in England are limited to a review rather 
than a complete rehearing, and most appeals should require permission from trial 
courts or appeal courts.  
The trial judge in China is obliged on the parties’ request to collect evidence 
from public organisations. The Chinese courts have more arbitrary power than 
English courts in controlling the trial and making judicial decisions, which are not 
reviewable or appealable until the final judgment. But any decisions or rulings in the 
process of the trial court in England can be instantly appealed to, or reviewed by, a 
higher court. This means that litigants in England do not need to await the final 
judgment, only then to appeal if they disagree with the judge’s decision on any 
procedural measures or decisions at the trial. Such trial and appeal structure leads to 
a different form of process. English court tries to justify its decision based on 
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procedural legitimacy of each step, instantly clearing up any doubts as to the finality 
of judgment. In the contrast, the Chinese court tries to justify its judgment by the 
double trial of the factors, and relies on a sound final judgment to sustain its interim 
decision and non-transparent process. 84 
The above introduction shows the comparison between the legal institutional 
structures of England and China. They inevitably reflect and are influenced by the 
two countries’ political realities. We cannot avoid the ideological or ethical 
principles behind them. In theory and in practice, China does not technically have an 
independent judiciary or a legal system that operates outside the influence of the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party. This is an important distinction between China 
and Western democracies like the UK, in which the court system is a critical 
component of the checks and balances placed on the other branches of government. 
The Chinese legal system is based on the continental code law model with Chinese 
socialism characteristics and features. 85 Originally it was influenced by the Japanese 
and German legal systems, especially with the 1946 constitution of the Republic of 
China directly absorbing the general context of German and Japanese constitutions 
after WWII
86
. Later its socialist character was influenced by the former Soviet 
Union and Marxist law theory, which holds that the law is but a normative 
expression of the will of the ruling class, formulated in the interests of that class and 
implemented by party-controlled state. 
87  The Marxist-Leninist law theory was 
essentially reflected in the 1954 Constitution, the 1975 Constitution, and the 1978 
Constitution, which were mostly full of ideological statements, with a substantial 
vacuum of individual legal rights and government duties. With the start of the Deng 
Xiaoping's economic reforms from 1978, China's parliament - the National People's 
Congress in 1982, adopted a new state constitution focusing on economic 
construction and economic modernisation. In the last 10 years with more and more 
Chinese students and judges having chances to study or get legal training in the US 
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and the UK, the common law model is beginning to influence, especially in the 
competition law and business law fields. 88 
The 1982 Constitution has been implemented and revised three times over the 
last 30 years, which has set up a basic structure for China to adapt into a modern 
civil society. The Constitution has four chapters: general program, basic rights of the 
citizen, state power, and the state symbol. But it still keeps silent about the 
relationship between the party, government and judiciary, and has no mechanism for 
investigating violation of the constitution.
89  
A significant point about the modern legal system is the judiciary's independ-
ence and the separation of powers, which provides restraint on the exercise of 
majority power in government. Given China's socialist and non-democratic political 
system and practice, China's government and the Communist Party maintain their 
autocratic rule in every field of society; the existence of the rule of law in China has 
been widely debated. Scholars regard China as a country of rule by law with law 
used by the state as an instrument for social control
90. There is basically no clear 
boundary between party politics and government policy and judicial independence 
under such a structure. As one typical political academic said, the CCP (Chinese 
Communalist Party) took its political program to every level and aspect of 
contemporary Chinese society: 'it determines the direction of society and 
government, there is no such thing as government policy independent from the 
CCP..., in this view, as a matter of fact, the CCP is the only political representation 
of all social forces, institutes, and classes of PRC'. 
91 
 In contrast, the UK is a ‘Parliamentary democracy’ with a ‘constitutional 
monarch’. Parliament consists of the Monarch, the House of Commons and the 
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House of Lords 
92. The UK enjoys parliamentary supremacy with the rule of law and 
Acts of Parliament are among the most important sources of the constitution. There 
is power separation and role definition and constraints between Parliament, 
Government, and the courts. Parliament's role is in making legislation and 
supervision over the law’s enforcement and governance; the Government's role is in 
the execution of law and governing society; courts independently apply law to 
specific cases and review Government's execution and governing in specific cases. 
Under such a political system, every institution has a duty to finish its work properly 
in order to make the result accountable and justifiable to other institutions and 
society and the public. It is very difficult to blame the malpractice or wrongs in the 
scope of its duty on other institutions or the general system. While under the 
Chinese political system, there is no enforceable power separation and role 
constraint between the People’s Congress, the Government and the courts, the 
Communist Party has absolute prior power leading the direction and objectives of 
every institution (including judiciary, government and the army ), which is not 
accountable and constrainable by any other social force. Under such a structure, it is 
very easy for one institution in China to cover its internal problems and blame its 
working wrongs on other institutions, the party’s interference, or uncivilised 
society
93. 
It is often said that each system of law has its own procedures, institutions and 
structure which accords with its own legal culture, ethics and values development. 
This may differ from other jurisdictions, in interpretations and construction of the 
substantive laws
94. When talking about the barrier in judicial independence and 
political reform, the Chinese government and quite a few scholars stress that ‘the 
western legal system [judicial independence] is embedded in and abstracted from 
particular historical and social experiences and theoretical contexts. Using such 
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western ideology as a critical standard to check the Chinese legal system and social 
situation is naive, simply labelling the particular experience as a universal 
theoretical framework for a legal system’. 95  
Also there is no perfect legal system in the world, even in countries where the 
separation of powers is well-established, as in the UK. Academics have worried that 
over the last 15 years, for example, the increased use of delegated legislation, and 
especially the granting of Henry VIII powers, has to some extent eroded the ability 
of the legislature to control the executive, while attempts to limit judicial review 
threaten the ability of the judiciary to limit executive power
96. (At least in the UK, 
however, the principle of separation of powers is widely accepted, and is a central 
tenet of the (unwritten) constitution.)  
But how far can a country deviate, because of its specific system and reality, 
from the basic judicial function and IPR substantive law to achieve an accountable 
judgment, no matter how different the social background is? This is the principal 
argument of the whole thesis: Is there a bottom line standard for adjudication? 
Among Chinese academics, whether on the left, against applying the western 
model, or on the right, supporting introducing western models to reform the Chinese 
legal system, it seems both agree that ‘ what is truly important is for us to discover, 
examine, and study concretely the shortcomings and merits of influence on and 
interference in the legal system (whatever its sources), and to determine how to 
adjust and improve the performance of China's judiciary , as well as make it just, 
efficient, and effective.’ 97  
The next chapters will not compare which judicial system is better. Rather, 
based on these specific situations it will instead explore how much difference in the 
manner and application of IPR law can be accepted for an individual state to choose, 
while maintaining the basic requirement for IPR law to meet the international 
conventions adopted. How much can China choose to allow judicial management to 
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differ while achieving the general principles in IPR substantive law? In other words, 
can we say China has arrived at the accountable level in enforcement of IPR as 
reflected in its law? Has China undertaken an inseparable connection between the 
means of enforcing IPR and the IP rights to be enforced in its statutes? If not, where 
is the solution?  
In the later chapters, I will examine in detail both countries’ methods of dealing 
with case management and interim measures (in Chapter Two); the interpretation of 
IPR substantive law in specific cases (in Chapter Three); the binding force of final 
judgments (in Chapter Four), and the basic criteria for evaluation of error judgment 
(in Chapter Five).  
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Figure 5: the reasons to initiate appeal and retrial procedure in China 
Appealing reasons art.147 Retrial reasons article 179 
If a party refuses to accept a judgment of 
first instance , he shall have the right to file 
an appeal to the next higher level within  15 
days time limit for judgment, 10 days for 
ruling decision, from receipt of the first trial 
judgment or rulings  
New evidence is sufficient to 
reverse the original judgment or 
ruling; 
The principal evidence in the 
original judgment or ruling is 
insufficient; 
The application of law in the 
original judgment or ruling is 
erroneous; 
The court violates the legal 
procedure that may have 
prejudiced the correctness of the 
judgment or ruling; 
The judge is found to have taken 
bribes, conducted malpractice 
for personal benefits, and 
misused the law in the 
adjudication of the case 
Procedure By petition to appeal court  Subject to the approval of the 
court, within 2 years limitation 
period for parties’ request ,after 
the judgment or ruling becomes 
effective; no time limit for 
initiation by court  
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Figure 6: Comparison of interim orders and provisional measures in 
England and China 
Order name Type of case Respondent 
Application 
stage 
Application 
procedure 
R25.1, CPA 1997 ,S 
7, search order, 
(中国:证据保全 
The evidence 
preservation 
measures, Art 81) 
Real possibility of 
defendant destroying 
vital evidence  
Authorising a party to 
enter premises ,search 
for and seize  evidence 
or property 
defendant 
 
 
On issue or pre-
action 
 
 
Urgent 
Applications 
without notice to 
the respondent, 
but with a 
hearing in court 
 
R 31.17 
Disclosure against 
non-party 
(China: CPL art.67
法院取证) 
Requiring the non-party 
to disclose relevant 
document that is in his 
control and is not 
privileged from 
inspection  
Non-party After issue Application with 
notice 
 
 
 
 
R31.16 
Pre-action 
disclosure 
(中国:证据披露交
换 The evidence 
exchange rules art 
133) 
 
Disclosure of document 
or inspection of 
property before a claim 
Party or 
non-
party/likely 
defendant 
Pre-action Application with 
notice 
 
 
 
R25.1  
Freezing injunction 
(中国:财产保全 
Property 
preservation,Art 
105.) 
Restraining a 
party from removing or 
dealing with any assets 
on the risk of 
dissipation 
 
Defendant 
 
 
On issue or pre-
action 
 
 
Applications 
without notice to 
the respondent, 
but with a 
hearing in court  
 
r.25.6 
Order for interim 
payments  
(中国:先予执行, 
CPR art 109) 
Require the defendant 
to pay an advance 
payment on account of 
damages, debt he 
owed, and enable the 
claimant avoid suffering 
the financial hardship 
of a strong case on 
liability. 
Defendant After the time 
for 
acknowledging 
service  
Application with 
notice 
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Figure 6-2: Methods of execution in England and China 
Methods of enforcement 
Choice of 
court 
Enforcement procedure 
Obtain the judgment debtor’s 
information by applying a court 
order  
(中国:法院向金融机构查询 art.221 
of CPL) 
where the 
debtor resides 
or carries on 
business 
applying an order to require                          
the debtor on oath to affirm his 
assets                                                   
Obtain the judgment debtor’s 
information by employing an enquiry 
agent to investigate the debtor’s 
assets 
(China: Requesting order Art.242) 
  
 
 
 
a writ or warrant of execution 
(中国:查扣,拍卖,变卖 auction order  
Art.247) 
the court in 
which the 
order being 
enforced was 
made 
applying an execution against 
goods: 
seizure, removal and sale of 
goods by public auction   
A charging order  
(中国:强制搬迁,退出 Compulsory 
moving out Art.247) 
.. File an application with notice for 
an interim charging order on a 
judgment debtor’s land or certain 
specified securities, or an order 
for possession of land.      
A third party debt order 
(中国:第三人协助执行义务 Art .242 
third party paying order) 
.. An order requiring a third party 
who owes money to the debtor 
to pay it directly to the creditor.(a 
bank account or building society 
account is often the target of 
such an order.) 
An attachment of earnings order 
(中国:单位协助执行义务 Art 243, 
salary deduction order) 
.. An order requiring the debtor’s 
employer to make deductions 
from his earnings and pay them 
to the creditor. 
Insolvency proceedings 
(中国: 对企业的破产清算) 
.. File the petition for bankruptcy of 
judgment debtor with debt £750 
or over; or a winding up petition 
for a company. 
Punishments for contempt of 
court(for breach of an order) 
(中国:妨碍民诉的强制措施.罚款,拘
留,刑责 CPL art.109 ) 
.. By an order of imprisonment 
/committal for up to 2years;  
By ordering the payment of a 
fine; 
By a writ of sequestration; 
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Figure 7: Comparison of the protection routes and authorities in China 
 
 
 
 
The protection 
routes 
Enforcement authorities Legal remedy 
enforcement route 
through  
Administrative 
authorities 
State Intellectual Property 
Office (SIPO) for cases of 
examining invention and 
granting patents.   
warnings, monetary fines, 
revocation of a license, 
confiscation of proofs and 
materials used for the 
infringing act, destruction 
of infringing goods, 
suspension of customs 
clearance for goods 
involving infringements, 
detention 
National Copyright 
Administration (NCA)   for 
supervision of copyright cases 
the Customs Administration 
for supervision of import and 
export of any infringing goods  
Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (AIC) at all 
levels above county for cases 
of trade-mark, tradename, 
unfair-competition.  
the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine of 
the State (AQSIQ) and local 
Technical Supervision Bureaus 
(TSBs) and the Ministry of 
Culture (MC) and Culture 
Bureaus (CBs), 
Criminal 
enforcement route 
the Ministry of Public Security 
(MPC), 
the police station for criminal 
investigation about IP 
monetary fines, criminal 
detention,imprisonment up 
to 7 years 
Civil enforcement 
route 
The people’s court at all level 
for trial of IP cases 
cessation of infringements, 
making apology, 
compensation of damages 
(actual loss, infringer’s 
profit), reasonable 
expenses to remedy the 
damage. 
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Figure 8: The main Intellectual Property Laws in force in China and England  
The protected objects of IP UK Resources China resources 
Literary, artistic works;  
Unregistered design, craft;  
Computer programs; 
Presentation of information; 
Audio or video programs or 
recordings; 
The Copyright,Designs and 
patents Act (CDPA 1988); 
the Berne Convention; 
the Rome Convention; 
the Universal Copyright 
Convention; 
WTO; 
WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty; 
TRIPs 
Copyright Law of the PRC 
Paris Industrial Property 
Convention 
the Berne Convention 
the Rome Convention 
the Universal Copyright 
Convention 
WTO 
WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 
TRIPs 
business reputation attached 
to goods or services 
unregistered trade mark, 
domain names, internet and 
enterprise names, business 
name, titles or badge of a 
trader, Business confidence, 
know-how, 
Trade secret information 
CDPA 1988 
Tort of passing off 
Fair trade Act 
Competition Act 1998 
Company and business Names 
1999 
Enterprise Act 
TRIPs 
anti-unfair competition law 
of PRC 
Regulation on Business 
Name Registration 
Company Law 
TRIPs (Agreement on 
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Chapter Two: Case Management and Trial Process 
As we know, intellectual property is intangible property, rather than physical 
property. IPR can be exploited in different ways, and are related to a series of stages 
in the commercial life of products - their creation and preparation for sale, their 
distribution, their ultimate user, etc. As a result, frequently, IPR cases involve more 
evidence discovery, interim injunction, staying and pending process orders because 
of the complexity and flexibility of IPR and the difficulty of finding original or 
secondary infringers.  
Much use is made of pre-action issues, interlocutory proceedings and proce-
dural remedies in IPR cases, e.g.: applications for interim orders to freeze or seize 
the infringing property or equipment; orders for disclosure of evidence; and interim 
payments or interim damages before the final remedy or judgment. This is a typical 
of the nature of IPR litigation. By contrast, in other civil cases, interlocutory 
injunctions are relatively rare
1
.  
Therefore the availability and use of interim measures is extremely important in 
terms of all IP rights. An interim request may be applied for by the applicant to curb 
the making of infringing copies of a work of copyright, or to destroy some article in 
an infringer’s possession which is used for making infringing copies. At the same 
time, it may also be applied to breach the opponent's privacy or confidence, or 
restrain the development of similar goods or service, or to shut down the defendant’s 
business. 
Because many interim issues occur before or at the trial, this means that there 
are many pre-trial requests which become the subject of decisions. Oral hearings and 
other forms of proof are common in IPR cases: seeking to adduce evidence or to 
exclude specific evidence; looking to stay infringement proceeding while awaiting a 
revocation decision; striking out a claim because of abuse of process or issue 
estoppels. The trial office has a lot of power to grant or deny such requests.  
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There is no doubt that each interim decision directly affects the final result of 
the case. For most IPR infringement cases, often the ultimate resolution of a case 
may occur through an interim measure or injunction. That means the whole case 
may end or the ultimate award may become unnecessary after interim measures are 
decided in the early stages. 
 In England, many IPR disputes are in fact settled, dismissed or withdrawn 
prior to full trial following an interim decision
2
. A kind of mini-trial (decision-
making process) often takes place before the real trial, mainly to reach prima facie 
decisions on any issues occurring before trial
3
. But in China, most IPR disputes are 
ended only after a full trial and appeal process.  
Today the judicial power in England and China are quite similar, even though 
in theory the trial system is adversarial in England, and inquisitorial in China.
4 
Under the CPR, the court has general powers to achieve legitimate judicial aims, or 
concerns in relation to any given cause of action.
5 
These powers include identifying 
the issues at an early stage and deciding what should be determined summarily and 
what should proceed to trial. Also relevant here are: adjournments; extensions of 
time; directions for trials of separate issues and so forth; the power to take any other 
step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the 
overriding objective; and the power to impose a sanction for non compliance of the 
court order. The court is free to rule on the measures it considers appropriate for the 
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specific case and is not strictly bound to rule on the specific measures sought by the 
plaintiff. There is huge scope for judicial flexibility and invention in management of 
a case. These broad-ranging powers can be exercised, in most cases, by the court of 
its own initiative, not only on application by a party.6 
It seems that the judge in both countries has absolute power, through interim 
decisions, to control the case through to final judgment. But a reading of the case 
law reveals that, unlike the arbitrary decisions of China courts, the courts in England 
always firmly and consistently maintain appropriate procedures for the disposal of 
cases. They are also very alert to safeguard the equal position of both sides against 
any serious risk of injustice at the interim stage.  
This chapter will analyse how judges in the two countries manage IPR cases to 
ensure a fair and accountable trial, and how a judge may make an interim order or 
decision, to deal with pre-trial or trial issues, before final judgment. 
2.1 Case Management and Trial Process in England 
2.1.1 Issues to Be Decided Based on Clear Case Management 
There are a lot of interlocutory matters and many more applications for court 
orders in IPR cases. In England, the courts first determine a clear purpose through 
case management to recognize the pre-issue or interim issue, and to guarantee that 
each case process reflects its circumstance and ensures a smooth trial. The court will 
hold a pre-trial mediation under CPR and cost penalties may be incurred if they 
refuse reasonable request to mediate even if they ultimately win the case
7
.  
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The court’s general powers of management are set out in CPR, r. 3.1(2), and it 
can be seen that they are quite comprehensive:8  
Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may – 
(a) extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or 
court order (even if an application for extension is made after the time for compliance has 
expired); 
(b) adjourn or bring forward a hearing; 
(c) require a party or a party’s legal representative to attend the court; 
(d) hold a hearing and receive evidence by telephone or by using any other method of 
direct oral communication; 
(e) direct that part of any proceedings (such as a counterclaim) be dealt with as 
separate proceedings; 
(f) stay the whole or part of any proceedings or judgment either generally or until a 
specified date or event; 
(g) consolidate proceedings; 
(h) try two or more claims on the same occasion; 
(i) direct a separate trial of any issue; 
(j) decide the order in which issues are to be tried; 
(k) exclude an issue from consideration; 
(l) dismiss or give judgment on a claim after a decision on a preliminary issue; 
(ll) order any party to file and serve an estimate of costs; 
(m) take any other step or make any other order for the purpose of managing the case 
and furthering the overriding objective 
Once the claim is served and defended, the court will begin its case manage-
ment by summoning a pre-trial meeting of the parties to set a timetable, with the 
lawyers indicating how long they are likely to take in cross-examining each witness 
and statement. The court will give directions on the main issues in the trial (e.g., 
direction on the extent of the evidence, applications, costs), identifying the trial 
issues at an early stage, and, where appropriate, directing the trial of a preliminary 
issues, etc.  
In practice, the courts ensure that the issues to be decided should emerge from 
the pleadings and they define those issues carefully. Further, they consider whether 
the preliminary decision on one or more issues would finally determine the dispute 
or at least substantially reduce the length of any further trial, because it is certainly 
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in the interests of both sides if the main issues of law could be properly resolved 
without the added expense of a full trial of liability based on all the evidence.
9
  
The trial timetable will be arranged and given initially by the court, when the 
case is allocated to a track. The nature of the claims, the amount of compensation 
claimed, and the complexity of the case determine what procedural tracks the judge 
will allocate. At the same time, once the track is fixed, the overriding objective for 
this kind track is also fixed. Therefore the litigation process continues in accordance 
with legal recourse, costs and evidence disclosure, and remedies within the track. In 
practice it is very difficult, and expensive to change the original track or apply for 
other tracks.
10
  
In Dyson Ltd v Qualtex (UK) Ltd,
11
 Jacob LJ analysed how to cut legal costs 
and try the real claim. While confirming the trial judge’s contribution, he said:12 
But there are lessons to be learned about how to try a copyright or design right case 
of this sort, i.e. one with a host of overlapping and similar points. There will seldom be any 
point in ploughing through them all. Cases like this call for effective and early case 
management to control them.  
First it will be important that the claimant should identify with precision each and 
every “design” he relies upon. Just claiming design rights in parts, for instance, will not do 
— each aspect said to constitute a “design” should be spelt out. This will focus minds from 
the outset. Well-advised claimants will confine themselves to their best case “designs.” In 
principle the defendant should then plead to each, raising challenges to originality or 
alleging commonplace and saying, if it is so contended, that one of the exclusions of must-
match or must-fit apply. There may be cases where, either by agreement at that early stage, 
or by application to court pre-defence, the issues can be limited to sample issues even at 
that stage. 
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In those cases where there is no earlier identification of such issues, there should be 
a case management conference at which such issues are identified. They should be such 
that they will in principle determine the whole case. Such an approach will obviate the 
evidence covering unnecessary detail, and very likely much else. It will considerably 
shorten the trial… Following identification of the sample issues the parties should produce 
a sort of Scott schedule, identifying each design relied upon, and each of the defences 
raised to that design. In that way it should be possible for all to keep the case within 
proportionate bounds. 
Case management may only ever be an approximation, but it is a very powerful 
guide both for the court and parties. Such a trial arrangement is like a trial contract, 
which will direct all participants in the hearing process. The hearing judge will 
actively manage the case to ensure that it stays on track, and that the proceedings 
follow the established timetable so far as possible. In doing so, the hearing officer 
will use it as one criteria to judge later whether one side’s delay, or a departure from 
the timetable, is serious or not, and whether he or she should grant or dismiss a 
further application. By looking to ensure that each application is dealt with fairly, 
the trial judge will act not only in the interests of the parties themselves, but also in 
the wider interests of the administration of justice and in furtherance of the 
overriding objective.
13
  
For the parties, once proceedings are commenced, they must be ready to 
comply with the court’s case management directions. The court has power to give 
orders and impose sanctions for any failure to comply with interim orders. Under 
CPR, r 1.4(1), the court is required to “further the overriding objective by actively 
managing cases”, and under r. 1.4(2) active case management includes:14  
(a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other in the conduct of the 
proceedings; 
(b) identifying the issues at an early stage; 
(c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly 
disposing summarily of the others; 
(d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved; 
(e) encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the 
court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such procedure; 
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(f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case; 
(g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case; 
(h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the cost 
of taking it; 
(i) dealing with as many aspects of the case as it can on the same occasion; 
(j) dealing with the case without the parties needing to attend at court; 
(k) making use of technology; and 
(l) giving directions to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and efficiently 
2.1.2 Appeal to Review Constrained by Case Management 
For an appeal court, the case track and its trial arrangement constitute the first 
criteria to evaluate whether or not the trial court has given a fair and equal treatment 
to litigants, whether or not the court has given too much consideration to one side’s 
situation, or has ignored the other side’s needs, and whether or not it is now 
necessary to interfere with the trial judgment because of procedural irregularity. 
The right to appeal promotes transparency and confidence in the process. 
However, decisions on preliminary issues can save a great deal of time and cost, 
only if appeal courts are reluctant to interfere. A balance must therefore be struck 
between finality and procedural legitimacy. However, another reason for reluctance 
to interfere is that the trial judge might be better placed than an appeal court to 
decide the issue. In Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton,
15
 the House of Lords took 
the view that the function of an appellate court was not to exercise an independent 
discretion of its own. It must defer to the judge's exercise of his discretion and must 
not interfere with it merely upon the ground that the members of the appellate court 
would have exercised the discretion differently:
16
  
The function of the appellate court is initially one of review only. It may set aside the 
judge's exercise of his discretion on the ground that it was based upon a misunderstanding 
of the law or of the evidence before him or upon an inference that particular facts existed 
or did not exist, which, although it was one that might legitimately have been drawn upon 
the evidence that was before the judge, can be demonstrated to be wrong by further 
evidence that has become available by the time of the appeal; or upon the ground that there 
has been a change of circumstances after the judge made his order that would have 
justified his acceding to an application to vary it. 
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In Hadmor, the House of Lords, overturning the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, restored the judge’s refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction. 
Similar sentiments were expressed, albeit in a different context, in Ashmore v 
Corp of Lloyd's,
17
 where the plaintiffs, underwriting syndicates, claimed damages 
from the defendant, Lloyd's, for failure to take reasonable care to warn names of 
serious breaches of underwriting rules which caused the plaintiffs’ large losses. At 
the beginning of the hearing, the judge ordered a trial of three preliminary points of 
law as to whether Lloyd's owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, to be decided on the 
basis of facts pleaded in the points of claim referring to the relationship arising upon 
a name becoming a member of Lloyd's. The plaintiff disagreed with the order for 
preliminary issue arrangement, and brought appeal on the ground that the question 
of duty of care for defendant could not to be decided in advance of oral evidence, 
but should be determined by a full trial under consideration of all the circumstances.  
The Court of Appeal set aside the judge's order and supported the plaintiff on 
the grounds that, the points of claim identified by the judge did not cover the 
plaintiffs' allegation that, Lloyd's had assumed a later duty of care in tort by their 
approval of the letter to names. Further, the question of the duty of care ought not to 
be decided in advance of oral evidence which the plaintiffs wished to adduce to 
show that comments made by committee members constituted admissions that 
Lloyd's owed a duty of care to names. But the House of Lords allowed a further 
appeal from the defendant, and held that plaintiffs to an action did not have a right to 
have their case tried to conclusion in such a manner as they thought fit and 
necessary, after all the evidence on both sides had been adduced. In any trial court it 
is the trial judge who has control of the proceedings. It is part of his duty to identify 
the crucial issues and to see they are tried as expeditiously and as inexpensively as 
possible:
18 
 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
64 
The appellate court should be reluctant to entertain complaints about a judge who 
controls the conduct of proceedings and limits the time and scope of evidence and 
argument. So too, where a judge, for reasons which are not plainly wrong makes an 
interlocutory decision or makes a decision in the course of a trial the decision should be 
respected by the parties and if not respected should be upheld by an appellate court unless 
the judge was plainly wrong.  
Lord Roskill emphasised not only the desirability for finality, but also that the 
judge was in the best position to decide the issues:
19  
... if from [the] pleadings it were possible to identify one or more issues a decision on 
which would either finally determine the dispute or at least substantially reduce the length 
of any further trial, it is right that the judge, of course after recognising, as did Gatehouse 
J., the possible hazards of trying preliminary issues, should order such issues to be tried 
first. A trial judge who has had control of the proceedings in its interlocutory stages is in a 
far better position to deal with these matters than any appellate court can be. That is 
especially true in the present case where Gatehouse J. had not only listened to part of a 
lengthy opening speech but also to almost as lengthy argument whether the already 
amended points of claim should be re-amended.  
The principle that an appeal court should respect the case management in the 
first trial and be reluctant to interfere into the ruling decision, was also reflected in 
Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams.
20
 The House of Lords clarified the role of 
appeal courts in relation to lower courts and highlighted that it was not open to the 
Court of Appeal to embark on the issue of substantiality afresh unless the judge had 
misdirected himself.  
Not only do these cases demonstrate the powerful function of case manage-
ment, but also the strong emphasis on finality in proceedings. In the particular case, 
the support, at appeal, of Gatehouse J.’s ruling, effectively determined the final 
judgment. He had decided that, at the start of the hearing, Lloyd’s owed the 
plaintiffs no duty of care. If the decision of the Court of Appeal had been allowed to 
stand, setting aside the trial court’s order that there was no duty, then the trial court 
would have had further to consider the degree of the duty, and damages for the 
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plaintiff, based on the appellate decision on the preliminary issue. In the event, since 
the ruling of Gatehouse J. was upheld, the plaintiff’s pleadings ended with the 
preliminary decision, thereby substantially reducing the length of any further trial. In 
the House of Lords, Lord Templeman referred to the following observation of Ralph 
Gibson L.J., with whom the other Lords Justices had agreed:
21
  
If the decision is in favour of the plaintiffs, the judge, having defined the relevant 
duty, may logically proceed to hear evidence in order to decide whether Lloyd's acted in 
breach of duty and the consequences of any breach. If Lloyd's owed no duty to each 
plaintiff, then the action will be at an end without further delay, expense or harassment of 
witnesses. 
The effect of upholding Gatehouse J.’s decision was therefore significantly to 
reduce the costs and delays involved in a full trial. 
2.1.3 Judicial Decisions Influenced by Overriding Objects 
A trial is not static, and trial courts need to respond to unpredictable turns of 
event. Consequently, English judges do not rigidly follow the original case 
management in considering later interim applications in the trial. They look to the 
changes occurring in the trial, and, in a balanced manner, consider their effect on the 
original case management strategy, making further flexible decisions regarding 
applications. The circumstances to be taken into account may vary according to each 
case. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, with the court seeking to do 
justice between the parties in light of the overriding objective. The court always 
fully considers the purpose and function of the interim action. 
In keeping to the managed case timetable, the court further considers the 
fundamental procedural design enumerated in 'the overriding objective' of the Civil 
Procedure Rules (CPR). This overriding objective is defined in Part 1 of the CPR. 
We have seen that 'active case management' lies at its heart, the requirements under 
CPR, r. 1(4) having already been set out. The overriding objective incorporates a 
number of elements: those of 'saving expense'; of dealing with cases in ways that are 
'proportionate to the amount of money involved, to the importance of the case, to the 
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complexity of the issues and to the financial position of each party'; of 'ensuring that 
[cases are] dealt with expeditiously and fairly'; as well as 'allotting to [cases] an 
appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot 
resources to other cases'.
22 
The parties have an obligation under the CPR to assist the 
court in attaining its overriding objective.
23
  
'Active case management', which is extensively but not exhaustively defined in 
the CPR, includes the court's power to deliver 'directions to ensure that the trial of a 
case proceeds quickly and efficiently'.
24
 The trade marks registrar is not explicitly 
subject to the CPR, but trade mark disputes are governed by the Trade Mark Rules 
2000 (as amended).
25  
Provision is made, however, for a case management 
conference in r. 36, and for a pre-trial hearing in r. 37. Under both these provisions 
the registrar is given wide discretionary powers, and there is an appeal from any 
decision of the registrar to the High Court.
26
 It may be presumed that the same 
criteria apply as under the CPR.
27
  
In H Young (Operations) Ltd v Medici Ltd,
28
 for example, the High Court, 
sitting as an appellate court in a case involving trade mark infringement, gave a 
proportionate and balanced consideration to whether or not to allow the defendant’s 
application to adduce expert evidence. Considering the expert’s role in the case, 
Laddie J. thought it unlikely that the evidence would have any practical influence on 
the trial. To allow the expert evidence would, on the other hand, bring huge delays 
in hearing the case, bearing in mind that both sides had agreed to expedite matters. 
The defendant had applied the possibility of adducing expert evidence in a 
management conference before the Master, who made a case management order 
giving the parties permission to apply for a directions hearing in respect of the 
expert evidence. The expert evidence was meant to demonstrate that there were 
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different clothing sectors and that the defendant's sector was not in conflict with the 
claimant's sector. It was also intended to support the counter-claim to restrict the 
claimant's specification to the sectors in which it sold its goods, a market allegedly 
different to the defendant’s sector. But the claimant’s view was that there was no 
need for evidence as to the structure and divisions in the clothing market, and that 
the defendant's witnesses of fact were not, in any case, familiar with the claimant's 
sector.  
Just before the scheduled trial date, the defendant made a second application 
for expert evidence. Laddie J. held that there was no adequate explanation as to the 
lateness of the application. This was particularly important in view of the trial court's 
original order and the fact that the defendant had already been the subject of a 
useless order because it had not lodged its evidence on time. The defendant should 
have realised the importance of making the application sufficiently early enough for 
the evidence to be adduced. 
Moreover, the timing of the application put the trial at risk. The defendant had 
been looking for an expert for three weeks but had not notified the claimant of its 
intention of making this application until two weeks after beginning its search. If the 
application were allowed, it would give the claimant only one week to find a 
suitable expert and to obtain a suitable expert report. So allowing the application 
would mean that the parties were not on an equal footing. 
In any case, the judge was unconvinced that the evidence would make a 
significant difference to the relevant issues. The structure of the clothing market was 
not likely to be a complicated issue requiring expert evidence. Both sides said they 
did not want to vacate the trial date and there was no real reason to do so now. So 
the application was refused in this case. 
In an intellectual property context, the need for a balanced consideration was 
also emphasised in T-Mobile (UK) Ltd v O2 Holdings Ltd.
29
 The Trade Marks 
Registrar had awarded (on O2’s application) a partial revocation of marks that had 
been registered by T-Mobile. Later, O2 (who had now registered similar marks of its 
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own) applied for invalidation of the same marks. The Registrar, whose view was 
upheld by the Hearing Officer, had taken the view that O2’s application for 
invalidation amounted to an abuse of process, the issues being essentially those 
considered in Chapter four of the thesis. On appeal, Amanda Michaels emphasised 
that, ‘an appellate court should in my view show a real reluctance, but not the very 
highest degree of reluctance, to interfere in the absence of a distinct and material 
error of principle. A decision does not contain an error of principle merely because it 
could have been better expressed.’30 The judge also noted the concerns expressed by 
the Registrar that such applications “should only be entertained if they serve some 
purpose, having regard to the continuing interests and rights of the parties”, and not 
if they raise only academic and hypothetical questions.
31 
In the end, however, the 
judge held that the marks in issue might still have some impact on O2’s rights or 
activities, and so allowed an appeal against the Hearing Officer’s decision. 
2.1.4 Judicial Decisions Based on Ensuring Parties on Equal 
Footing 
It is obvious that there is no fair judgment without an equal treatment to both 
sides. Parties may be quite different because of their respective financial situations, 
information resources or personal ability. But English court always tries to treat both 
sides’ arguments equally and makes an interim decision based on overriding objects 
to ensure the treatment of both sides is fair and equal, whether at the case 
management stage or in the trial process. Indeed, ‘ensuring that the parties are on an 
equal footing’ is an overriding objective under the CPR.32 The following examples, 
all of which involve intellectual property disputes, can illustrate the factors the 
courts will take into account. 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
69 
In Markem Corporation Ltd v Zipher Ltd,
33 
the trial judge had decided to allow 
the applicants, in a patent entitlement action, to delay bringing a claim for breach of 
confidence until the entitlement issues had been resolved. In allowing the appeal, 
Jacob L.J. stressed how a delayed evidence application can significantly affect the 
fair trial and equal treatment. It was an abuse of process (and a breach of their duties 
under CPR, r. 1.1(2)) for the applicants to delay, once they knew they had a viable 
claim for breach of confidence. It was important to allow the respondents sufficient 
time to search for and prepare their evidence. Therefore the court should dismiss 
such evidence disclosure or extend the time for defendant.  
In Einstein Trade Mark,
34
 Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. highlighted the need, to keep a 
fair trial, eliminating any element of “surprise”. This is not only requirement for 
both parties, but also for the judge. In a dispute on trade mark revocation, the 
hearing officer had gone beyond the issues raised in the written submissions of the 
parties.
35 
Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. observed that:
36  
the registrar was required to adjudicate fairly and impartially on the matters in issue 
and should not become embroiled in the presentation of either side's case against the 
other.37 If he considers that an argument on one side or another needed to be explored in 
more detail, he should invite the parties to make representations on the points on which he 
required further assistance ... [Where the parties] have opted for determination on the 
basis of written submissions, the hearing officer should write to both sides informing them 
of the points of concern and giving them an opportunity to respond. Irrespective of whether 
submissions were made orally or only in writing, the registrar's decision should not be 
based on a point of substance which did not, before the close of submissions, form part of 
the case that the parties were required or invited to address. 
He concluded that the hearing officer should have given them an opportunity to 
respond to the grounds on which he proposed to reach his decision.  
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Generally, when a later application brings substantial changes to the original 
case arrangement, the court should first consider whether there is an acceptable 
reason for such application. The court should consider denying the application if its 
role is limited and no good reason has been shown for the applicant not to make it 
earlier. The court may allow such application, but subject to conditions, if it finds it 
is a substantial issue which might directly affect the later trial direction. The court 
sensibly considers the whole situation under the overriding direction in exercising its 
powerful discretion. It would not be open to courts to employ their discretion to 
prevent litigants from putting forward allegations central to their argument, but they 
can use CPR, r. 32 to control the waste of court time and costs, preventing prolixity 
by controlling the manner in which cases are presented.
38 
 
Timing is not the only issue which can arise. In Columbia Picture Industries v 
Robinson,
39
 the claimants alleged that the defendant was a video pirate and claimed 
that he had copied 104 films, infringing copyright, registered trademark and, 
additionally, being guilty of the tort of passing off. The claimants sought and 
obtained a search order and a freezing order,
40 
the purpose of the latter being to 
prevent the defendant from removing his assets from the jurisdiction of the court. 
But the claimants were excessive in their execution of the search order, exceeding its 
provisions. They took more material than was identified in the order, virtually 
emptying the defendant’s premises. It appeared that the claimant’s real motive in 
obtaining the order was to shut down the defendant’s business. It was held that the 
method of execution was an abuse of the order. While accepting that the defendant 
has been infringing copyright and awarding an injunction and damages to the 
claimants, Scott J. awarded both compensatory and aggravated damages to the 
defendant. 
The issue in Coflexip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd,
41 
was the width of an 
injunction to restrain patent infringement. In refusing a wide injunction, Laddie J. 
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emphasised that the court must “tailor the injunction to match the wrong”,42 that the 
injunction must protect the plaintiff but also be fair to the defendant and, citing 
Proctor v Bailey and Son,
43 
that injunctive relief would not apply where there was 
no threat of future infringement. An injunction in the usual terms, to restrain the 
defendants from infringing the patent, was refused, the injunction instead being 
limited to those acts of infringement proved. 
2.2 Case Management and Trial Process in China 
2.2.1 Lack of Effective Case Management to Direct the Trial  
Case management in the civil trial guidance in China, is a very general 
arrangement about evidence exchange and discovery. 
44 
Once a claim is served and 
defended, trial court case management in CPR provision is merely documentary 
evidence exchange; there is no requirement to identify pre-issues or trial issues. The 
case management in China does not identify issues at an early stage or direct the 
trial on a particular course, ignoring issues such as: what needs to be ruled first; 
which facts need to be clarified; what problems exist in the documenting witness 
testimony; or what response should be made to the receipt of the evidence. 
Compared with England
45
, Chinese case management has not played a role in 
directing trial proceedings. 
In Yun He Ren,
46 
the plaintiff (Yun He Ren) applied a mark of words with a 
picture 'YUN HE YI NA', in its business of home care, on 19 Oct 2003, and got it 
registered in 2006. The defendant was also a home labour service company, set up in 
June 2003, and had registered the same business name 'YUN HE YI NA'. The 
defendant used this same mark as a logo in a brochure and website. The claimant 
sued the defendant for infringing its registered trademark right. But the defendant 
contested that the claimant’s registration was in bad faith, and requested to stay the 
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process, pending the result of revocation proceedings. The defendant submitted that 
its company had been set up earlier, and that it had used this disputed mark earlier 
than the claimant's company. It was said that in preparing for registration of its 
company, the claimant's wife had been involved and provided some help. The 
claimant had illegally taken advantage of its information through his wife and 
registered this trademark in bad faith.
47
 But the claimant resubmitted that the mark 
was designed by his wife, and that he was entitled to register it as a trademark. 
48 
In order to prove its argument, the defendant handed in the cooperation 
agreement for setting up a business, the printing time of its business brochure, its 
website design, and the bill of costs in set up this company.
49 
In the final judgment, the court granted the rights in the disputed word 
trademark to the claimant based on the finding that the defendant did not provide 
evidence to prove its design process. The court set aside the defendant's interim 
application, on the basis that a stay of action, pending the result of trade mark 
revocation, had no direct influence on the infringement hearing. All the admissible 
evidence proved that the defendant had infringed the claimant's registered 
trademark.
50 
In this case, the court should have first identified that there were two main 
issues arising from their arguments to guide hearing and evidence discovery. The 
first was who designed this disputed trademark. The second was whether it should 
allow the stay of application pending the result of revocation. The result of the first 
issue would directly decide which side had the design right to use it in business, and 
which side was in bad faith in registration of the business name or trademark. The 
Chinese court failed to arrange a proper trial plan to identify issues, and failed to 
arrange an attendance as a witness of the claimant’s wife to identify her role in the 
argued mark. 
In the trial process and judgment file, one cannot find any preliminary issue 
management or trial direction as to the what issues needed to be proved; the 
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evidence required to decide those issues and the way in which the evidence is to be 
placed before the court; the issues on which both sides agreed or did not agree; what 
needed to be first answered and confirmed in order to start resolving the main 
contentious issues of trademark infringement.  
But in England, after the exchange of the reply to the statement of case and 
before the trial hearing, the parties and judge shall hold a without prejudice meeting 
or discussion to identify issues, serious disputes, to clarify and to understand the 
main opposing stances in relation to the issues. 
51 
As mentioned in the front part, the 
evidence discovery and the trial process in specific case follows its case 
management, which is based on the grounds of the overriding objects and ensuring 
parties equal treatment.
52
 
2.2.2 Lack of Transparent Evidence Discovery 
Generally, a Chinese trial of an IPR case is based on documentary material and 
a few expert witnesses, but very rarely are other witness summoned to answer 
questions arising from the documents. There is no proper evidence discovery 
process. After one month for evidence exchange, the first trial process begins with 
evidence discovery, which is there to examine and cross-examine the relevance and 
acceptability of the evidence. But such evidence discovery is not grounded on the 
genuine relevance to each argued point, or to determine the probability rooted in 
evidence, but constitutes a shallow, formal test of credibility. The reasoning about 
its relevance or irrelevance in relation to the facts disputed , is not present and 
inaccessible in the judgment.
53 
 
For a typical UK case, there is always, first, the judge‘s detailed ascertainment 
of all the facts. In comparison with a typical UK case involving evidence discovery, 
Lucasfilm v Ainsworth, in order to find who really produced and created the 
drawings and relevant three dimensional items of the helmets and armour used in the 
first Star Wars film, and in what way, Mann, J. described the witnesses, their 
occupations and characteristics, and set out details of the evidence they gave, and 
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proceeded to evaluate that evidence, explaining fully why he believed one party and 
disbelieved another. He considered the probability of particular evidence led being 
correct, and his whole reasoning process was transparent.
54
 
The courts in China heavily rely on the defects of evidence to pick up on facts. 
Typical facts and findings in a Chinese court will usually amount to little more than 
evidence listing and selection. In Yun He Ren,
55
 the court did not accept the 
admissibility of the defendant's evidence, holding that the bills were copies and not 
original receipts, and that there were no printing times on the advertisement 
brochure to prove the precise time of its logo usage.
56 
Since the claimant doubted 
their reliability, the court could not accept them as facts to support the defendant's 
argument.
57  
Under article 69, Supreme People’s Court legal interpretation regard-
ing evidence in civil cases 2001, the following evidence by itself cannot be used to 
establish a particular point of fact: 
(1)Testimony provided by a person who is not an adult which is inconsistent with the 
person’s age and ability;  
(2)Testimony provided by a person who is related to one of the parties or one of the 
parties’ attorneys;  
Questionable audio and visual material;  
(3)Copies in duplicate which cannot be verified as to origin;  
(4)Testimony provided by a person who refuses to attend court and fails to provide a 
sound reason for doing so. 
The main purpose of Article 69 should be understood, at most, as follows: if 
there is an issue which the litigants try to prove with a copy evidence, or testimony 
document, or audio visual material, then the trial court should not only use such 
single evidence to establish a particular point of fact. The trial court should combine 
with other evidence together to ascertain the specific facts in specific cases. But in 
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China the trial courts frequently use Article 69 as legal grounds to reject or pick up 
some evidence as ascertaining of facts in evidence discovery. 
2.2.3 Relying on Formal Defects to Decide Evidence Relevance 
and Credibility 
The courts in China often rely on evidence being copied, rather than original or 
notarised, as a ground to dismiss strong relevant facts. In Levis Strauss,
58
 the 
plaintiff (Levis) alleged that the defendant (Jinkobi) had infringed its registered 
trade mark rights by selling fake 'LEVI'S' clothes in the year 2005-2006. The 
claimant in 2000 registered 'LEVI'S' as a trademark in category 25, clothes. In 
October 2005 it first found and notarised fake 'LEVI'S clothes in two big department 
stores, and also alleged that Beijing Business and Industrial Bureau had levied an 
administrative fine and warning notice on the defendant for its selling faked clothes. 
In March 2006 the claimant found, in another Mall in Beijing, the defendant still 
selling of the fake 'LEVI'S' clothes. Then the claimant sued the defendant to put an 
immediate stop to the trademark infringement, and to compensate it for its business 
loss.
59 
The defendant submitted that the clothes were imported from an American 
company and were licensed for sale in the Chinese market. In order to support his 
argument the defendant handed in five customs' declarations of goods, two import 
duty notes, and the licence letter to the defendant from Gimco (an American 
company), with a licensed goods list including 'LEVI'S', five business receipts with 
'LEVI's', and also three business receipts with 'zanla'. As to the standard of its 
evidence, the defendant insisted that those documents had proved its clothes were 
imported from abroad as 'LEVI'S', not fakes of the claimant 's 'LEVI'S'.
60 
But the 
claimant argued that all those documents were copies not the original records, and 
doubted their legality unless they might be notarised against the original ones.
61 
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The judge held that according to Article 56, section 3 of China trade mark 
law,
62 
the defendant did not need to pay compensation if he could show his clothes' 
legal source proving that he did not know they were fake. The court held that the 
evidence provided by the defendant had not satisfied the burden of proof that the 
argued clothes really came from America, since the customs' declaration just 
mentioned jeans, and did not list the specific brand name. Secondly, they were not 
original documents. Without other evidence to ascertain or certify their originality, 
they could not be accepted independently as a basis for a claim. The court dismissed 
the defendant's defence, and in consideration of the repeat infringement found by 
administrative bureau and the plaintiff, held that the defendant should pay 
RMB500,000 yuan to the claimant. 
63 
In this case, the trial court obviously emphasised the formal defects of the 
evidence 
64 
(that it was not original, not notarised, and on the surface, unreliable) to 
deny its potential value, which would be used to prove whether its clothing came 
from a legal source.  
The trial court merely criticised and rejected the evidence with defects rather 
than to find the true facts of the whole event: whether the clothing sold by the 
defendant were fake infringing the claimant’s trademark, or imported as genuine; 
whether it concerned sale of parallel imported goods; whether the defendant’s 
evidence stood in terms of probability. Under Article 56, section 3 of China trade 
mark law,
65 
the defendant did not need to pay compensation if he could prove his 
clothes' legal source. Here the principle question from such judgment is whether the 
court should have discarded the copied evidence or should have put that evidence, 
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summoning the witness ( such as, the customs officers in respect of official 
certificate) to clarify where the disputed clothing came from. 
In this case, it should have been possible to summon or request official 
certificate from the Bureau to ascertain whether the defendant had imported and sold 
licensed legal goods from abroad, and whether the goods were the same as the 
infringing goods. In a similar situation in Deng Shi Yuan, the Beijing Haidian Court 
could summon the non-party as witness to answer whether he illegally produced the 
faked good and whether the defendant purchased it from him, rather than relying on 
uncertainty and standard of proof to dismiss the claimant’s contention. The Chinese 
court mainly relied on the defects of evidence as the most relevant consideration to 
decrease the trial complexity
66
. 
This is what a UK court would do. In England, defects of evidence are dealt 
with as follows: the evidence would be considered earlier in the case management 
meeting, to give a chance to correct it or add new evidence rather than rely on 
defects of form as the basis for making final judgment.
67
 According to English CPR, 
the court may control the evidence by giving directions as to: the issues on which it 
requires evidence; the nature of the evidence which it requires to decide those 
issues; the way in which the evidence is to be placed before the court.
68 
Relevance 
and acceptability of evidence mainly depend on whether the significance of an item 
of evidence makes a particular inference either more or less likely to be true on the 
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facts. The discretion to exclude evidence in civil cases is seldom used by judges. 
69 
In contrast, it seems ridiculous for a civil court deliberately to close its eyes to 
relevant evidence: ‘Here, the court cannot ignore the reality of the situation... It 
would be artificial and undesirable for the actual evidence, which is relevant and 
admissible, not to be placed before the judge who has the task of trying the case’.70 
On receipt of documents, any objections to evidence ought to be raised at case 
management stage by litigants or the trial court so that an interlocutory hearing can 
be appointed if necessary to resolve the matter. 
71
 English courts will also scrutinize 
the evidence for defects in their format. Such defects may arise in the heading, 
content itself, exhibits or attestation. The defects will be brought to the attention of 
the filer and an opportunity will be given to put matters in order, and remedy matters 
within a specified period. Any amendments to the text of the evidence must be 
initialled by the claimant or deponent and the witness.
72
 In certain circumstances, the 
defects in format may not be relevant to prove one issue, but may be used as 
probative evidence at a later stage.
73
 
As for any doubts or disagreement as to evidence: ‘ if the court did disagree 
with one or both experts of parties' opinions and methods, it was important for him 
to inform them both, telling them what was in his mind and allowing them to 
address him on it.’ 74  
Even in the hearing stage before judgment, if some issues occur and were not 
predicted by the judge in case management, if one side makes a request to stay 
proceeding to get further evidence, the judge would still consider whether to permit 
it based on balanced consideration.
75 
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In considering a request to file additional evidence or to extend time, English 
court will primarily consider the following: the nature of the evidence to the 
question needing to be determined; the justice and fairness of subjecting the opposite 
party to the burden of evidence in question at that stage of the proceedings, 
including the reason why the evidence was not filed earlier; whether the admission 
of the additional evidence would prejudice the other side in ways that cannot be 
compensated in cost, e.g. excessive delay. 
76
 
In the following case, English court considered that the evidence defects in 
format were irrelevant to the argued issue. Maybe it was not enough in proving 
whether the respondent had done enough to guarantee the quality of goods by 
licensing third party, but it was enough and strongly relevant in proving the argued 
mark was once licensed to third party use. In ,
77
 The applicant 
(Hebrew) challenged the registration of the word mark EINSTEIN registered in the 
name of the respondent (Continental) for articles of clothing in Class 25. The 
applicant argued that the mark had not been used for a five-year period and 
consequently contravened the Trade Marks Act 1994 s.46(1)(b). So whether the 
respondent had used this word mark in this period became the crucial issue. The 
evidence, mainly purchasing receipts, adduced by the respondent to support the 
validity of the registration, was provided by a third party.
78
 The trial court found the 
labels exhibited on the invoices did not bear any date so it was impossible to tell 
whether these were used in the relevant period. It also found the respondent had not 
effectively controlled the use of the mark made by HSL. Owing to the failure to 
establish consent, the application for revocation of the argued mark should succeed, 
the trial court held. But the appeal court reversed this ruling on the following basis:
79 
 …If he considered that an argument on one side or another needed to be explored in 
more detail, he should invite the parties to make representations on the points on which he 
required further assistance. Where the parties had opted for determination on the basis of 
written submissions, the hearing officer should write to both sides informing them of the 
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points of concern and giving them an opportunity to respond. Irrespective of whether 
submissions were made orally or only in writing, the registrar's decision should not be 
based on a point of substance which did not, before the close of submissions, form part of 
the case that the parties were required or invited to address.  
The evidence provided by both sides concerned business use of the trademark, 
and no evidence was provided as to whether there was a quality problem with the 
licensed trademark. In the end the appeal court held that the evidence now on file 
was weak but was sufficient, in the absence of cross-examination or evidence to the 
contrary, to prove the required consent.
80
 
2.2.4 Lack of Equal Treatment to Both Sides 
The method of ascertaining facts in Chinese trial also shows that once the 
courts may use defects of evidence to exclude consideration of one side’s evidence, 
which would directly lead to unequal treatment to this side’ s claims. In Levis 
Strauss
81, the defendant’s evidence was refused on the grounds that it was copied 
evidence and that an item was unclear in the customs notes. Such identification 
ended any possibility to consider in the judgment the genuine practical defence 
raised. The trial court did not arrange any further cross-examination for the 
defendant to clarify issues with customs’ witnesses, or its salesman. In the end, the 
trial court only relied on the claimant's evidence to consider damages; there was no 
any consideration of the probative value of the defendant's evidence.
82
 
In Yun He Ren 
83
, the court did not give any consideration of the defendant’s 
evidence, and there was no inference drawn from the early registration of its 
business and from the employment history of the claimant’s wife. The working 
history of plaintiff’s wife for the defendant and earlier name registration were strong 
points relative to ascertaining which side was in acting bad faith. The trial court 
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might observe from English court the need to find the whole facts by connecting all 
of the scattered evidence to establish the merits, rather than giving an arbitrary 
conclusion isolated from the evidence. Here in the absence of ascertaining the doubt 
about whether the defendant lied in his statement or whether such statement was 
irrelevant to the infringement charge, it is difficult to accept such arbitrary 
declaration on trademark infringement. There was no transparent and equal 
treatment of both sides’ argument84.  
In England, equal protection in case management is the first step to a fair 
hearing and judgment. The trial court should consider and promote this concept 
throughout the whole trial and its judgment.
85  
At the preliminary meeting or 
managing meeting, the judge will remind the parties of the strict timetables imposed 
by the rule and of the serious consequences if they fail to meet the dates for the 
service of their statements. 
86 
The court also has a duty to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, 
giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that 
of his opponent. Once it is fixed, the purpose of the timetable is to enable the party 
to know the case he has to meet at the hearing and avoid being taken by surprise. 
Parties and trial courts are bound by the agenda and the timescales, and cannot at the 
hearing go into any matters not fairly included in them, unless the party has good 
reason for that failure. 
87 
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2.2.5 No Civil Search Order for Plaintiff to Obtain Infringing 
Information  
Both Chinese and UK civil procedural law stipulate interim measures, 
especially the search order for inspection, to help the IPR owners in discovering 
infringing evidence.
88
  An English claimant can in practice apply to the High Court 
in camera without any notice to the defendant, for an order to inspect the 
defendant’s premises and to seize, copy or photograph material relevant to the 
alleged infringement.
89
 A search order covers any premises under the defendant’s 
control and the defendant may be required to deliver up infringing goods, retain 
infringing stock or incriminating papers, and even to give information about his 
sources of supply or the destination of stock passing through his hands. 
90
  
The defendant’s refusal to allow the inspection is contempt of court, as well as 
in itself being evidence against him and will be dealt with according to the 
circumstances. Even a defendant whose contempt is not very serious may have to 
pay the plaintiff‘s costs of the application on an indemnity basis.91  
But for a plaintiff in China, he has no way to apply for such a search order in 
civil litigation. Such measure is still a listing on paper. There is no guidance for 
litigants to apply for a search order.
92
 Who should execute a search order, lawyer or 
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police or court official? Should the defendant be notified in order to have a chance 
to challenge the basis on which the searching order is made? What responsibility 
would arise if litigants do not carry out the order properly? Those basic participation 
factors are absent from the Chinese IPR statutes. Interim measures seem a facade to 
meet the WTO standard, rather than advice for enabling remedies. The statutes are 
so open-ended and vague that it is difficult to see that any duty has been placed on 
the Chinese courts to enforce the law. Nor is there a framework which details are 
filled in by statutory instruments.  
Until now no civil case has ever granted a search order to get infringing 
information. Most methods used by plaintiffs involve getting a public authority to 
notarise the fact of a fake sale in the sellers’ shop. If a plaintiff tries to prove a 
defendant‘s producing, copying, possessing or storing infringing goods, he has to 
report to the administrative bureau to apply for a sudden search. In legal practice, 
only the administrative bureau has the power to search or detain infringing material 
from a factory or producing site. Whether the administrative bureau would carry out 
a sudden search is often the essential question.
93  
In Deng Shi Yuan, 
94
 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed its 
trademark right and breached anti-unfair competition law, by illegally producing and 
selling faked welding tools under its trademark name and package. But the court 
refused to consider the damage of such producing and held that there was no 
evidence to prove it. To prove a faked product was really sold by defendant, the 
plaintiff must have the evidence of infringement notarised. It is very difficult in 
China to prove the defendant is producing the fake goods because the court asks the 
claimant to prove the infringing process on one hand, and on the other hand the 
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plaintiff has no practical tool to enter the secret producing site in order to obtain 
evidence. In the end, most plaintiffs can only notarise the selling of fake goods in 
the defendants’ shops. 
In China even if there is an administration bureau search result, civil cases have 
not given any hint about the nature of and the ways to use evidence obtained from 
the administration bureau. Until now such evidence are treated differently and 
inconsistently in cases.  
In Levis Strauss
95
, while providing the notarised documents with the faked 
'LEVI'S clothes in two big department stores ,the plaintiff also provided the 
administrative fine, and warning notice to the defendant by the Beijing Business and 
Industrial Bureau for selling goods with a faked brand name. In the judgment, the 
court dismissed the defendant's defence, and regarded the administrative fine as 
proof that this was not a first time infringement, and held that the defendant should 
pay RMB 500,000 to the claimant.  
It is clear in this case the court recognised the weight of administrative 
evidence in the official anti-faking campaigns. But in Pfizer Products Inc 
96
 , the 
plaintiff tried to use the information from the official anti-faking action to prove the 
defendant’s products were faked, and cheated consumers, and that the Chinese word 
‘伟哥’，was once used as the Chinese translation of ‘Viagra’ in China. 
At this time, the trial court refused to admit the evidence from the administra-
tive anti-faking measure. Instead it picked up the information from the plaintiff’s 
public notice in a newspaper as the main evidence to support its decision on the 
meaning of the Chinese word ‘伟哥’，or ‘艾哥尔’ as the translation name of 
‘Viagra’. 
The trial court and the appeal court both held that the official anti-faking action 
was intended to protect genuine ‘Viagra’ products in the Chinese market, not to 
prove its Chinese name, especially as the claimant had once confirmed its Chinese 
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name through its lawyer’s notice in a newspaper. The defendants did not breach 
anti-unfair competition law because the defendant’s product package, the blue shape 
drug pill, also had clear marks ‘weige伟哥’ and ‘TM’ on the surface, and could not 
be confused by customers with the claimant’s blue shape and ‘Viagra’ mark.97  
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unclear items and even no dates on a written 
document are very common in both China and England. Direct and perfect evidence 
with self –supporting content and no defects are very rare in practice. Where the 
official document or copied evidence is written unclearly and irregularly, the court 
needs to rule whether the defects in format are only formally wrong or wrong in 
relation to the content itself; and whether it is irrelevant at this point or possibly 
relevant to another point in later proceedings. That is exactly English court does in 
ascertaining facts.
98
  
The usual correcting way for English court is to have open and fair equal 
discovery of evidence by calling witness to clarify it or amend it.
99
 It is absurd to 
rely on a formal defect to refuse consideration of their connection and probability to 
the argued issue, with the court failing to find the truth. Some articles have argued 
that there is no tradition of Chinese people to be witnesses in court. But most 
evidence defects are actually caused by government officials and staff working in 
public organisations. It is difficult to see any problem in a court summoning them to 
clarify a document recording its history. Relying on defects in evidence to exclude 
consideration of the facts not only affects a fair trial but also damages the legitimate 
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credibility of public documents and creates more conflict and chaos in ascertaining 
recognition of the issues. 
100
  
2.2.6 Lack of Judicial Notice about Court’s Inference on Findings  
In England, the court may make an assumption or draw an inference if certain 
facts are established. A matter may be resolved by judicial notice or by judicial 
findings from evidence. If they have been regularly recognised in the past in judicial 
decisions, there comes a point at which the courts can judicially notice or inform the 
existence of particular customs and practices. The Court of Appeal sets out the 
procedure that the court should follow, when judicially noticing a notorious fact or 
view: ‘the judge, upon being called to take judicial notice, may refer to any person 
or any document or book of reference for his satisfaction in relation thereto’.101 
In contrast, there is a very general expression of judicial notice in China 
CPL,
102  
but it does not mention in what situation the trial court should, before 
making its decision, give judicial notice to litigants about its view or assumption 
towards evidence and the meaning of law, which is likely to be material to the 
judicial decision. 
103
 
Once evidence is submitted by the litigants with a descriptive explanation of its 
purpose and relationship to the argued issue, often litigants themselves argue about 
and cast doubt on the credibility and relevance of evidence in the trial, yet they 
cannot find any hint of the trial judge‘s view on the relevance and weight of 
evidence, or further summons or request a witness to clarify defects or amend 
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weaknesses. At trial Chinese judges passively sit there listening, without any 
comment or indication to the litigants of their views, findings, doubts, or 
uncertainties on issues. They simply ask the parties not to repeat arguments, ask 
whether both sides have more evidence to support their claims, and whether they 
wish to negotiate a settlement before judgment. Both sides are ignorant of what 
opinions or doubts the judge has in relation to the evidence, or any presumptions on 
the disputed issue. There is no ground or basis in the procedural arrangements for 
litigants to challenge the judge's view or possible bias or to contest his assumptions 
or to further request evidence discovery.
104  
In Deng Shi Yuan 
105
 because the 
defendant provided a purchasing receipt, then there was no need to consider 
evidence of damage. The court said that the defendant was under a duty in respect of 
the illegal production, if he could not provide evidence of where the fake products 
came from. Since the defendant had provided a non party seller’s bill, then the court 
held that both possibilities existed and that they might have been faked by the 
defendant or faked by a non-party. Based on such uncertainty, the trial court 
dismissed the claimant's claim for illegal production, on the ground that the claimant 
had failed to satisfy the standard of proof. 
But such presumption as to the burden of proof seems unreasonably high on the 
claimant. In the statement, the claimant argued that every authorised 'GORDAK' 
seller had signed with him a genuine guarantee of quality, and that he had not found 
any other seller who had sold faked goods, including the non-party that the 
defendant had stated. The claimant pointed out that the defendant had sold his 
products for several years, and was quite familiar with genuine products and should 
have recognised the faked product. Since the defendant was the faked good 
distributor and possessor as a direct infringer, providing a purchasing receipt should 
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not have removed the burden of proof on the defendant. The defendant has a duty to 
prove non-production, not merely selling.
106
 
In China, the sudden attack in trial is not from the litigants’ evidence itself (eg, 
from evidence suddenly found and handed in by the parties), but mainly from an 
unexpected judicial inference based on evidence provided by litigants. 
In Pfizer Products Inc, 
107
 while refusing to recognise the effect of an adminis-
trative anti-faking document, but picking up the Chinese name used by the 
plaintiff‘s public notice in a newspaper as the main evidence to support its decision, 
the ground and assumption that the trial court relied on was that the official anti-
faking action was intended to protect genuine ‘Viagra’ products in the Chinese 
market, not to prove once used Chinese name.  
This is an arbitrary presumption on the weight of the official document. The 
more convincing stance should be that the name written in the administrative 
searching documents, (in the monetary fine and warning notice given to the 
defendant), reflected at that time the administrative officer‘s understanding about 
‘Viagra’ and its Chinese translation name, given the main function and role of the 
Business and Industrial Administration Bureau in China to maintain market order by 
identifying genuine goods and confiscating and destroying faked goods. Under 
evidential rule
108
, official recordings should be given higher weight than a 
newspaper media notice. From the trial process we cannot find any judicial adoption 
of such a presumption. That is an arbitrary sudden attack inherent in the decision of 
China court.  
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In Levis Strauss 
109
, facing the same type of evidence from the administrative 
bureau, the court could simply declare that the administrative fine documentation 
from Beijing Business and Industrial Bureau to the defendant was admissible, to 
prove the defendant had repetitively sold faked clothes, but at the same time the 
court declared that the customs’ declaration document issued to the defendant was 
not admissible to prove the origin of goods. The court did not summons the customs 
officer to clear any doubt as to the name of the imported clothes, but made a 
declaration that customs' declarations of goods, and import duty notes, could not be 
accepted independently as a basis for a claim. The litigants had no chance to adduce 
other evidence to ascertain or certify the originality of the defendant’s goods, 
because they had no notice of the judge’s position. 
In Yun He Ren
110
, there was not, prior to the decision, any judicial notice to the 
litigants about the inadmissibility of the bills and business promotion brochure 
provided by the defendant. Everyone would be puzzled as to why they were not 
acceptable just because they were copies, rather than original documents. If the 
defendant knew that was the judge’s objection, he would, I suggest, have challenged 
by asking why it mattered, while proving the use of its business name with a copy of 
the original design, (since normally the original application documents are kept in 
the business registration bureau). The defendant would also have challenged why it 
was not enough to prove of the trademark earlier use than in the plaintiff’s case.  
Such sudden attacks cannot be rectified by litigants or corrected by appellate 
court because there is no instant review or appeal on interim decision.
111 
In China 
this relates not just to ascertaining the meaning of facts, the inference and 
admissibility of evidence
112
. It is also present in the methods for hearing argument 
and evaluating the infringement damages.  
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In Hao You Duo Supermarket v. Wan ke Long Ltd
113
, the appellant company 
(the claimant Hao You Duo) appealed against the first trial judgment,
114 
at the basis 
that the trial court's decision about damages calculation was wrong, and that the 
respondent company should pay its loss. The reasons for appeal included the 
following grounds: that the facts as to loss identified in the trial court were wrong 
and based on a lack of reasoning as to the method employed (average profit 
calculation); that the appellant’s loss was not only the expected profit in the 
infringing period, but also the costs that it had invested in this trade secret; and that 
there were the legal fees it had spent on the case, together with the unrecoverable 
loss of future business, because of the leakage of its trade secret. The trial court did 
not arrange expert witnesses to assess the loss, nor did it allow cross-examination, 
even though the appellant had handed in the profit and loss report, a finance audit 
report, and also expressed a willingness to disclose more computer data if needed. 
115 
The respondent also disagreed with the first trial judgment and claimed that the 
amount of the damages decided by the first trial court was unreasonable and 
improvable, there being no direct causation between the appellant's loss and the 
respondent's undertaking
. 116 
This case originated from an infringement of business confidence, by one 
employee of the claimant selling to the defendant its business information 
(providers’ lists, goods pricing policies and customers’ information). The claimant 
first reported the matter as a criminal case, and its employee was sentenced to 
imprisonment under criminal procedure. Later the claimant used the method (Maxim 
Loss Access Report) admitted in the criminal case as evidence of damage, and 
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brought a civil case against the defendant. The main dispute in this civil case 
concerned how to evaluate and calculate the compensation to the claimant. 
117 
In the first trial judgment the intermediate court of Gongzhou held that the 
defendant had infringed the claimant's business confidence, based on China anti-
unfair competition law, and that the defendant should pay damages 
(RMB1195693.66 yuan) for the claimant's business loss. It struck out the other 
claims, and held that both parties shared the legal fee equally (each RMB110134 
yuan). 
118 
The trial court disagreed with the claimant’s attempt to rely on the evidence of 
damage in the former criminal case as the basis of its loss (the much higher figure of 
RMB42051637.88 yuan), based as it was on prosecutor's evidence in the previous 
criminal procedure, which was not investigated and examined in the civil procedure. 
According to civil evidence rules,
119 
any evidence if not agreed by both parties, 
should not be admitted as fact to justify claims, unless it has been passed through a 
proper examination between parties.  
However, the trial court refused the claimant's application to appoint an 
independent inspector to evaluate its loss in the civil procedure. It held that 
appointing a new expert was impractical because the infringing action happened in 
1997, quite a long time ago, and the claimant could not provide a detailed finance 
audit dating back so far. Instead the trial court took a method of average profit 
calculation in the judgment, by reference to the general department store's data from 
the Statistic Bureau of Gongzhou, and awarded the remuneration for the 
infringement period. Such damage compensation was totally outside of the parties 
‘expectations, so the plaintiff after the first trial appealed mainly to challenge the 
trial judge's calculation method. The appeal court, the High Court of Gongzhou 
dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment made by the first trial court.
120
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Both litigants were bound to feel dissatisfaction and injustice with such 
judgment because they had no chance to challenge the court’s method and were not 
encouraged to adduce further evidence and cross-examination concerning their 
method of calculation. The trial prevented the litigants from supporting their side of 
the story, whatever the technical reason was.
121
 
In contrast, a very similar issue on the calculation of damages also arose in the 
English courts. The judge, Humphrey Lloyd Q.C., dismissed the appeal for summary 
judgment, holding that
122
:  
 the adjudicator (Mr Richards) did not inform either party of the methodology that he 
intended to adopt, or to seek observations from them as to the manner in which it or any 
other methodology might reasonably and properly be used in the circumstances to establish 
or to test [the defendant’s] case. It was a suitable basis from which to derive a 
retrospective “critical path”. If an adjudicator intends to use a method which was not 
agreed and has not been put forward as appropriate by either party he ought to inform the 
parties and to obtain their views as it is his choice of how the dispute might be decided. The 
application must be dismissed since it is such a potentially serious breach of the 
requirement of either impartiality or fairness, that the decision is invalid for it is not a 
decision which the adjudicator was authorised to make.  
2.2.7 Lack of Cogency between Findings and Legal Decision 
Reading English judicial decisions, one strongly feels that the findings and 
legal decisions are connected by formulas of logic, common sense, practical 
performance and recognised authority. It is very hard to find a decision which 
ignores one side’s arguments and employs bias and isolated evidence to support 
judgment.  
No matter how simple or complex a case history, English court always tries to 
find the whole background of a specific case rather than selected facts. After the 
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discovery of evidence, a specific inner connection is set up, and a cogent 
ascertainment of the facts is reasonably fitted into the chain of discretion, in line 
with applicable provision.  
In Earns (t/a Autopaint International) v Anglo-Dutch Paint and Chemical Co 
Ltd,
123
 the main issue was whether and in what way the defendant breached 
trademark, copyright, and passing off law around a licensing sale contract between 
plaintiff and defendant. 
By examining Autopaint’s international history, the original franchise content, 
further requests after Autopaint's inability to supply, and the nature of switching 
selling to the trade, the court confirmed whether the agreement covered what the 
defendants had done, and in what way it infringed trade mark rights, and constituted 
passing off (malicious falsehood). 
English court set up a transparent ascertainment of the facts: what started the 
cooperative business franchise? What happened in the performance of contract? 
What had gone further beyond the permitted consent? When had the misunderstand-
ing and false inference of association started? And what results lead from the argued 
activity? 
In the whole discovery of evidence and trial process, the trial court narrated 
what the both sides agreed and did not agree. It isolated the main issues needing to 
be proved, determining what should be answered first and confirmed in order to start 
resolving the main issues.  
The Chinese courts place too much stress on evidence formality, and rely 
heavily on defects in the form of evidence to exclude relevant evidence. The inquiry 
focuses on picking up factors to meet a statutory provision, rather than finding the 
truth of the real situation of each case. It is hard to find a comprehensive cogent 
understanding in court decision. After the hearing, the selected, isolated evidence is 
formed alongside the statutory provisions, but there are still gaps and uncertainties 
between the findings and the legal decision. Then Chinese courts heavily rely on 
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judicial power and the burden of proof to exercise discretion, and to make 
declarations of the connection between its findings and the applicable provisions.  
But the fundamental problem is that, by discarding evidence because of its 
formal defects, by picking up some evidence because of its notarisation or 
originality, the decision’s grounds and applicable law lack inner connection, and 
cannot be properly fitted into the judgment, so the disputed issues are not 
persuasively resolved, which inherently damages the legal finality of the final 
judgment.
124
 
In Yun He Ren,
125 
after dismissing all the evidence provided by the defendant 
based on the formal defects, the court supported the plaintiff‘s claims. But the 
Chinese court did not offer a persuasive judgment to answer the major issue raised 
in this case: why the defendant had breached the registered trademark of the plaintiff 
if he had legally registered and used his business name within its scope. 
In Levis Strauss,
126
 here again, the court dismissed unfavoured evidence 
because of lack of clarity as to the items and dates in a copied document. The 
question is still why, without ascertaining whether the defendant lied in his 
statement, the copied customs' declaration and receipt could not prove that the 
defendant’s goods were from a third party. 
In Gong Zhou Restaurant
127
, both trial and appeal courts ignored the relevant 
evidence of several similar trademarks registered and used by non-parties. The 
appeal court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the first trial judgment on the ground 
that these facts could not change the distinctiveness of 'CAI GEN XIANG'. Yet why 
there was no effect on the distinctiveness of 'CAI GEN XIANG' if there were 
several similar marks used at the same time in different parts of the Chinese market? 
How the claimant could succeed in his trademark infringement claim against the 
defendant if there were several non-parties using a similar mark in this field. 
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In JinGo Adversary Company ,
128 
the claimant, an exclusive licensee represent-
ing Swiss AVC in China, brought two copyright infringement cases against the 
defendant, Beijing HaiChuan Disk Company, for illegally producing and selling the 
music CD ‘Spring Field---BANDARI’. The defendant admitted he had produced the 
disputed CD but under a licence agreement with JiangXi Video Publisher. The 
defendant also argued over whether the claimant had an exclusive legal licence in 
China, because there was no evidence to prove that Swiss AVC was the genuine 
copyright owner of ‘BANDARI’. The final judgment in the first case was held that 
the defendant had not infringed the plaintiff’s licensed rights on the grounds that the 
disputed copying happened earlier than the time at which the plaintiff acquired the 
exclusive right. The judge also held that the genuine copy claimed by the claimant 
was the product of a non-party, which could not be used to prove the claimant’s 
rights without notarisation.
129 
Checking the licensing contract has a fundamental effect on the whole 
infringement trial and damages of consideration, including whether it is legal or 
fake, who has the duty among producer, seller and publisher, and their infringing 
manner, etc. All such basic doubts and issues were neither argued nor cross-
examined, just because the licensing contract was not notarised and therefore 
excluded from consideration.  
The reliance on picking up evidence to fit a provision and the judicial 
assumption in ascertaining facts, might decrease the trial complexity, and guarantee 
speedy trial, but any fair, transparent, equal process, and a just cogent result are lost 
in the process. A reasonable and cohesive inner connection between the issues and 
the judicial decision is always properly made following a full discovery and a 
process of equal treatment. We can occasionally find such shining cases even among 
most arbitrary judicial discretion. For example, in Aifut Chemical Industry v. Beijing 
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Di Tan Hospital,
130 
the appellant company (Aifut) appealed against the first trial 
judgment by the High Court of Beijing, (2001) first trial judgment (No. 79), that it 
had infringed the respondent’s well known brand name by displaying ‘84 
Disinfectants’ on its products.  
In the first trial, the claimant (Ditan Hospital) brought proceedings against the 
defendant under the anti-competition law for damages arising out of the defendant’s 
usage in its business advertisement and product package of its well known brand 
name. The claimant asserted that it had researched and developed a special 
disinfectant liquid called ‘84’ in 1984, and had received a government award for its 
special effect in killing viruses and bacteria in 1985. Until 1997 it had authorised 30 
factories around China to use its technology to produce ‘84 disinfectant’, and the 
defendant was one of exclusive licensees in Jiangsu province from 1988 to 1992. 
The claimant alleged that the defendant had no right to continue using ‘84 
disinfectant’ after ending the franchising contract. ‘84 disinfectant’ was a well 
known brand name in China which was designed by, and belonged to, the claimant. 
The defendant’s usage had misled consumers into misunderstanding the source of 
the products.
131 
 
The defendant contended that ’84 disinfectant’ was a well-known common 
product name, not a specific brand name of the claimant. The defendant used its 
trademark registration experience to prove that it was a common goods name to 
describe disinfectant liquid. In 1996, the defendant applied for the registration of ‘84 
Disinfectant’ as a trademark to the Administration Bureau. In 1997, the Bureau 
rejected the application on the ground that the name ‘84 Disinfectant’ reflected this 
kind of good’s nature and form. Therefore, it could not be registered as a trademark. 
The defendant used this administrative decision to stress that ‘84 Disinfectant’ had 
become a commodity name.
132 
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The first trial court agreed with the claimant’s suit and held that ‘84 Disinfec-
tant’ was a well-known brand name originated and developed by the claimant; the 
defendant should stop using it as a commodity name and should pay RMB 250,000 
damages under Articles 5 and 20 of the anti-competition law . But the first trial 
judgment was reversed by the appellate court, based on the different identification of 
the nature of ‘84 Disinfectant’’.133 
In the appellate process, the main issue was still about whether ‘84 Disinfec-
tant’ was a well-known brand name of the respondent, or a well-known commodity 
name for this kind of goods. 
While affirming the facts identified in the trial court, the Supreme Court also 
considered further evidence about the licensing history granted by the defendant to 
32 factories under the name ‘84 Disinfectant’; the disinfectant producers’ and 
consumers’ reaction towards ‘84 Disinfectant’; the registration record and the 
administrative management of the disinfectant market. All the relevant evidence 
introduced at the appellate stage strengthened the final judgment that ‘84 
Disinfectant’ might had been used as a brand name of the respondent in the 
beginning, before 1990. With the years of uncontrolled licensing by the respondent 
to 32 factories, the respondent had not taken any measures to register it or clarify it 
as its prominent business logo. Now the reality had showed that, since 1990, each 
factory of these 32 licensed had registered its specific separate trademark, and all of 
them regarded ‘84 Disinfectant’ as a common goods name in their products range. 
By now ‘84 Disinfectant’ had been recognised as a well-known commodity name. In 
the end, the Supreme Court reversed the whole first trial judgment and held that the 
first trial ignored important evidence and wrongly identified the nature of the facts, 
and applied the law incorrectly.
134
 
This case reflects the relevance and necessity of considering what evidence the 
parties should be allowed to introduce, in order to reconcile the conflicts necessarily 
inherent in civil procedure with the goals of efficiency, fairness, and justice. In the 
first trial judgment there was no detailed introduction to the licensing history and its 
effect on public consumers and producers. The first trial judgment is unpersuasive, 
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as it is hard to arrive at a proof of probability, on the basis only that the claimant 
originally labelled its design as ‘84 Disinfectant’, and the claimant had made this a 
well-known name for disinfectant. It is a big leap from these two facts to the 
conclusion that it is the claimant’s brand name. This is a big leap, especially as we 
noticed from the first judgment that the claimant was a hospital. It had not produced 
any disinfectant itself, and had never taken any measures to control its licensee’s 
usage of the disputed name.  
Why was the appellate result so different from the first trial judgment in this 
case? It is not because the appellate court changed the facts or law identified by the 
first court. It is mainly because the appellate court probed the case more deeply, 
rather than undertaking a superficial check of the form of evidence. The appellate 
court introduced more background evidence to demonstrate the whole licensing 
development of ‘84 Disinfectant’ from 1988 to 2007. We know that a different 
impression and influence may arise just because of the different manner in which a 
court describes and organises the available material. But if courts can even ignore, 
add or change some of this material, it is hard to evaluate the story merits at all. The 
appellate judgment is more sensible and persuasive because it gives us a much 
broader and more detailed picture about the whole story. There is no big leap from 
its description to its conclusion. So the first guarantee of a fair and just judgment is 
to keep a fair and transparent process, which can lead to all relevant facts being 
discovered and considered. The second thing to guarantee a just judgment is to 
strengthen case management to identify the disputed issues earlier and make further 
discovery requests promptly. This would not only help the trial court to conduct a 
proper hearing, but also provide a basis for a higher court to review and to correct 
any mistake which occurred in the first trial. 
From this case and from the comparison between the Chinese trial process and 
that in England, it is clear that a trial system does not work by focusing on merely 
picking up evidence and quoting a statute provision. Without full open discovery 
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and consideration of all relevant factors, there is no other way to justify the legal 
analysis, and no alternative to justify the judgment under the applicable law.
135 
2.3 Conclusion 
The case management and trial process in England is clear, and places parties 
on an equal footing while considering procedural measures and substantive interests. 
The judicial decision is based on specific case merits, and does not conflict with 
decided facts and the overriding objects of civil procedure and substantive law. The 
basic success of English trial lies in an open process of discovery of evidence and 
case management. The main arguments from both sides on points of law and facts 
are equally heard. In contrast, Chinese case management lacks clear guidance to 
bind the trial. Its trial process lacks proper discovery of evidence, relying on 
formality to decide evidence relevance and credibility. Its case management and trial 
process lacks equal treatment of both sides’ arguments, and lack judicial notice of 
the court’s inference as to findings. There is no search order available for the 
plaintiff to obtain infringing information. Its judicial decisions lack comprehensive 
and cogent links between the findings and legal decisions. Its case management and 
discovery evidence are not transparent enough to see what has happened in trial. The 
judicial decisions do not reveal clearly how a Chinese judge has arrived at his 
conclusion, if both sides’ arguments had been treated equally. The fundamental 
problem is that, mainly by discarding evidence because of its formality defects, and 
by picking up some evidence because of its notarisation or originality, the decision’s 
grounds and applicable law lack inner connection, and cannot be properly fitted into 
the judgments, and as a result the disputed issues cannot be persuasively resolved. 
The situation described here, about the case management and trial process, triggers 
another problem dealt with in the next chapter, namely that legal finality and its 
binding force are very weak in the Chinese judicial regime.
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Chapter Three: Overlapping IPR Trials and Compensation 
Overlapping claims in intellectual property suits are very common; indeed this 
is a major characteristic of IPR litigation. This trait reflects the complexity and 
transformative nature of invisible intelligence property: idea, expression, design, 
inventions, discovery, data, processing and labouring etc. For example, Ocular 
Sciences Ltd (OSI) v Aspect Vision Care Ltd ,
1 
was a case claiming breach of several 
IPR rights in a business cooperation relating to the manufacture of contact lenses. 
The two claimants sued eight defendants for breach of confidence, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy and infringement of copyright and 
design rights relating to the manufacture of contact lenses. But the judge only 
confirmed copyright infringement in the judgment.
2 
 
The creation of more, and also more complex, IPR has also caused the 
boundaries between types of subject-matters to become blurred. 
3
 The boundaries 
between the subject matter: patentable or unpatentable, business methods and 
computer programmes, functional design or artistic design, remain unclear. The 
same design may be protected by copyright law, design law as well as the tort law 
protection of ‘passing off’, because one intelligent work will often encompass 
different forms, interests or functions. These can exist in a status of artistic work 
through to an industrial production, so they do not fit squarely within the boundaries 
of either copyright, design right or patent law. This is one reason why, today, there 
are a lot of different and sometimes conflicting demands, some for new and some 
for improved rights. Confusion increases even more when there is no clear definition 
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of what is related to, and what is different from the subject matter.
4 
So we find more 
and more IPR creations may fall into several IPR protection categories. 
5
 
The legal finality rule 
6
also increases the overlap of claims occurring in IPR 
suits. Under the res judicata and issue estoppel principles, claimants are worried that 
they may be deprived of their full protection by making an inappropriate election in 
pleadings. So the safe choice to recover a full compensation is to lodge multiple 
claims with all possible causes of action rolled together. Litigants often attempt to 
pursue multiple claims in order to ensure the full award of damages, especially when 
the boundary of each subject matter is vague or uncertain in scope. The complexity 
of most IPR cases is hard to avoid and likely to generate a lot of claims under 
different substantive legal provisions. 
7 
On the other hand, property calls for boundaries. Any property law has to draw 
boundaries determining who holds rights, and what the matters subject to these 
rights are. Especially for intangible property rights---IPR, there is no need to occupy 
its physical limits to utilize its intelligence rights. Comparing with real property 
rights, the IPR owner and the public need clearer and more coherent boundaries to 
know who owns what, and where each right begins and ends.
8 
Each IPR right should 
have a clear boundary around its specific protection subject, and accordingly should 
vary in strategic ways, since overlapping protection for a single subject with 
different layers suggests high costs of legal enforcement. There are significant costs 
in devising specialised systems to record and award rights that are uncertain in 
scope. There could be also high costs in challenging or defending such rights.
9 
It is 
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obvious that a clear IPR boundary can help an IPR owner to choose the best suited 
methods, to efficiently protect rights and save money in litigation. 
This chapter will analyse, through the legal interpretation of the substantive law 
of IPRs, how the judges in each of the two countries deal with and manage 
overlapping claims in IPR cases to enforce IPR protection. 
3.1 Overlapping IPR Trials in England 
3.1.1 Cogent Ascertainment of Legislation and Case Law to 
Identify Boundaries 
Protection for literary phrases, a logo, title or company name and trademark 
may be available under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA 1988), the 
Trade Marks Act 1994 (1994 Act) and under the common law of passing off. In 
practice, an originally worded phrase, product brand or a logo is commonly used in 
product packaging or advertisement or commercial service. Sometimes it is difficult 
to judge whether it is used for as an unregistered trademark, or a company name or 
an artistic design. 
In Dicks v Yates,
10
 Lord Wright offered a general observation about the 
possibility of copyright existing in a commercial phrase: 
in general a title is not by itself a proper subject matter of copyright. As a rule a title 
does not involve literary composition, and is not substantial to justify a claim to protection. 
That statement does not mean that in particular cases a title may not be on so extensive a 
scale, and of so important a character as to be a proper subject of protection against being 
copied (though the judge adjudicated that no copyright could subsist in the title ’splendid 
misery). 
In Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Ltd, 
11 
the plaintiff sought to restrain 
the defendant from using, in connection with its business, the name ’Exxon’. This 
word had been invented by the plaintiff to denominate their own business. It was 
held that, while the defendant was not entitled to engage in passing off, no-one could 
prevent the name ‘Exxon’ being used by claiming infringement of copyright alone. 
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This case clarified the boundary between copyright and passing off to protect a 
literary phrase, while considering the situation for commercial or non-commercial 
usage. It was not an “original literary work” for the purposes of the Copyright Act 
1956 (U.K.). The plaintiff's claim for passing off succeeded when the defendant 
used the trade mark for insurance services, given the strong reputation of the 
plaintiff's trade mark (although only registered and used for petroleum and related 
goods and services not including insurance services) and the likely confusion that 
would exist in the public's mind if the use was allowed to continue. Nevertheless, 
the plaintiff's separate claim, based on infringement of copyright in the term 
“Exxon” itself, failed. 
The above cases indicated that pure literary words or phrase without artistic 
sense could not be protected by copyright law but the passing off of the words might 
be constituted if they were attached to products or services and might lead to unfair 
competition.  
In Inter Lotto (UK) Ltd v. Camelot Group Plc,
12 
the court purely relied on the 
legislative definition between the relationship trademark and passing off to resolve 
the argued issue of the priority rights and boundary of each right. In this case, the 
plaintiff (Inter Lotto) brought proceedings against the defendant (Camelot) for 
passing off. The plaintiff first in July 2001 used ‘HOTPICK’ in lottery tickets, the 
defendant in Oct 2001 applied for registration of ‘HOTPICK s’ as trademark in 
lottery services, and succeed in registration in 2003. 
The plaintiff relied on its prior rights in passing off to challenge the defendant’s 
trademark use. In other words, what the plaintiff claimed is its goodwill was 
established prior to the defendant started using HOTPICKS, (as early as July 2001 
the plaintiff began to use the mark in ticket sales, but only in July 2002 did the 
defendant go to market, file registration and await the opposing registration). 
Apparently, one year is quite a short period of prior use. Had the plaintiff really 
established a reputation by using ‘HOTPICK’ in lottery tickets in such a short time? 
So the preliminary issue was how to evaluate the reputation and goodwill of the 
plaintiff, and whether the defendant’s use, during the dates of application would be 
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actionable in passing off. The defendant argued that passing off is actionable from 
its filing registration, that the issue was one of priority of rights and ‘hierarchy’. His 
right to use its registered trade mark overrode any common law rights that Inter 
Lotto might have. The mark once registered would have retrospective effect from 
the date of application.  
Where a trader claims he has a right to sue for passing off which prevents a second 
trader obtaining a trade mark registration, he has to show that the right existed at the date 
of application for registration. If he establishes that it does, the application should be 
refused (or if it has already been granted, it should be declared invalid and removed from 
the register (Section 47(2)). If, on the other hand, a trader claiming that he has a passing 
off right cannot show that the right existed at the date of application for registration by a 
second trader, the second trader is entitled to registration and to complain of the use by the 
first trader of the trade mark from the date of application for registration, though he cannot 
bring an action for infringement until the mark is registered (section 9(3)). That is so even 
if the first trader has between the date of application and the grant of registration (which 
may include the period between the date of application and the second trader's first use of 
the mark), built up a reputation and goodwill under the mark. 13 
The trial judge, and subsequently the Court of Appeal, both confirmed that, in 
the passing off proceedings, it would be open to Inter Lotto to adduce evidence and 
rely on the reputation and goodwill in those prior marks up to the relevant time in 
2002: 14 
the presence in the 1994 Act of Section 2(2), which provides in terms that “nothing in 
this Act affects the law relating to passing off,” is fatal to Camelot's claim on the 
preliminary point.’ ‘Section 5 makes detailed provision for the protection of earlier rights, 
including rights in passing off but it does not follow that passing off rights cannot be 
acquired after the date of application for registration by the competing party. In specifying 
circumstances in which a trade mark shall not be registered by reason of the existence of 
earlier rights, the section does not in my judgment have the effect of preventing later use 
forming the basis for a claim in passing off. The law of passing off is expressly stated in 
Section 2(2) not to be affected by the Act and the long-recognised possibility of establishing 
rights by use is thereby preserved.  
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It is clear that passing off protects an earlier right based on the goodwill of the 
business. Section 5 of Trade Marks Act 1994 accords similar protection in refusing 
to register where there is an earlier mark
15
. Passing off is not a property right as a 
trade mark is, but rather a right to seek a remedy during the period of time that the 
goodwill continues to exist. Passing off can be used as a supplementary right
16
, 
complementary to the statutory formal right, especially in a case concerning of an 
attack on the general image, which is not capable of being protected by a trade 
mark.17 
Reputation on Designed Marks Used as Business Name, Brand 
Name, Logo, or Trademark? 
Where one action involves overlapping claims, the courts are trying to 
distinguish specific subject matter within the same object. In Fearns (t/a Autopaint 
International) v Anglo-Dutch Paint and Chemical Co Ltd,
18 
a dispute arose from the 
first defendant’s action, selling paint and ancillary products bay reference to the 
AUTOPAINT brand without informing the claimant’s customers whether he was 
authorised or not .  
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
106 
Judge Christopher Floyd Q.C. in his judgment found mostly for the defen-
dant
19
:  
‘the claims which I have indicated as not being pursued will be dismissed. Of the 
claims pursued at trial:  
(1) the claim for trade mark infringement and “standard” passing off succeeds to the 
extent that the marks were used in relation to products where it was not established that the 
Claimant could not supply them;  
(2) the claim for passing off by false representation as to status fails;  
(3) the claim for passing off by switch selling to the trade succeeds;  
(4) the claim for passing off by switch selling to the public succeeds;  
(5) the claim for malicious falsehood fails;  
(6) the claim for infringement of copyright fails; ’ 
The judge analysed in detail how the notion of a business reputation overlaps 
extensively with the notion of its goodwill and trademark, by the likely 
consequences of words, actions, and advertisement .From the above cases, it seems 
that passing off can be more flexible than trademark law, and can protect marks that 
would not be sufficiently distinctive for registration as a trademark or would be 
otherwise unregistrable. As goodwill is such a vague concept, protection can apply 
to all manner and aspects of a trader’s business operations and activities and 
advertising and marketing techniques. Trademark and passing off both have the 
secondary effect of protecting customers from trade deception. A registered 
trademark is a positive right, which can directly guarantee the origin of goods and 
services. Registration gives rise to rights. There is no need to prove the elements of 
passing off or the reputation of a mark. A registered trademark is protected both 
locally and nationally, whereas a passing off action may only apply in the claimant’s 
area of reputation
20
. Both consumers and traders benefit from a system of 
registration which places limits on what constitutes a trade mark.
21
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The CDPC 1988, and the Registered Design Act 1949
22
 generally set up a 
boundary between copyright protection and design right protection for commercial 
exploitation of a design. Unregistered designs are essentially functional, non-
aesthetic designs. The design right is defined in s.213 of 1949 Act: ‘design right’, is 
a property right which subsists in an original design. The technical definition of a 
‘design’ given is that it is ‘the design of any aspect of the shape or configuration 
(whether internal or external) of the whole or part of an article. ’ ‘a design 
document’ means “any record of a design, whether in the form of a drawing, a 
written description, a photograph, data stored in a computer or otherwise.’ 
A design right does not subsist unless and until the design has been recorded in 
a design document or an article has been produced in accordance with the design. 
The Court of Appeal has indicated that ‘configuration’ refers to the relative 
arrangement of three-dimensional elements.
23 
 
A design right is distinguished from a registered design and there is no 
registration requirement. The aspect of design shape has a clear distinction from the 
‘eye appeal’ requirement for registered designs. Unregistered designs are intended to 
offer protection for functional designs; the eye appeal of registered design has no 
technical function. The worth and ingenuity of an unregistered design might be 
found in its detailed relative dimensions. In the case of registered designs, the 
tangible form is evidently required for the purposes of registration. In the 
registration system, the date of registration is the starting point for the term of 
protection.
 24
 
Section 236 of the CDPC 1988 covers any work in which both copyright and 
design right subsist. In such a case any copyright infringement excludes any design 
right infringement. Anything that is an infringement of the copyright in the work 
will not be an infringement of the design right. This provision clearly aims for a 
complete separation between copyright and design right. It applies to design right 
infringement cases, whereas s. 51 applies to the copyright infringement cases. Once 
a copyrighted design is put into production of an industrial function for commercial 
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purpose, it can only be protected under the design right with a short duration of 15 
years maximum
 25
. A design work before industrial process as product for 
commercial exploitation can still enjoy copyright protection of 25 years. The 1988 
Act was intended largely to put an end to industrial copyright.  
S 51 of the CDPC1988 provides that it is not an infringement of any copyright 
in a design document or model recording or embodying a design for anything, other 
than an artistic work or a typeface, to make an article to the design or to copy an 
article made to the design. That means there is no infringement of any copyright in 
transferring a design document to commercial product, except an artistic and 
typeface document. 
Some further guidance is provided by the case BSW Ltd v Balltec Ltd.
26 
There 
the judge dismissed the claimant’s claim of copyright infringement, and held that, 
although BSW had copyright in its drawings, it was not an infringement of copyright 
in the slurry separator design document to make an article to the design or to copy 
an article made to the design.  
The duration of design rights also suggests that CDPC 1988 tries to compro-
mise both artistic copyright and design right, to encourage industrial exploitation, 
and to achieve similar rights and remedies, even under different causes of action. 
Section 52 provides that the duration of copyright in a design document derived 
from an artistic work is 25 years from the date first recorded; S. 216 provides for a 
design right to expire fifteen years after the design was first recorded in 
documentary form, or when an article was first made to the design, unless articles 
made to the design were marketed within five years. In that case the design right 
expires ten years after the end of the year in which they were first marketed. Under 
s. 269 the duration of a right in a registered design is five years, but it can be 
renewed by applying to the registrar for an extension and paying the prescribed 
renewal fee. Most designs will be exploited before the end of a five-year period. If 
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such exploitation takes the form of items made to the design becoming available for 
sale or hire, the term of unregistered design protection is ten years from when the 
exploitation first occurred. In the absence of exploitation, the term of unregistered 
design protection expires 15 years after the end of the creation year. So unregistered 
design rights roughly offer 15 years of protection, during which the right holder has 
the exclusive right to reproduce the design for commercial purposes
.27  
The limited nature of protection for a design right is also clarified in Fearns (t/a 
Autopaint International). 
28 The judge held that Fearns’ copyright protection in the 
design and logo on the paint tin was limited to 15 years. As the articles in question 
were paint tins, they did not fall into the exception for printed matter of a primarily 
literary or artistic character. Fearns' claim for copyright infringement, in those 
circumstances, had to fail. 
The case of Jules Rimet Cup Ltd v The Football Association Ltd 
29 
also raised 
the issue of whether copyright claim and design right claim can be overlapped to 
protect same article, and whether the copyright protection to a design is limited to 15 
years.  
The judge stressed that the design infringement claim excluded a copyright 
claim on the same subject issue, and confirmed that once fifteen years have passed 
since the date of the first sale of such articles, it is not an infringement of the 
copyright in the drawing to apply the design in the drawing to any article, regardless 
of whether the article is one excluded from consideration by the above provisions: 
30 
Accordingly, where the design for articles has been applied industrially and such 
articles have been sold, and designs for that genre of articles were registrable (i.e. not 
excluded from registration by the rules), the restricted protection scheme applies.  
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The dynamic relationship between registered design right and copyright has 
been fully considered in British Leyland Motor Corp Ltd v Armstrong Patents Co 
Ltd.31  where the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal set up a hierarchical 
approach with a four-tier structure in relation to designs applied industrially:
32
 
(a) the top tier consists of industrially produced objects, such as wall plaques or 
medals, which are themselves intrinsically artistic. These are dealt with by excluding them 
altogether from the Registered Designs Act. if a design is excluded from registration by 
rules, copyright protection can be relied upon [25 years protection now]…. (b) The second 
tier consists of genuinely artistic works which, if applied to objects, would be of registrable 
designs. After 15 years from first use or registration, the copyright [now called design 
right] was lost for all objects…. (c) The third tier in the hierarchy consists of designs which 
are not in any way artistic (such as a gas cooker), These, provided they are not fully 
functional, can claim the 15-year Registered Designs Act protection, but there is no 
copyright protection for the designs as such….(d) The bottom tier consists of designs which 
are purely functional. No protection at all is available for them, unless they are 
patentable.‘ 
Above all, the CDPC1988 together with case law has made the boundaries 
clearer between copyright, design right and the trademark right. S. 236 expresses 
copyright protection prior to design right; s.51 stresses there is no copyright 
infringement where a design is exploited into commercial purpose; s .52 operates to 
cut down copyright protection to 25 years, where there has been industrial 
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exploitation; that is where the copyright owner has made by an industrial process 
and marketed articles falling to be treated as copies of the work, or has consented to 
such acts.  
The CDPC 1988 sets up not only a boundary, but also a bridge to protect and 
exploit IPR according to the character of the subject matter and its usage in special 
circumstance. Before the CDPC 1988, disputes about the copying of designs of 
industrially produced functional articles had to establish that the copyright in an 
artistic work, such as a drawing of the design of a functional article, entitled the 
owner of the copyright to prevent reproduction of the drawing, either directly or 
indirectly (e.g. via a three-dimensional article made according to the drawing), or 
any substantial part of it, whether in two-dimensional or three-dimensional form.
33 
This had widespread repercussions in industry, in particular in the manufacture and 
supply of spare parts by persons other than the original manufacturer or its licensees, 
for the purposes of fitting to, or matching, articles designed for and produced by the 
original manufacturer. The outcome of these cases was not regarded as satisfactory, 
particularly in the context of competition law and the law of the European Economic 
Community. Nor was it regarded as satisfactory within the framework of intellectual 
property law.
34
 A design right introduced in CDPC 1988 also reduces the extent of 
protection from copying afforded to the designs of industrially produced articles 
and, in the case of spare parts, removes protection from copying completely by 
express provision.
35
 The CDPC 1988 set up a clear boundary to identify an original 
design in what condition should be protected by copyright, or functional industrial 
design right, or trademark.  
Protecting information or expression? 
Where novelty or originality is a prerequisite for most IPR protection, as with 
patents and registered designs, confidentiality agreements are a very important way 
of protecting inventions or designs before applications are filed. An invention can be 
disclosed to a prospective financial backer under a confidentiality agreement without 
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compromising its novelty. The courts recognise that information can be protected if 
it is of the right sort. They seek to balance the rights of the proprietor of confidential 
information against the rights of those who have an interest in using it. The result is 
that the use of confidential information may generally be restrained to a reasonable 
degree and for a reasonable time. The information must be specific and well-defined 
and of a secret status. The courts have also constructed a boundary claiming for 
patent or copyright protection for patent document, which mainly considers whether 
the claim is based on illegal usage of the new idea or the expression.
36 
In Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd,
37
 the trial judge, Whitford J., 
held that, although the defendants had made use of some of the information set out 
in Catnic's brochure and had taken the plaintiffs' idea of using a box girder 
construction, the defendants' acts did not constitute an infringement of the plaintiffs' 
copyrights and that, if this were wrong, there were other grounds upon which the 
plaintiffs' claim in copyright would fail.  
It was conceded that: 
38 
 
Mr Hodgetts derived the idea of a box girder type of lintel from the brochure. 
…Nothing in the plaintiffs' brochure affected the measurements chosen by Mr. Hodgetts : 
these were basically dictated by brick dimensions, cavity dimensions and the depth of a 
standard mortar course’ (by which I think he clearly meant that they were not in any sense 
copied from any other drawing) and did not infringe the copyright in the brochure 
drawings, which were the only material originating from the plaintiffs available to Mr. 
Hodgetts when he made his drawings. 
Whitford J. concluded: 
In my view, by applying for a patent and accepting the statutory obligation to de-
scribe and if necessary illustrate embodiments of his invention, a patentee necessarily 
makes an election accepting that, in return for a potential monopoly, upon publication, the 
material disclosed by him in the specification must be deemed to be open to be used by the 
public, subject only to such monopoly rights as he may acquire on his application for the 
patent and during the period for which his monopoly remains in force, whatever be the 
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reason for the determination of the monopoly rights. If this be correct, and even if I were 
wrong in the view which I have expressed that D3 and D4 do not infringe, upon 
publication, the plaintiffs must be deemed to have abandoned their copyright in drawings 
the equivalent of the patent drawings. 
In Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, 
39 
the claimant bought the following claims, so 
far as still extant at the end of the trial: 
40 
 
(i) A claim for infringement of copyright. (ii) A claim in passing off. (iii) A claim to 
such copyrights as Mr Ainsworth might himself have acquired. (iv) A claim in confidence to 
restrain Mr Ainsworth from making his helmets and armour. (v) A claim to enforce the US 
monetary judgment. (vi) A claim to enforce US copyright (but no other US rights).’ 
In the end that judge supported only the claim based on an infringement of US 
copyright and dismissed all other claims from the claimants. As to the secret 
material provided to the defendant for the purposes of making props, the judge held 
that: 
41 
 
However, all that confidentiality disappeared when the material was put in the public 
domain, which it was when the film was publicised and then shown. If there is some form of 
residual confidentiality in the drawings themselves then that is not subverted by what Mr 
Ainsworth is doing now. So prima facie, and looking no further than that, Mr Ainsworth is 
no longer using any material which has retained its confidentiality. 
3.1.2 Relying on Case Management to Identify Genuine Claims 
Sometimes the boundary of rights is clear, and the problem arises from 
overlapping claims about how to identify the true subject issue from the multi-
claims. Boundaries between types of subject-matters become blurred when litigants 
argue the subject matter from different views and perspectives in order to support 
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overlapping claims. This requires the judge to identify the real claim by effective 
case management. 
In BSW Ltd v Balltec Ltd,
42 
the applicant had brought several infringement 
claims on its design alleging copyright, design right and patent right infringement. 
But he failed in all the claims. The infringement claims were mainly made on the 
basis that it would have been impossible for defendant to have designed, produced 
and tested a range of products incorporating ball and taper technology in such a 
short period without copying B's existing designs.  
As for relying on pre-action disclosure to find infringement evidence, the judge 
held that:
43 
‘It does not need the disclosure sought to make out its claim of design right. But it 
does need it to be able to establish and plead an allegation of infringement. As things stand 
it has no evidence of that.’ 
The judge also employed abuse of process to dismiss unnecessary overlapping 
claims. In Ocular Sciences Ltd (OSI) v Aspect Vision Care Ltd, 
44 
the judge held that 
it can equally be an abuse of process to give proper particulars of information which 
was not, in fact, confidential because a claim based even in part on wide and 
unsupportable claims of confidentiality could be used as an instrument of oppression 
or harassment against a defendant. There was a risk that the more technology that 
was put in issue the more likely it was that the court would jump to the conclusion 
that some of what had been copied was confidential. It was an abuse of process for 
the plaintiffs to maintain such broad claims which they knew or ought to have 
known that these were unjustified.  
In Fearns, 
45
 the claimant also brought several claims to protect his right. Some 
claims the judge struck out, based on lack of enough evidence in their support:
46
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These were not the only causes of action which were raised in the Particulars of 
Claim. I struck out certain other causes of action originally pleaded which required proof 
of foreign law at the commencement of the trial. Yet further causes of action have not been 
pursued in the light of the evidence. (Although a conspiracy to injure by “lawful means” 
was pleaded, it was not pursued. That cause of action requires that the causing of harm be 
the predominant purpose. 
3.2 Overlapping IPR Trials in China 
3.2.1 General Provisions in IPR Statutes, and Large Extent of 
Discretion 
The general protected scope and duration for IPR in two countries may be quite 
similar,
47
 but English IPR statutes are detailed and focus on activities and the precise 
manner of infringement. This greatly decreases misunderstanding of infringing or 
permitted acts in relation to different works and creation. For example, concerning 
the owner’s rights, in China’s copyright law, there is only one article—article 10, 
which lists a general content of copyright: the right of publication, the right of 
authorship, alternation, integrity of the work, reproduction, distribution, lease, 
exhibition, performance, show, broadcast, information network dissemination, 
production, adaptation, translation, and compilation. 
48 
In UK copyright law, there 
are twelve sections stipulating the exclusive rights to the copyright owner. The acts 
restricted by copyright are set out from section 16 to section 28, which give detailed 
description about direct infringement behaviour and indirect infringement 
behaviour. The scheme also explains what assumption should be held when an issue 
of copying or passing off arises in the proceedings. The meaning of infringing copy 
in UK copyright law not only lists the copying manner, but also considers the 
condition and required evidence to raise this issue.
49 
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Compared with English trademark statute, Chinese trademark law lacks clear 
context especially on the process of implementation and balanced consideration of 
relative factors involved. China trademark law only generally lists the exclusive 
right of registered trademark
50
; there is no description about the relationship 
between earlier rights, unregistered marks and registered trademarks. 
The TMA 1994 gives a much clearer definition than the China Trade Mark 
Law 2001 about the relation between earlier mark, later mark, concurrent mark and 
confusion recognition.
51 
A later registered trade mark does not have to give way to 
an earlier mark; 
52
 a registered trade mark is not necessary superior over 
unregistered trademark.
53
 Similarity does not necessarily lead to confusion. 
Confusion is not necessarily caused by the later mark usage.
54
 English law explains 
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clearly in the situations in which trademark infringement is directly committed 
where there is no need to prove reputation or confusion. It also shows in what 
situation there is need to prove confusion or association and in what situation there 
is a need to prove well known or reputation in England.
55 
If Chinese trademark law had provided express context and condition for the 
exercise of the discretion, and had clarified the relationship among trademark rights, 
if the various possible commercial activities were listed, and if the prima facie 
condition to raise every issue had been clear, there would be fewer misunderstand-
ings and conflicts arising from enforcement and legal interpretation.  
In Yun He Ren, 
56
 the main argument is about whether there was infringement 
and confusion in using a similar word mark as the registered trademark and as 
business name mark.  
The claimant argued that it had a trademark right in the words mark with a 
picture, 'YUN HE YI NA', registered in May 2006. The defendant argued that it had 
a business name right on the similar mark also registered in June 2006. The claimant 
sued the defendant for infringing its registered trademark right. But the defendant 
contested the validity of claimant’s registration as being in bad faith and against 
prior use. 
57
 
If we consider the argument under the trademark law of the UK, the dispute 
would disappear and become unnecessary. The result would be very clear ,under 
section 11 (3) and section 47 (2E) , both sides could use their trademark or business 
name mark in their registered scope properly ;or there would be no legal confusion if 
both used their mark honestly, for which registration was sought under section 7; or 
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the claimant ‘s registered trademark might become invalid if the claimant’s 
registration was proven in bad faith , under section 47 (2).
58
 
But those identifying factors and the conditions required raising the issue, 
slipping away from the China trademark statutes. By leaving these matters out of the 
statute, China IPR statutes allow a very wide judicial power in interpreting law in a 
specific case. They give the courts little constraint to pick and choose any 
assumption and favoured factors from general provisions. So it is not surprising that 
the courts in China have a great deal of arbitrary power to decide the meaning of law 
and factors for consideration, but give no reasoning for litigants to understand such 
discretion. 
59 
 
3.2.2 Lack of Clarification of Meaning of Rules through Judicial 
Process 
There are issues, such as in what situation to allow an interim pending request 
about the revocation of registration; and how to identify the nature of similarity and 
confusion; what elements should be considered in trademark infringement and unfair 
competition; what are the reasonable grounds to judge a person or entity deliberately 
selling or purchasing faked goods with IPR involved. These are issues frequently 
raised in trademark infringement cases in England and China.  
Although UK trade mark law does not contains express provisions relating to 
discretionary stay of proceedings , through case law, English courts gradually 
developed and set up the rules to assist with the conditions for exercise of the 
discretion on staying the main trial pending the results of interim proceedings.
60  
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There are a number of factors to consider before the courts exercise the 
discretion to grant a stay of proceeding
61
. In order to achieve the balance of justice 
between the parties, English courts would regard all the relevant circumstances of 
the particular case in considering the uncertainty surrounding the validity of rights, 
including: how long these overlapping proceedings would proceed; in what way the 
length of the stay of proceedings would affect the interests of both sides; what 
possible interim decisions might conflict with the final proceedings; what 
unnecessary costs or delay would be caused in considering the final result; whether 
‘greater weight should be given to an assertion by a commercial party that it has a 
good reason for resisting a stay’.62 
Interim request for staying of proceeding? 
Chinese courts do not substantially consider the interim and potential issues, 
and often ignore them arbitrarily on grounds of no direct influence on the main trial. 
Even though the same issue is raised again and again in similar cases, no specific 
inference can be used as guidance for later argument. In many cases
63
, the judicial 
decision on stay of trial pending the invocation is a repetitive declaration of the 
general provision,
64
 and no case in trademark law has ever been order an interim 
trial to explore the condition or circumstance for requesting stay of process. The 
refusal reason is always the same: ‘The filing notice regarding the revocation of 
trademark and its result would not affect the present case hearing; further, there was 
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no compulsory requirement in CPR to stop an infringement hearing, pending a 
revocation result.’ 65 
In CHNT Holding Share Co. v. CHYM Ltd.,
66
 the appellant (the defendant 
CHYM Ltd) appealed against the trial judgment because there was no proper 
consideration of an interim order. The appellant believed that there would have been 
a different result if the trial court had given a hearing of its request for a stay of 
action.
67 
But the High Court affirmed the trial court 's decision and said, ‘it is not an 
effective defence for the defendant to raise the stay pending a request to delay 
trademark infringement hearing, because the defendant's Chinese word mark is still 
in opposition stage, and it has no legal right to challenge the claimant's existed trade 
mark right ’.68  
In this case, two causes of action were considered, trademark infringement and 
unfair-competition claims in the first trial. A prominent point in this case is that the 
claimant was a well known electric light producer with a trademark 'ZHNT', well 
known in the whole of China; the defendant was a common light producer in Bei 
Jing. The claimant was founded in 1994 and registered 'ZHNT' with Chinese 
characters, '正泰 ', together in 1997 on a lighting product, and in 1999 got the 
certification of a well-known trademark in China. The defendant registered its 
company 'CHYM Ltd' in 2003. It applied to register two marks on lighting; one was 
'CHYM' with a circle shape together, and the other was Chinese words '正泰亚明'. 
Its first one was permitted as a trademark in 2005, but the second (Chinese words 
mark) was still in opposition process when the infringement suit against him was 
filed in the trial court. 
69 
In 2005 the claimant found that the defendant prominently used the Chinese 
words '“正泰亚明' on its lighting package and in its website introduction. It sued the 
defendant for direct infringement of its trademark rights, with similar marks on the 
                                               
 
温州正泰集团股份诉北京正泰亚明有限公司因侵犯商标权及不正当
竞争纠纷一案，北京市高级人民法院民事判决书（ ）高民终字第 号
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
121 
same goods. It also sued for offending the anti-unfair competition law, by 
misleading consumers to buy the defendant's goods as the claimant's. 
70 
In the first trial the defendant applied to stay the trial process, pending the 
result of the opposition process in the administrative bureau, but the first trial court 
dismissed its application and held that the defendant had infringed the claimant's 
trade mark rights and offended the anti- unfair competition duty. The trial judge then 
awarded RMB 120,000 yuan. 
71 
 
The defendant appealed to the High Court, mainly on the ground that the first 
trial court was wrong to refuse to stay the process which would affect assessment of 
the damage. The appellant (the defendant CHYM Ltd) appealed against the first trial 
judgment, but the appeal court did no more than follow the trial court decision, and 
simply reaffirmed what the trial judge had said. 
72 
In Yun He Ren
 73
, there would have been very valuable and guidance for a later 
similar issue, had it ascertained and interpreted the meaning of staying trial pending 
revocation process. Since the claimant’s application for a trademark was three 
months later than the defendant’s business name registration, and the claimant’s 
wife once worked for the defendant, all this evidence had at least set up a probability 
to doubt whether the claimant was honest in his trademark registration. The 
claimant’s registered trademark would be invalid if the claimant’s trademark 
registration were proved in bad faith. So staying the trial process pending the result 
of revocation process should have been necessary, if the chance of revocation had 
been very high and the final remedy was too late or costly for the defendant. This is 
what a UK court would do. 
74 
The result of interim application in this case would greatly have influenced the 
ownership of the argued mark, and whether it was necessary to continue the 
infringement of trademark trial. But the trial court held the stay of hearing, and 
pending the result of trade mark revocation, had no direct influence on the 
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infringement hearing, since the defendant did not provide evidence to prove its 
design process on the argued mark. Such recognition is arbitrary. Whether further 
evidence is needed in process of trial, is always influenced by subsequent issues. 
The question is why the defendant should prove the process of its designed mark, 
rather than the claimant, especially where the trademark registration was challenged. 
Here the assumed burden of proof is arbitrary.  
Likewise, how to identify a lawful licensing contract and to ascertain whether 
the defendant has justified grounds in selling the faked goods, is raised in Levis 
Strauss (concerning selling faked cloth)
75
, in Deng Shi Yuan (concerning producing 
and selling faked welding tools )
76
, and in JinGo Adversary (concerning producing 
and selling faked music CD). 
77 
Meaning of ‘without knowledge' of infringement? 
How to interpret and ascertain whether a licensing contract or trading deal is 
under the permission of the genuine IPR owner or exclusive licensee, has a 
fundamental effect on the whole infringement trial and consideration of damage. A 
trial court has, before making judgment, to clarify whether a licensing contract or 
trading deal claimed by the defendant is really legal, whether the argued acts 
(selling, storing, advertising, publishing, producing) is in or out of the contract, and 
how to ascertain the infringing duty and damage , especially among a non-name 
producer, big name seller or publisher. The doubts and issues in the cases mentioned 
above were not answered, but the courts made arbitrary declarations. The trial courts 
did not properly ascertain and interpret the meaning of ‘without knowledge of 
infringement’ in article 56.78 If the information given in the main street shops is 
unclear about the trademark owner or legal licensing or permission towards the 
goods and service ; or if the trade dealer deliberately sells or purchases faked goods 
from unknown street peddlers or producers, should such trading be judged as direct 
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infringement or secondary infringement? How might selling fake goods in the main 
street be prevented? Is this mainly caused by untraceable or small producers, or by 
the big name sellers deliberately taking advantage of the minor duty of selling, as 
opposed to producing, in infringement calculation? 
In JinGo Adversary Company
79
, the faked CD sellers as defendants were big 
market traders ( MeiLian Mei Supermarket and Beijing Hai Chuan Disk Company). 
The plaintiff cited all the defendants in the legal action and sued twice in respect of 
illegally producing, and selling faked music CD ‘BANDARI ’ in China. The 
producing defendants all defended on the ground that their producing acts were 
under a producing licence agreement with the CD publishers ( JiangXi Studio, and 
Gong Zhou Studio), with the licensed number (ISRC CN-E21-01-302-00/A.J6 ). 
The defendants also showed the delivery receipt of 20,000 copies of CD music from 
the publishers. But even after the second trial, the final judgment in the second suit 
did not ascertain any infringing duty to the publishers (JiangXi Studio, and Gong 
Zhou Studio), and did not grant any damages to the sellers, producer and publisher. 
The courts confirmed the infringing duty owed to the producer on the basis that he 
did not properly check the legal position of the licensor (publisher). But the trial 
court and appeal court did not confirm the infringing duty on these big publishers, 
who had no any connection with the genuine CD owners but had licensed the 
producer to copy it. The final judgment, as confirmed by the appeal court, held that, 
the producer (Hai Chuan CD Ltd) should stop producing and bear RMB 900 of the 
legal cost and fee, and that the seller (Mei Lian Mei supermarket) should stop selling 
and take RMB 100 of the legal cost and fee. It dismissed the request of the plaintiff 
for damages.
80
  
The defence provided by the defendants in these cases was very different in 
respect of the nature of evidence, and infringing period and manners. Such 
difference reveals a cooperative role in this infringing chain. Some sellers may be 
not just sellers, but also involved in producing. But all these trial courts had not 
distinguished their different intentions from the purpose of law on direct and 
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secondary infringement, and had not interpreted their different effect on the 
infringing duty and damage calculation. 
81
 From their application of the law, we 
cannot read out how the Chinese courts tried effectively to stop the selling of faked 
goods in the main street, and to guarantee the genuine IPR owners could get 
substantial damage compensation from the chain infringing acts, whenever in 
producing, selling, copying, licensing, broadcasting, etc. 
It seems that for Chinese courts, a declaration of a statement of the provision 
has replaced the recognition the meaning of rules.
82
 There is no ascertaining process 
to develop or explore the connection between general provision and its specific 
situation. Facing different rights’ protection, Chinese courts could not clarify and 
identify the specific condition to give a merit judgment. We have no chance to know 
for a Chinese court when is a situation where a staying process pending the result of 
a revocation might have affect on the infringement hearing
83
. It is still a mystery in 
Chinese judgment what should be considered in determining whether a trade dealer 
has taken necessary steps to know and check that its act does not involve 
infringement of IPR. 
 
Identification of goodwill and likelihood of confusion in trademark 
infringement? 
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English court requires the potential problems or preliminary issues to be 
considered and even to be appealable if they directly influence the final decision. 
84 
 
Based on specific facts in each case, rules are set up by English courts in 
ascertaining the conditions to raise the issue of passing off and trademark 
infringement. English courts confirmed a rule of, no goodwill no passing off action, 
in a tort law claim;
 85 
where a claimant has no goodwill in the UK, he is unable to 
sustain a passing off action.
86  
Three essential elements should be identified in 
passing off claims: goodwill or reputation attached to goods or services; a 
misrepresentation made by a trader in the course of trade to the public and 
prospective customers; and actual or potential damage to the business or goodwill.
87
 
Goodwill may be geographically limited. A reputation for goodwill in 
Birmingham is different form that found in London.
88 
A registered trademark is 
protected and tested nationally, whereas a passing off action may only apply locally. 
‘As set out above, registered trade mark rights are only superior to passing off rights 
which are not established at the date of registration. Passing off rights which are 
established at the date of registration are earlier rights which invalidate the 
registration. 
89 
After many similar cases, the boundary and rule between unfair competition 
and trademark infringement is still unclear in China. 
90
 We do not know whether 
reputation or goodwill on a mark used in dissimilar goods or services should be 
regarded separately as belonging to each user, or only as belonging to the prior user. 
The vagueness, uncertainty or loophole is filled up in England by cases, but in China 
it still remains after the final judgments.  
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In Gong Zhou Restaurant Ltd v. Cai Gen Xiang Restaurant Ltd,
91 
the claimant 
(Cai Gen Xiang) alleged that the defendant (Gong Zhou Restaurant) had infringed 
its registered service trademark 'CAI XIANG GEN' on the Category 42 restaurant 
registered in 1995. The defendant registered in 1998 with 'CAI XIANG GEN' as the 
keyword and public name of its business. Its argument was that even if it thought 
both parties were in restaurant service, yet the word marks were different in 
arrangement order, meaning and style. Also (and especially) the claimant was 
located in the city of Guang Zhou, whereas the defendant was in Beijing, so that 
there was no chance of confusion on the part of local customers in mistaking the 
claimant's food as the defendant's. 
92 
 
In order to support its argument the defendant handed in the following 
evidence: since Oct 2004 there were no business licence recordings in the Industrial 
and Business Administration Bureau of Guang Zhou. The picture showed that the 
premise address of the claimant registered was a drug store not a restaurant. A 
website search reflected there were several similar registered trademarks in the 
restaurant service: 'JIN XiU CAI GEN XIANG', 'CAI GEN XIANG SHAN', 'DU 
SHI CAI GEN XIANG', 'MEIFENG CAI GEN XIANG', etc. 
93 
The trial court recognized that both parties' marks were very similar as to their 
meanings in Chinese, but a little different in their order arrangement. As a whole 
impression under normal awareness, their visual looks could easily cause confusion 
to a normal customer. Considering that they were in the same service field, the judge 
held that the defendant had infringed the claimant's trademark right and should pay 
RMB 500,000 yuan to the claimant.
94 
The defendant disagreed with the first trial judgment and challenged it on the 
ground that it did not consider an important piece of evidence--- that the 
respondent's mark had not been used for several years, and that several similar 
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registered trademarks existed in China.
95  
Surely it was hardly to justify the 
reputation on the mark owned by the plaintiff and the confusion caused by the 
respondent (defendant) if the defence was proved. But in the final judgement the 
trial court and appeal court both only affirmed the protection of the registered 
trademark right and did not explore the boundary: how to protect other rights and 
interests when facing different legal grounds and overlapping claims. 
The same problem occurred in Blue Lotus Culture,
96  
where the claimant 
registered ‘ Blue Lotus’ as a trademark, and took action against the defendant (who 
had registered ‘Blue Lotus’ as part of his company name), for trademark 
infringement and unfair competition in 2006. The basic issue was also around how 
to understand and judge ‘confusion’ and ‘similar mark using on similar goods or 
service’. The claimant had a trademark right about ‘Blue Lotus’ and the defendant 
had a company’s name right on the same mark.  
Even though the claimant registered his trademark prior to the defendant’s 
company’s name, a defendant’s usage of its name may not cause confusion among 
consumers. But after the first instance and appeal trials, the courts made the 
infringement judgment mainly based on the claimant’s trademark registration being 
earlier than the defendant's business name, so the defendant should respect the prior 
right and avoid using the similar mark in its business. Such decisions ignored the 
situation of concurrent reputation, non-continuous use, or several similar marks 
registered in the food service, which had caused reputation dilution and non 
distinctiveness. 
Let us now consider a similar case from the balanced consideration an EU 
judge in Lloyd v. Klijsen:
97 
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The degree of recognition of a mark is one factor to be taken into account in the 
overall assessment of confusion. The greater the degree of recognition of the mark, 
the greater the likelihood of confusion with a similar sign, and vice versa; the 
likelihood of confusion must be properly substantiated and genuine — it must not be 
merely hypothetical or remote; the risk that the public might believe that the goods 
or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically-
linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of association, but not likelihood of 
confusion. 
In making that likelihood of confusion assessment, account should be taken, in 
particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does 
or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has 
been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically 
widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the 
undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the 
public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating 
from a particular undertaking. 
The general provision from both China Anti-competition law and England case 
law is well established and is that, the confusion cannot automatically be asserted, 
just because names or marks are identical or similar or prior in registration. The 
issue is whether the relevant public would be sufficiently confused and also what 
caused such confusion. 
98 
The Chinese courts cannot put all relevant factors together 
to illustrate how these factors influence each other, or to reveal the casual link 
between using a similar mark and its misleading of the relevant public. We can 
hardly see any specific recognition and identification on the facts to justify the 
meaning of confusion or the element of misleading in each specific case
99
.  
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It appear that in a Chinese judge’s view, once there is similarity there is 
confusion, and once there is confusion it must be caused by a later mark user or a 
local user. The reasons for this offend our common sense after reading the 
judgments. Nor do the Chinese judges make clear what is the purpose, in statute law, 
of proving a mark’s reputation and confusion in infringement claims. It is still 
uncertain how a Chinese court deals with the relationship between protection of a 
registered trademark right, and an unregistered trademark and a business name, if an 
identical or similar mark is used in similar goods or services. 
The Chinese courts lack the process of identification of specific facts, and 
ascertainment of the meaning of law under specific situations, as a UK court does
100
. 
English courts hardly believe that one legal right is absolutely superior to others.
101 
English courts dig into detailed and specific facts in each case and confirm that, 
goodwill may attach to one trader or to a number of them collectively. But the larger 
the number of those sharing goodwill, the harder it may be to establish 
distinctiveness in the public mind.
102 
 
It is possible that each of two traders has built up an independent reputation 
quite honestly in the same or similar mark. If one can show that he has the 
reputation in a business name for a particular area, the other will not be permitted to 
use the name in that area; if each has built up his reputation in his own locality and 
both are expanding business into intermediate territory, neither may be able to show 
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that the public there associate the name with him so as to lead to passing off by 
other.
103
 
3.2.3 Arbitrary and Mechanical Identification of Damage  
The normal aim of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the 
harm caused him by the infringement. Most IPR cases in China are about rights 
infringement, subject to a tortuous action and sometimes also a breach of licence. 
Generally, the victim may recover for any loss which was foreseeable, caused by the 
infringer, to put the victim back to his position before the infringement action. 
According to CPL 2007 and IPR laws, calculating damages in copyright, trademark 
and patent infringement matters is similar, and includes the following types of 
potential recovery: actual damages of the plaintiff; the infringer's illicitly gained 
profits; and statutory damages or general royalty fee. 
104 
But for IPR infringement, there is a specially regulated distinction between 
direct infringement and secondary infringement, which affect the different remedies 
for a direct infringing act and a secondary infringing act.  
According to the China Trademark Law 2001, Article 56: 
the amount of compensation for the infringement of the exclusive right to the use of a 
trademark shall be the income obtained by the infringer ... A person selling goods without 
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knowing infringement of the exclusive right to the use of the registered trademark who is 
capable of both to evidence the goods he obtains in a lawful manner and to provide the 
supplier shall not have the responsibility for compensation
.105 
For a Chinese court, a legal purchasing receipt with a supplier name on it is the 
main evidence required to prove the defendant did not know he was engaging in 
illegal selling, and that he had met the requirement of Article 56 ‘in a lawful 
manner’. In most infringement cases, the situation is often that the large retail 
traders provide their purchasing receipt from small untraceable producers, rather 
than directly from trademark owners or enfranchised licensees. Then large retail 
traders use such purchasing receipts as evidence to prove that they are only 
secondary infringers, to avoid paying damages. If IPR owners try to sue the faked 
goods producers or supplier for the direct infringement damage, they often find such 
suits to be meaningless, because the small producers have no money to pay 
damages, or they suddenly disappear from the registered address. 
106
 These claims 
by the large retailers are upheld in most IPR infringement cases. In 
Pfizer Products Inc.,
107
 the final judgment held that the drug seller (Lian Hua 
Supermarket) did not need to pay damage but should just stop selling, on the ground 
that the legal purchasing receipt proved that he did not know they were illegal 
medicines. 
A reasonable business dealer has to wonder how only a legal purchasing receipt 
could prove the defendant did not or should not know the drug in sale was illegal 
medicine. In most trademark infringement cases, the Chinese courts have used such 
reasoning to deny compensation from large retail traders to the mark owner.
108 
 
It appears that Chinese IPR law and courts have not set up a clear rule to check 
the marketing process in order to guarantee the seller or other secondary infringers 
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really did not know nor had no reason to know his behaviour was likely to involve 
piracy and counterfeit.  
It would be unbelievable for a UK court to make a secondary infringement 
decision based on such evidence. As in China, secondary infringement is exempted 
from liability for damage, under section 10. 
109
 But UK law strictly and clearly 
indentifies what action is genuine secondary infringement, what is merely alleged to 
be secondary infringement, and whether infringer knew or had reason to believe his 
behaviour was likely to involve infringement.
110 
In determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge for the purpose of 
this section, a court shall take into account all matters which appear to it in the particular 
circumstances to be relevant and, amongst other things, shall have regard to  
(a) whether a service provider has received a notice through a means of contact 
made available in accordance with regulation 6(1)(c) of the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013); And  
(b) the extent to which any notice includes - 
(i) the full name and address of the sender of the notice; 
(ii) details of the infringement in question.  
In Handi-Craft Co v B Free World Ltd,
111  
the first claimant traded in a 
particular type of anti-colic baby bottles. The claimants sued the first defendant, 
alleging that he had used on its own products a logo similar to the claimants’ 
product, and pretended “Y” bottles were a renamed version of “X” bottles (the 
claimants’). The claimants claimed patent, copyright and registered community 
trade mark infringement and passing off by the first, fifth to eighth and tenth to 
twelfth defendant corporate and personal bodies (selling directors). 
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 In identifying the infringement liability, the court held that it was appropriate 
to extend that liability to the seventh, eighth and twelfth defendants as directors of 
the offending companies: 
112  
there was secondary infringement, i.e. there was importation, possession and distri-
bution, etc., of these bottles with the relevant knowledge that the defendant's bottles with 
the printed packaging therefore were undoubtedly imported and/or distributed in the 
course of business and/or sold within the jurisdiction by all of the UK corporate defendants 
who were the main defendant's alter ego. They therefore possessed the relevant knowledge 
at the time these acts were carried out. All the other defendants were also guilty as joint 
tortfeasors.  
In relation to damages, English courts have, through cases, set up how to 
understand the meaning of ‘know or had reason know’ in construing behaviour as 
secondary infringement. They stress the normal practical business duty, in 
purchasing, to check whether the product is from genuine IPR owners or the legal 
licensees
.113
 If the check has not reached a prudent reasonable level, then sellers fail 
in defending their undertaking on the ground that they did not know the goods were 
fake. 
In Chinese courts, there is no proper calculation of damages because of poor 
case management, a failure to identify what damage is associated with what 
infringing acts, and a failure to confine the causal connection between claims and 
the infringing action. 
114
 So even if there are several infringing actions, as in Levis 
Strauss (concerning selling faked cloth),
115
 in Deng Shi Yuan (concerning producing 
and selling faked welding tools), and in JinGo Adversary (concerning producing and 
selling faked music CD), the Chinese courts just calculate the selling damage --- 
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how many fake goods had been sold, ignored the secondary infringing acts--- 
importing, publishing, licensing and advertising.  
In Deng Shi Yuan v. jinxing Qi Hang Science & Technology Ltd,
116 
the claimant 
(Deng Shi Yuan) brought overlapping claims against the defendants for 
infringement. He alleged that the defendant (Jinxing Qi Hang Science & 
Technology) had infringed his trademark right and offended anti-unfair competition 
law, by illegally producing and selling faked welding tools under his trademark 
name and package. In order to prove that the defendant not only illegally sold, but 
also illegally produced its products, the claimant proved that every authorised 
'GORDAK' seller had signed with him a genuine guarantee of quality, and that he 
had not found any other seller who had sold faked goods, including the non-party 
that the defendant had stated. The claimant pointed out that the defendant had sold 
his products for several years, and was quite familiar with genuine products. The 
item in the defendant's receipt of 100 welding tools from a non-party seller was 
clearly added later, with different handwriting, and could not prove that these 100 
products were from a legal authorised seller. 
117 
The court confirmed that the defendant was under a duty in respect of the 
illegal production, if he could not provide evidence of where the faked products 
came from. But the defendant had provided a non party seller’s bill. Then the court 
held that both possibilities existed, that they might have been faked by the defendant 
or faked by a non-party. Based on such uncertainty, the trial court dismissed the 
claimant's claim for illegal production, since the clamant had failed to satisfy the 
standard of proof. 
118 
In the end, because there was no arrangement for cross-examination about 
illegal production, only one claim of the plaintiff’s two claims towards the 
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defendant’s infringement was decided. In fact, the plaintiff suffered even more loss 
in protecting his IPR with two claims than if he had only brought one claim, because 
he got nothing to compensate him for the legal fees which he had incurred. In China 
overlapping claims by litigants are discouraged to resolve their all arguments in one 
suit. 
In Hao You Duo,
119 
both the plaintiff and the defendant disagreed with the 
damage calculation of the first trial judgment and appealed to the High Court. The 
plaintiff appellant said he had provided enough evidence in proving its economic 
loss, and also expressed a willingness to disclose more computer data if needed. The 
damages calculation should have been based on its genuine loss in the infringing 
period. The defendant appellant argued that the amount of damages decided by the 
first trial court was unreasonable and there was no direct causal link proved between 
the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s undertaking. 
The appeal court confirmed the trial court’s method based on the average profit 
calculation by reference to the general department store's data from the Statistics 
Bureau of Gongzhou. The judge said both parties' methods were unrealistic. 
However, he did not put forward his method in the first trial, and allowed both sides 
to argue why his method was realistic and fair to this case. Even in the appeal 
process, there was no interpretation on why using average profit of last year should 
be fair and acceptable. There is no detailed interpretation of what compensation 
methods should be used, based on the actual damages of the plaintiff; the infringer's 
illicitly gained profits; statutory damages or general royalty fee, or average profit in 
its industrial field.  
Based on the real damage or nearest profit in the specific case to consider 
infringement, this is just the English court‘s manner in Hollister Inc v Medik Ostomy 
Supplies Ltd 
120
. When the claimants sued the defendant for trademark infringement 
by selling parallel imported medical goods without prior notice to the trade mark 
owner, there was no argument about the nature of infringement. The main argued 
issue was about how to calculate the damage. The claimant H pursued an account of 
profits as the relief on liability based on the sale price values. The defendant M 
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argued the profits derived from the infringement was nil, or a token sum, because 
that the acts of infringement were due solely to the failure of giving adequate notice 
rather than selling faked goods, and that H had not suffered any damage caused by 
that failure. The trial judge Birss QC, first reaffirmed the long set up principle about 
infringement
121
 :  
‘The proprietor can choose which remedy to seek, damages for loss or an account of 
profits, but cannot have both. They are freely entitled to choose the one they think will give 
them the largest sum of money. In this case the claimants chose an account of profits.’  
Then he checked the specific situation in this case
122
:  
‘The purpose of apportionment of costs is to try and arrive at a fair figure for the 
costs properly to be regarded as relevant to a product or activity—in this case the parallel 
importing and repackaging of product [rather than counterfeiting infringement or 
hindering a proprietor’s battle against counterfeiting]’. 
In the end he held the damage should be calculated based on package unit 
rather than sale price
123
: 
My reasons for this are as follows. Medik is not a manufacturer, it is a trading 
business. Medik buys goods in and then sells them on at hopefully a higher price. For 
goods which are not repackaged, the sale price is therefore generally just a function of the 
purchase price (plus a margin). The sale price is not a function of work carried out by 
Medik on the goods. For goods which are not repackaged, the only processes Medik 
performs on the goods are to bring them in, warehouse them and send them out. ’ ‘I will 
award the claimants half of Medik’s profits. That seems to me to be an effective deterrent to 
dissuade those engaged in repackaging and relabelling from not giving notice which 
accords with being proportionate to the reality of this case as a breach of a procedural 
requirement and nothing more. 
 The damage principle in Chinese IPR law also stipulates that if a copyright or 
trademark right is infringed, compensation shall be paid according to the actual loss 
of the right owner or account of profits earned by the infringer. The compensation 
shall also include the reasonable expenses of the right owner for preventing the act 
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of infringement. If the actual loss of the right owner or the illegal gains of the 
infringer could not be ascertained, the people's court shall judge the compensation 
not exceeding RMB 500,000 yuan depending on the circumstances of the act of 
infringement
124
.  
But in adjudication, it seems once there is a dispute about the damage 
calculation, the Chinese court would automatically conclude that ‘the actual loss or 
the illegal gains could not be ascertained,’ so it is up to the judge to gave an arbitrary 
decision. Unlike the English courts China courts do not attempt to find the nearest 
loss or gain from the parties’ arguing information. In Starbucks Corporation125, the 
compensation claimed by the plaintiffs was RMB 1,060,000, comprising RMB 
500,000 for economic losses and RMB 560,000 for reasonable expenses and legal 
fees. The court held that the calculation was on the basis of the profits made by the 
defendants from the infringement. Since it was hard to determine the profits made 
by the two defendants from the infringement of trademark and unfair competition, 
the compensation could be lawfully determined as RMB 500,000, on average 
calculation. 
126
 
As to whether the other four trademarks claimed by Starbucks Corporation and 
United Corporation were well-known trademarks and therefore should be given 
higher damage compensation, 
127
 the court held that since the two trademarks, 
"STARBUCKS" and "星巴克", were determined as well-known, and thus sufficient 
and effective legal protection already had been given to the plaintiffs' rights, there 
was no necessity to determine whether the other four trademarks were famous or 
not. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim was not upheld.
128 
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In Yinte Laige Co. v. Kegao Co.,
129 
the appellant (the defendant in the first trial) 
challenged the first trial judgment on the ground that the respondent had got a patent 
right for industrial design about its products - toddler toys, building blocks, and 
should not be awarded double protection regarding the same aesthetic design under 
copyright law and patent law. The appellate court affirmed the first trial decision and 
held that there was no Chinese IPR statute law which prohibited overlapping 
protection of the same creative design. On the other hand the High Court also 
mentioned that the overall impression of the claimant’s design was not very high in 
terms of novelty and originality, and that the reputation or goodwill on the building 
blocks was limited and not high enough, so that the claimant should be awarded a 
lower compensation.
130
 
It is impossible to assume that: if one claim is successful and received 
compensation, then other claims do not need to be considered because sufficient and 
effective legal protection had already been given to the plaintiffs' rights
131
; if 
defendant could provide purchasing receipt then there is no need to consider 
producing damage; if there is disagreement between parties about the method of 
calculating the damage, then the court does not need to notice both sides but can 
directly use an unexpected way to decide compensation
132
; and that once 
infringement is already recognised and confirmed, there is a need at the damages 
stage to evaluate the extent of novelty and originality in a work, in deciding how 
much compensation should be given. 
133 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
English trial court comprehensively ascertains the reputation and goodwill of a 
designed mark used as business name, brand name, logo, or trademark. Through 
identifying the usage for commercial exploitation or non-commercial intention, 
distinguishing between overlapping claims with substantial facts or mere doubts 
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about infringement to identify genuine claims, and contrasting protection of 
information or expression to identify the subject matters and its protection period, 
English courts have tried to set up cogent and consistent rights boundaries to 
decrease overlapping claims in IPR.  
 In China, the general provisions in IPR statutes have allowed a large area of 
judicial discretion. Through analysis of the cases involving interim request for 
staying of proceedings, through proof of the meaning of ‘without knowledge ’of 
infringement, and through identification of goodwill and likelihood of confusion in 
trademark infringement, the Chinese courts have showed that their judgments lack 
clear and consistent recognition of the meaning of applied rules . There is no proper 
compensation for infringement based on arbitrary and mechanical identification of 
damage. IPR rules and statutes in Chinese cases are applied like 'window dressing' 
garnishing the judge’s arbitrary discretion. Chinese legal decisions not only cause 
conflicting results among similar cases, but have also lost a chance to gradually 
develop and enrich the understanding of the statute law on a case by case basis as in 
England.  
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Chapter Four: Legal Finality, Issue Estoppel and 
Consistency 
In Chapter Three we discussed the conduct of the defendant and the potential 
for multiple and overlapping claims based on different causes of action by IPR 
owners seeking a remedy. IPR substantive law identifies the boundaries of rights to 
guarantee that final judgment in one suit resolves issues and includes all argued 
claims, guarding against later challenges to enforcement on the basis of unsolved 
issues. This chapter will discuss how the trial system strengthens the binding force 
of judgments in order to achieve the finality of litigation and efficiently enforce 
judicial decisions. The trial system maintains the binding force of its judgments 
against relitigating by way of res judicata, estoppel and abuse of process. 
4.1 Legal Finality in England  
Res judicata is a doctrine intended to ensure finality in the dispute resolution 
process, by ensuring that issues which have already been decided are not relitigated. 
Abuse of process, a doctrine that is accepted in England, is also intended to ensure 
finality, though the principles upon which it operates are different from those 
underlying res judicata.
1 
This doctrine has the goal of avoiding piecemeal litigation. 
Thus, when relief is sought through a judgment, a subsequent lawsuit might be 
barred where a prior lawsuit: (1) involved the same parties; (2) involved the same 
claim of cause of action as the later suit; and (3) was terminated by a final judgment 
on the merits.
2 
Finality in the dispute resolution process is central to the strong protection of 
intellectual property rights, but IPR also poses particular difficulties in this regard. 
There is the fact that situations continually change; a trade mark that is distinctive 
today may fail to be so tomorrow. Disputes will often affect third parties; thus, for 
example, if a claim for revocation of the validity of a trademark succeeds, its valid 
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registration will potentially affect everyone in the world, and not just the parties to 
the dispute. It is also the case that parts of IPR, such as the registration of patents 
and trademarks, ideally require finality of administrative procedures, which have not 
been the subject of judicial adjudication. In these respects IPR disputes pose 
problems for the res judicata doctrine, which are greater than those posed in the case 
of most other types of dispute. 
Finality issues lie at the very core of principles of IPR protection. For example, 
the need for the very development of the trade mark, in the UK in the Nineteenth 
Century, arose because of the difficulties otherwise facing claimants bringing 
successive passing off actions
3
. Registration of a trademark provides protection 
essentially against the whole world, it is more convenient and direct to prove 
trademark infringement with statutory rules than proving passing off under goodwill 
of case law. Though conceptually they are quite disparate, the avoidance of 
continual litigation is also the main justification for a strong res judicata doctrine, 
and for the concept of abuse of process. Another problem with IPR is that of 
overlapping protection from substantive laws, a single act can give rise to multiple 
causes of action. 
4  
4.1.1 Legal Finality Facing Challenge from Overlapping Intellec-
tual Property Rights 
Overlapping intellectual property rights are very common; indeed this is one 
main characteristic of IPR laws. Two or more IPR rights might subsist in the same 
subject. For example, a document might be subject to copyright and to an obligation 
of confidence. An article of manufacture might be subject to patents, design rights 
and trademarks. A pictorial trademark might also be subject to copyright.  
So in IPR law, a single act of infringement by a defendant may easily violate 
several rights of the claimant. For example, company A uses a very similar 
packaging and trademarks in his products to that of company B, causing confusion 
and damaging B’s reputation. B might choose to sue company A for breach of his 
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design right, or his registered trademark right. An employee might be involved in 
infringement of copyright by the act of making a copy without permission, and a 
serious breach of confidence to her employer, in giving the copy to a competitor. 
There might also be a breach by the latter party, if he realises or ought to realise that 
the report is confidential. The employer could dismiss the employee for breach of 
contract of employment or sue the employee for infringement of copyright, and an 
injunction could be sought against the competitor, restraining him from using the 
information and from divulging it further.  
In legal systems where different courts hear different causes of action, this 
allows a party to bring separate cases, where legal rights in each action rest on 
different legal relationships or legal grounds. In jurisdictions adopting such systems, 
it is not contrary to the doctrine of res judicata if the same issue arising from 
different IPR laws is raised in more than one suit, by the same litigants in civil 
litigation. Thus, what often happens in practice is that where one claim fails, the 
claimant uses another claim to obtain a remedy. Moreover, in such systems the 
structure of claims may not allow litigant to raise multiple causes in one suit.
5 
 
But modern civil procedure, at any rate in England, prevents a party from 
relitigating the same subject matter. The litigation system encourages the party to 
frame the whole story together in a single action, raising multiple causes of action 
based on different IPR grounds or statues, to solve all his arguments and rights 
claims concerning one issue. 
6  
This allows courts to design several methods or 
doctrines in process, such as cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel, res judicata 
and abuse of process, to prevent relitigation. In one multi-claims suit courts also use 
abuse of rights to compromise different remedies and to provide legal protection for 
a person’s intellectual property. 7 For example, in an infringement action between A 
and B, the res judicata doctrine will require the court to review how many of A’s 
rights are violated, or how many wrongful acts are committed by B. The court will 
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also require an inquiry into B’s rights, and A’s wrongs, in order to discover whether 
B also has a potential claim against A, arising out of the same series of events, 
which may constitute a separate cause of action in a permissive pleading.  
Where civil procedure rules require resolution of all material conflicts in one 
suit, the res judicata doctrine should prevent either party from later raising any issue 
which was, or could have been, raised at the trial. Arguably this is to allow rules of 
procedure to defeat rehearing of a claimant's cumulative IPR rights. However if the 
judge in the former case has allowed the hearing of all the issues in one suit, were a 
later court to allow one party to use new facts to challenge the same (decided) 
subject matter, this can be considered improper and unjust, both in terms of the 
interests of the individual IPR litigants, and the public interest. On the other hand, if 
the judge in the former case could not structure and solve all conflicts in one suit, 
but the later court refuses to file unsolved issues around this same subject, this 
would also create injustice. So it is very important to scrutinize whether a judge has 
encouraged parties to put forward all their argument together in one suit and has 
properly heard them before the court reverts to res judicata and abuse of process.  
This chapter considers when, where and how the courts use the procedural 
measures of cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel or abuse of process to control a 
case hearing, and their effect on IPR protection in England and China. The chapter 
analyses the way in which judges approach the problem, including the way in which 
an interlocutory ruling is conveyed to the litigant, and the understandings of the 
cause and nature of the problem. 
4.1.2 Relationships between Cause of Action Estoppel, Issue 
Estoppel and Res Judicata 
As we know, all judicial systems require and seek to preserve the finality of 
litigation. Once claims or pleadings are successfully proven and meet the 
requirements of the cause of action, the judge will make a final decision or 
judgment. In civil proceedings, the court can from time to time make an 
interlocutory ruling on the issues in the case. Other than this, and in the absence of 
appeal, the parties must accept and be bound by the judicial order, decision or final 
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judgment. They cannot bring the same cause of action to relitigate the same issues in 
a later litigation. 
8 
The doctrine of res judicata maintains the binding effect of a 
judgment. Courts fully rely on the technicalities of cause of action estoppel and issue 
estoppel to promote res judicata in England, supplemented by abuse of process to 
promote finality.  
According to the Oxford Law Dictionary, a cause of action is defined as the 
facts that entitle a person to sue. It is usually revealed in the statement of claim.
9 
The 
cause of action is the heart of the statement of a claim. The core propositions in 
contention and the central issue of the case are the elements of the cause of action. A 
working case theory should deal with the legal elements of the case. 
Without an adequately stated cause of action, the claimant's case can be 
dismissed at the outset. The cause of action of a suit should introduce the applicable 
legal rule, the facts (what has happened to the claimant), and a causal conclusion 
that flows from the application of the law to those facts. The statement of claim 
should disclose all the facts necessary to support such conclusion.
10
 For example, in 
a claim for infringement of trademark, the cause of action should include the 
following: a registered trade mark certification; the way in which the trade mark 
rights have been infringed; and a calculation of loss and damage. 
Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceed-
ings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the 
same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter. In relation 
to the effect of cause of action estoppel, Lord Keith said in Arnold v. National 
Westminster Bank plc:
11 
 
The bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is 
alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment. The discovery of new factual 
matter which could not have been found out by reasonable diligence for use in the earlier 
proceedings does not, according to the law of England, permit the latter to be re-opened. 
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Issue estoppel arises in relation to an issue that has previously been litigated 
and determined between the same parties or their predecessors in title. The issue 
must be an essential element of the claim or defence in both sets of proceedings. It 
may arise where later a party wishes to rely on new evidence or a new argument to 
change the former decision on that same issue.
12
 
Lord Keith said that issue estoppel:
13 
 
may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary ingredient in a cause of 
action has been litigated and decided and in subsequent proceedings between the same 
parties involving a different cause of action to which the same issue is relevant one of the 
parties seeks to re-open that issue. 
Issue estoppel is mainly used where a final decision on an issue has been made 
in the previous proceedings, then the identical or relevant collateral issue arise to be 
relitigated in the later proceedings. The claims based on the identical or relevant 
collateral issue will be dismissed or not reconsidered by the later court, and the later 
court will accept the former decision made in the previous proceedings. 
Res judicata is the principle that when a matter has been finally adjudicated 
upon by a court of competent jurisdiction it may not be reopened or challenged by 
the original parties or their successors in interest.
14
 Its justification is the need for 
finality in litigation. Originally the binding effect of res judicata was exactly the 
same as that of cause of action estoppel. Now res judicata also includes issue 
estoppel, when it extends to bar an issue that one of the parties seeks to re-open 
involving a different cause of action. This is regarded by jurists as a form of 
collateral estoppel.
15
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Thus there is no doubt that res judicata will totally prevent one party from suing 
on the same issue in the same cause of action in a later process; cause of action 
estoppel bars reopening all points which had or should have been decided in the first 
suit. However, a judgment should resolve the issues around the same cause of 
action, or separate causes of action pleaded, which is the precondition of enforcing 
res judicata. Civil procedure relies on issue estoppel to curb relitigating about the 
same issue, in later proceedings in separate causes of action.  
Issue estoppel is often invoked when separate causes of action are presented in 
the first and second suits. It prevents the relitigation of the same issues, regardless of 
what causes of action actually were litigated in the first suit. Cause of action 
estoppel is often invoked when litigants pursue the same claims or counterclaims 
with slightly different facts in the first and second suit. It prevents the relitigation of 
issues which are in essence the same, and which must necessarily have been 
considered in order to get the first final result, regardless of what was actually 
recorded as part of the judge's reasoning in the first suit; though sometimes the 
reasoning is obvious from the result. The doctrine of estoppel within res judicata 
guarantees that any issue that was actually and necessarily litigated in one action 
cannot be relitigated in another subsequent suit. So the binding nature of a judgment 
arises out issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.
16 
 
Generally speaking, one cause of action stands for one legal relationship.
17
 
Because there is a lot of overlapping protection available to deal with the same act 
or events in IPR law, a case may have more than one cause of action, especially 
where it includes a multiple claims resting on different statutes or grounds. Multiple 
causes of action often occur where one event or action concerns more than one 
statute’s rules and complex issues. In such situations, cause of action estoppel and 
issue estoppel may be applied simultaneously, thereby guaranteeing that any party, 
litigating in one subject matter, should not use same or a separate cause of action in 
the second suit, to relitigate same or relevant merits decided in the first suit. 
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4.1.3 Requirements for Abuse of Process 
In China, there is no abuse of process provision in civil procedure law. 
According to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, abuse of process mainly concerns 
those proceeding actions that are regarded as so obviously frivolous, vexatious, or in 
bad faith that they should be dismissed by the court as an abuse of process. The 
Oxford Law Dictionary explained it as ‘a tort where damages are caused by using a 
legal process for an interior collateral purpose. 
18 
Such a definition suggests that abuse of process has strong connection with 
issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. But cause of action and issue estoppels 
look backwards, preventing relitigation of issues which have already been decided. 
They are very dependent on the nature and status of what has been decided. In 
contrast, abuse of process is intended to prevent harassment, and is less dependent 
on the precise status of what has been previously decided before.
19
 
Since a party asserting res judicata or estoppel first must show that the same 
cause of action or same claim is involved in both suits, and that there was a final 
judgment on that claim, estoppel or res judicata cannot bar the possibility that an 
initial proceeding may be used to harass the opposing party. 
20 
This might be so, 
where, for example, the writ has been issued with no reasonable evidence or ground 
on which to serve the statement of claim. 
Nor can estoppel or res judicata bar the situations where a judgment involving 
the same cause of action may be final, but still does not preclude a second action if it 
is not on the merits of case. For example, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction will not bar the identical action from being brought in a court having 
proper jurisdiction. Again, failure to state clearly a claim for relief in the first 
complaint may be rectified by the grant of amendment rights at the time of the first 
dismissal for another complaint, rather than using estoppel or res judicata. Some pre-
trial dismissals, for failure to comply with some court order, will not be given res 
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judicata or estoppel effect either, because it is clear from the very nature of the 
dismissal that the merits of the case or substantial arguments were never determined 
or considered in the first action. There was no prior judgment on the merits. 
However, the judge will apply abuse of process to strike out litigation involving the 
same cause of action or issues, if he finds that the party has failed to amend its 
claims or to perform the order made in the pre-trial process. Pleadings have also 
been struck out as an abuse of process on this ground where a party has been joined 
merely to obtain disclosure of documents or costs or where a claim is a disguised 
action for gaming debts.
21
 
The core value for applying the abuse of process is to combat the litigant’s 
motivation to use a suit as a tool of harassment, damaging the public interest when 
the prospect of winning in the final result is minimal. Abuse of process is mainly 
evaluated and considered in terms of the action’s possible impact upon to the 
interests of each side and the public, e.g. where without good cause, the claimant 
suddenly withdraws his claims before a decision for patent infringement against a 
defendant, and later he attempts to bring the claims against the same person again. A 
judge in England will be likely to strike out his second claim as abuse of process 
because he withdrew his first suit without good cause and wants to harass defendant 
twice about the same issue. The court will strike it out based on the rule of abuse of 
process, rather than issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel, because the earlier 
suit has only reached the preparatory stage, and there was no final decision on the 
first claim, and hence no res judicata to be applied in the latter relitigation.
22
 
Abuse of process has a function similar to that of estoppel and res judicata, in 
curbing relitigation of same issue. So some judges regard abuse of process as a kind 
of issue estoppel.
23 
But we must admit they are based on different reasoning. The 
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former stresses that the second litigation should end because the same issues or 
cause of action have been resolved in the first action; the abuse of process stresses 
that the second litigation should end because it is unfair to public interest or 
constitutes a harassment to the defendant, if a second action is allowed. The question 
whether the court’s decision has involved the merits or substantial argument is 
irrelevant in abuse of process. In particular, therefore, abuse of process is more 
extensive than res judicata and estoppel in precluding the relitigation of other issues 
from the same litigants. It achieves the result that the litigation terminates once and 
for all after the dismissal in the first case, and the question whether the first court’s 
decision is correct or not on the merits is irrelevant. It highlights that the judicial 
system must prevent itself from being used as a tool of harassment.
24
Moreover, 
abuse of process has been codified in the CPR, so it seems that judges now are 
stressing the greater importance of abuse of process in striking out a case, since it 
not only includes the function of res judicata and estoppel, but can also achieve the 
objective of the CPR.
25 
From the above analysis, it is clear that whether estoppel or the res judicata 
doctrine can be applied in a case mainly depends on how the judge classifies the 
contested issues belonging to the same subject litigation in the second suit. Whether 
the abuse of process doctrine can be accepted mainly relies on the judge’s 
recognition of the degree of harassment or offence to the public interest. The 
difficult question lies in how to define the same or different issues, causes of action 
or merits in two cases. Thus it is very important to probe their scope and to check, in 
the jurisdiction where suit is brought, to determine exactly what binding effect is 
likely to attach to a particular judgment. I will examine the position in England and 
China, on a case by case basis. 
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4.1.4 Binding Effects of Estoppel or Abuse of Process in England 
Henderson v Henderson  
In any consideration of the ambit or scope of estoppel, or the binding effect of 
res judicata, it is a necessity to begin with the old case of Henderson v Henderson. 
26 
The decision of Wigram V-C in this case has become a paradigm and is often quoted 
by later cases for the application of estoppel and res judicata. I shall consider res 
judicata development from this case. 
Henderson v Henderson 
27
was a case of brother against brother, brought 
between Jordan Henderson and Bethel Henderson, involving aspects of partnership 
and trusteeship. Their late father had given £15,000 to Bethel in trust for Jordan. 
After Jordan's death his widow and adult children brought proceedings in 
Newfoundland, for the taking of accounts of the partnership and of the estate of the 
father possessed by Bethel on account of Jordan. Bethel failed to appear at the trial 
and a decree was made ex parte for the taking of the accounts, plus any interest due 
to Jordan's estate. When Jordan’s relatives sued Bethel on this decree, Bethel took 
an action against Jordan, in another court (in England) on the ground that Jordan 
was indebted to him on the balance of the partnership account on the basis that the 
money received from their father had been invested in the business, and that Jordan 
owed him money on a private account. 
Wigram V.-C. upheld a demurrer to Bethel's pleadings on the ground of res 
judicata. He expounded the key meaning of res judicata: It was in this context that 
Wigram V-C made his famous statement of principle
:28  
In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of the court correctly, when I say, that 
where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of 
competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward 
their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties 
to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought 
forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because 
they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The 
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plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court 
was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to 
every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, 
exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at that time. 
He observed the same subject in the two suits as following:
29 
 
“… The whole of the case made by this bill might have been adjudicated upon in the 
suit in Newfoundland, for it was the very substance of the case there, and prima facie, 
therefore, the whole is settled.” 
Though there are disputes about the basis of the decision in Henderson, 
30
 it is 
submitted that it was based on issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, because 
the case has at least two causes of action, one raised from the trust relationship and 
the other from partnership. The first suit and the second suit were totally based on 
the same merits and arguments; the second suit was an attempt to use a partnership 
cause of action to relitigate the matters already resolved in the breach of trust action 
in the first suit. The grounds pleaded in the second suit were covered as the defence 
to the first suit, and vice verse. So if in Henderson
31 
Bethel had attended the first 
suit, he could have entered a defence or counterclaim to set off the trust account on 
the ground that Jordan was indebted to him on the balance of the partnership 
account, and that the money received from their father had been invested in the 
business. But Bethel Henderson failed to defend and appeal the final decree, which 
means that all issues around the trust account and partnership account should have 
been resolved between the parties, and res judicata arose to bind all core arguments 
around them. If the judge had tried the second suit and accepted Bethel’s claim, it 
might have led to a judgment contradicting the first decree, adjudicating on Jordan’s 
liability to compensate his loss. So the judge had to terminate the second suit on 
grounds of issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel or res judicata. 
 Wigram V-C did not explain clearly the scope of res judicata, and he judged 
that the structure of claims in above two suits were same. But the decision had a 
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huge influence on later cases. It broadened the effect of res judicata from cause of 
action estoppel, in which the final judgment binds only in respect of what the 
claimant has claimed, to issue estoppel, in which the final judgment should bar 
reopening all relevant issues under the former subject of litigation. Its importance 
has been re-stated by judges in many cases, which often attempt to probe the scope 
of same issue and exceptional circumstance through issue of estoppels, abuse of 
process and retrospective effect of a judgment. 
In Poulton v Adjustable Cover and Boiler Block Co,
32
 the claimant had sued the 
defendant for infringement of a patent. The defendant had alleged that the patent 
was invalid on the ground of anticipation by prior use. Subsequently the defendant 
had discovered a further prior use and petitioned for the patent to be revoked. On the 
inquiry as to damages in the infringement action, the defendant relied upon the 
revocation of the patent as a defence to the claim for damages. The claimant 
contended that the defendant was estopped from introducing the invalidity of the 
patent. This contention was upheld by Parker J and by the Court of Appeal. For the 
purposes of the inquiry as to damages, the defendants were estopped by the 
judgment in the first action and therefore the claimant was entitled to substantial 
damages, notwithstanding the revocation of the patent in later proceeding. Fletcher 
Moulton LJ said:
33  
The judgment obtained by the Claimant against the Defendant settled for ever, as res 
judicata between these parties, that this Patent is valid and that it was, infringed during the 
period that it was valid. So far as those issues are concerned the cause was terminated … 
This stresses that damages were based on past infringements in respect of 
which validity and infringement are res judicata as between the parties, and the 
effect of later revocation of the patent is not retrospective to the former 
infringement.  
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An issue which can complicate many IPR disputes is that IPR decisions often 
involve parties other than those immediately involved in the dispute. In Coflexip SA 
v Stolt Offshore MS Ltd,34, Coflexip SA was the registered proprietor of a European 
Patent (UK), which contained product and process claims. In 1996, Coflexip SA and 
the exclusive licensee of the patent brought proceedings against Stolt Offshore MS 
Ltd., and other companies in the same group, for infringement of the patent. The 
defendants counterclaimed for revocation and failed; Laddie J held that the patent 
was valid and infringed. In subsequent proceedings a third party claimed and 
succeeded in an action for revocation of the patent, relying upon different prior art, 
and the claimant counterclaimed for infringement. In these proceedings, Laddie J 
held that the patent was invalid and made an order for revocation which was stayed 
pending an appeal.
35 
 
The defendants in the original action then applied for the inquiry as to damages 
against them to be stayed, pending the decision on that appeal. The claimants 
opposed the stay and argued that, even if the revocation of the patent were 
maintained on appeal, the defendants would be bound by cause of action estoppel. 
This argument was upheld by Jacob J,
36  
and Chadwick LJ came to the same 
conclusion:
37 
 
This is not a case in which it can be said that the prior art on which [Stolt] now wish 
to rely … would compel the court to hold that [Coflexip's] patent is invalid. The most that 
can be said is that [the fresh prior art] provides a further basis for [Stolt's] attack on the 
validity of [Coflexip's] patent. In those circumstances it is clear that, if [Stolt] cannot 
succeed without relying on the prior art which they seek to introduce by amendment, 
permission to reamend would , necessarily, lead to a retrial. 
Here the court stressed that there would be new evidence in the present appeal 
action, and that would be crucial if the third party eventually succeeded for 
revocation of the patent. Further, if this new evidence from the third party appeal 
were admitted, it would lead effectively to a retrial, which is against the principle of 
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appeal. Therefore the estoppel extended not only to the matters mentioned in the 
judgment itself, but also to the matters decided for the purpose of that judgment. 
 Finality from final civil judgment or from administrative decision? 
IPR disputes are not always resolved by courts, but may be dealt with 
administratively. It is necessary for finality to apply to some stages of this process 
also, but it is a matter of interpreting the statutory provisions as to whether any 
particular stage of the proceeding is intended to be final. Where it is not, and in 
particular where the legislature contemplates that it may be open to challenge at a 
later stage, it would be inappropriate to apply res judicata or an abuse of process 
doctrine, in the event of that later challenge occurring. In Buehler AG v Chronos 
Richardson Ltd,
38
 the Opposition Division of the European Patent Office had, in 
March 1995, rejected Chronos' opposition to Buehler's patent, granted in 1992. 
Chronos could have appealed, but did not do so. In April 1996 Buehler brought an 
action against Chronos in the Patents County Court (in England), claiming 
infringement of that patent. Chronos denied that the patent was valid and repeated 
the allegations put before the Opposition Division of the European Patent Office, 
counterclaiming that the patent should be revoked. Buehler appealed against the 
refusal of its application to have the allegations of invalidity struck out, claiming 
that they were res judicata, having been ruled upon by the Opposition Division, or 
alternatively were an abuse of process. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed Buehler's appeal and held that under the 
European Patent Convention 1973, Art. 138, the validity of a patent was a matter to 
be determined in revocation proceedings in the national courts. The Convention was 
given effect in England by the Patents Act 1977, and the power to revoke a patent on 
specified grounds was given to courts and comptrollers under s. 72. The jurisdiction 
under s. 72 extended further than that exercised by the Opposition Division, under 
Art. 100 of the Convention, and the grounds for revocation under s. 72 were 
different to the grounds for opposition. Accordingly, the cause of action pleaded by 
Chronos in its counterclaim could not be regarded as identical to that pleaded before 
the Opposition Division. That was sufficient to dispose of cause of action estoppel, 
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but issue estoppel does not require an identical cause of action. However, the court 
also took the view that a decision of the Opposition Division was not a final judicial 
decision as to the validity of a patent and therefore was no bar to revocation 
proceedings under s. 72. Aldous LJ stated that issue estoppel cannot arise unless the 
judgment relied upon as giving rise to the estoppel was a final judgment. Though 
abuse of process was not explicitly considered as a separate head in the Court of 
Appeal, it is difficult to see how that could apply either, in the event of a final 
judgment. 
This case stresses that a decision or judgment made in opposition proceeding 
has only finality to bind the later court proceeding reopening the same issues—the 
validity of registration on any grounds, but the registry decision has no final status in 
respect of matters concerning revocation of trademark validity, because patent law 
has accorded (by statute) a second chance to challenge the validity of a patent, in the 
revocation process. Moreover, consideration of the Opposition proceedings had been 
conducted in a manner very different from that of High Court litigation, with 
counsel representing the parties and with proper disclosure and cross-examination in 
legal process. 
4.1.5 Res Judicata, Abuse of Process and New Facts  
If we consider a case such as Henderson v Henderson,
 39 
the matter complained 
of was over and done with. Either Jordan was indebted to Bethel on the balance of 
the partnership accounts, or he was not, and all the relevant evidence could have 
been provided for the proceedings in Newfoundland. IPR disputes are different; 
whether a trade mark is valid is not determined for all time in any set of 
proceedings. The mark may, for example, later lose its distinctive character and 
become a common name. Clearly, there is no reason not to admit evidence that 
throws light on subsequent grounds for invalidity, whatever determinations have 
been made on validity in earlier proceedings. This was one of the issues before 
Richard Arnold QC in Hormel Foods Corpn v Antilles Landscape Investments NV.
40 
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The claimant (Hormel) had registered the trademark SPAM in 1938 in respect 
of the well-known canned meats. The defendant (Antilles) was an Internet service 
provider and registered the trademark SPAMBUSTER in 1997 in respect of a 
computer program and service for countering unsolicited e-mail. In 2001 Hormel 
filed an application to the Registrar of the Trademarks for an invalid declaration of 
Antilles’ mark on grounds of lack of distinctive character. In 2002, the Registrar 
dismissed Hormel’s application and Hormel chose not to appeal against this 
decision. In 2005, Hormel sought a declaration in the High Court that the registered 
trademark of the defendant was invalidly registered or should be revoked based on 
different grounds. Antilles counterclaimed for the same relief in respect of Hormel’s 
trademark, and claimed Hormel was barred by cause of action estoppel, or abuse of 
process on the principle originating from Henderson v Henderson.
41 
 
Thus, Hormel had failed to stop the defendant’s registration in opposition 
proceedings, and then sought to take revocation proceedings in court on different 
grounds, which would have been available at the time of the earlier proceedings. 
Both the claimant’s claims and the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaration of 
invalidity were dismissed on the ground of issue estoppel, there having been a final 
decision on whether the defendant’s mark was invalidly registered. 42 
However, the claims for revocation of trademark are not bound by estoppel or 
res jusdicata, because a later claim for revocation was concerned with events 
occurring subsequent to registration. Under s. 46 the former opposition proceedings 
are not binding on it. Insofar as the facts related to the time of the former 
proceedings, abuse of process applied, on Henderson v Henderson
43  
grounds, 
because the claimant should have brought these before the earlier court. To use the 
same facts on different grounds to apply for revocation of the trademark was a 
harassment, and hence an abuse of process. 
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Richard Arnold QC also emphasised the principle in Buehler,
44 
to the effect that 
there is no bar to reopening later proceedings if the rule of procedure has arranged 
more than one process to hear the case. (The 1994 Act expressly affords a party who 
has failed in opposition proceedings, under section 38, a second opportunity to 
defeat registration, by way of a declaration of invalidity, under section 47.) 
The case of Hormel
45
 also develops new principles to deal with continuous 
events (in the erosion of distinctiveness of trademark). It suggested that the claimant 
(or indeed anybody) could successively challenge for revocation of an existing 
trademark if new events occurring subsequently to registration, meet the grounds of 
section 47. Richard Arnold QC also agreed that issue estoppel would not be applied 
if the claimant could prove the facts in its present claims which were different to the 
facts in the claim advanced in the Registry proceedings. But without new facts or 
evidences to prove the occurrence of new events, the claimant cannot rely on the 
same or different grounds to relitigate revocation of a registered trademark. This will 
constitute an abuse of process based on ruling in Henderson v Henderson.
46
 
 In Hormel
47
, after failing to obtain a declaration of invalidity on grounds of 
lack of distinctiveness, the claimant tried to rely on the defendant’s inactivity in 
failing to take steps to prevent his trademark from becoming a common name, but 
the claimant could not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant’s 
inactivity had rendered his trademark becoming a common name, and losing its 
distinctiveness. The judge held that:
48 
 
 ‘the claimant’s claim for revocation is made out as at 25 April 2003. I am not 
satisfied, however, that the claimant has established that grounds for revocation existed at 
an earlier date. Although … I have found that SPAMBUSTER was already being used 
descriptively as at 5 Dec 1997, I am not satisfied that it was a common name in the trade 
for relevant service at that date.’ 
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Beuhler 
49
was followed, and Hormel 
50
distinguished, by the Court of Appeal in 
Special Effects Ltd v L'Oréal SA,
51
 a distinction again being drawn between 
preliminary and final proceedings. The case involved prior opposition proceedings. 
In 2000, the claimant's predecessors in title had applied to the Trade Marks Registry 
to register the mark “Special Effects” in relation to goods in class 3. The first 
defendant opposed the application under section 38 on grounds including that the 
words were not distinctive in relation to the goods in question, and were likely to be 
confused with its own trademarks using the word “FX”, for similar goods sold in the 
United Kingdom. The hearing officer rejected the first defendant's grounds of 
opposition and registered the claimants' mark. The first defendant did not appeal but 
in 2002 it successfully applied to the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal 
Market for the registration of “Special FX” as a Community trade mark, 
notwithstanding the claimant's opposition. In 2005 the claimant began proceedings 
against the first defendant and its UK licensee, the second defendant, alleging 
infringement of the “Special Effects” mark. The defendants issued a defence and 
counterclaimed for a declaration of invalidity and for relief on the basis of passing 
off by reference to their own mark “Special FX”.  
On the hearing of preliminary issues, Sir Andrew Morritt C ruled that both 
defendants were precluded by cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel from 
relying on the allegations made by them in part of their defence and counterclaim, 
and were precluded by issue estoppel from asserting use of the mark “Special FX” 
before 30 June 2000 (the date when the claimant's predecessors had applied to the 
Trade Mark Registry for registration of the “Special Effects” mark), whether for the 
purpose of their defence under section 11(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 or their 
counterclaim for passing off.  
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On appeal, the decision of Sir Andrew Morritt C was reversed on the following 
grounds:
52 
It seems to us that the co-existence of the provisions for opposition and for a declara-
tion of invalidity has the result that opposition proceedings are inherently not final. They 
exist at the first stage of the process, before registration. By itself that would not be 
conclusive, but it seems to us that the fact that, at least, any unconnected third party could 
challenge the validity of the registration despite an unsuccessful opposition by another, and 
that, if that challenge were successful, there would be nothing which would bind the 
unsuccessful opponent (in contrast with the position of a party which had unsuccessfully 
applied, at any rate to the court, for a declaration of invalidity), shows that the decision of 
the Registry on opposition proceedings, or more generally a decision to register despite 
opposition, is not a final decision so as to be capable of being the basis for an issue 
estoppel. This is true both as regards the grounds of invalidity and as regards the issue of 
prior use more generally, as relevant to a passing off claim. The same would be true of 
cause of action estoppel if, contrary to our view expressed above, there was a cause of 
action at that stage. … even though the statute has created a specific jurisdiction for the 
determination of the issue of registrability, which establishes the existence of a legal right, 
in the sense of leading to the registration of the trade mark which is itself an item of 
property, the principle of res judicata does not apply to give finality to that determination 
because the provisions as to a declaration of invalidity show an intention to exclude that 
principle.  
It is wrong and unjust to allow a party such as L'Oreal two bites at the cherry of the 
validity of the trade mark. If it chooses to oppose the registration at the preliminary stage, 
and fails, it should not be allowed to try again, on grounds which would have been 
available at the opposition stage, when it comes to court proceedings for infringement and 
a possible counterclaim as to invalidity. There may be other grounds on which invalidity 
can be argued, depending on later facts, but the grounds which had been relied on 
unsuccessfully, and other grounds which could have been relied on at that stage, should not 
be regarded as still open. 
Though the circumstances in L'Oreal are similar to those in Hormel Foods 
Corpn v Antilles Landscape Investments NV, the decision was entirely different. 
Delivering the judgment of the court, Lloyd LJ held that this was not a suitable case 
for the application of either res judicata or abuse of process. Even though the 
claimant in L'Oreal did not claim to declare invalidity of registration by relitigating 
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the validity of registration in court, rather than directly applying for revocation of 
defendant’s registered trademark, the reason for refusing res judicata was the same 
as same as in Hormel, that there is no finality preventing the same issue (trademark 
validity) from being reopened in later proceedings on different grounds, if the 
procedural rule has arranged more than one process to hear the case.
53 
The reason for 
there being no abuse of process can be explained; it is suggested, from two 
circumstances. The first is that it is obviously unfair and unjust if substantive trade 
mark law has provided the chance to challenge the validity of a trade mark in the 
revocation process, but civil litigation does not allow challengers, using the different 
grounds of invalidity to defend themselves in respect of a successive event (passing 
off in the protection period of a registered trademark). Secondly, there is no 
harassment for the claimant, unlike Hormel , because it was right for the judge to 
consider the validity using the new (later) fact and different grounds submitted 
within the trade mark period before expiry. There was an arguable point about 
passing off. So in this case the Court of Appeal reversed and set aside this order of 
estoppel, and permitted the defendant freely to defend his counterclaim. 
54 
It is proper for limits to be placed on estoppel as Lord Upjohn had said:
55 
 
“All estoppels are not odious but must be applied so as to work justice and not 
injustice and I think the principle of issue estoppel must be applied to the circumstances of 
the subsequent case with this overriding consideration in mind.” 
Hormel
56 
and Special Effects Ltd v L'Oréal SA
57 
, these two trademark cases 
reflect different legal effect, in different proceeding stage, on issue estoppel in 
relation to successive actions arising from similar new evidence. They also reflect a 
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balance consideration through a flexible application of issue estoppel to achieve the 
interest of legal finality and the interests of civil justice. 
4.1.6 Conclusion from UK Practice 
From these cases, we can find a clear direction as to how UK judges use res 
judicata and abuse of process. First, all judges stress that the doctrine of res judicata 
or abuse of process must be obeyed (except in special circumstances) to prevent re-
litigation of the same subject-matter once it has been raised, or should have been 
raised in the former suit in a competent court.  
Secondly, English courts are attempting not to give a rigid precise definition or 
lists in classifying the scope of same issues or harassment for the second suit, in 
order to achieve the doctrine's function. The courts take a developing attitude based 
on each case's specific circumstances and the overriding civil justice objective. The 
clear meaning and criteria can only be evaluated in the cases. As Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill concluded in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co:
58
 
‘That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, 
merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and 
also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question 
whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by 
seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot 
comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast 
rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not’. 
Thirdly, English judges are very sensitive to the principles reflected in past 
cases concerning the same subject matter, following the legal principle: ‘treat similar 
cases similarly’. Cases rarely adopt positive definitions but the judges have 
recognized through cases, by an iterative process, that the scope of same subject 
matter is based on the whole story given by litigants. English judges consider the 
scope of the finality from the main evidence, the structure of claims, and the fair 
opportunity for litigant to reveal the issues in the first judgment. Exceptional 
circumstances are based on how reasonable diligence has been exercised by the 
litigants. Through the cases the judges in England have determined that the 
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following situations are not sufficiently exceptional to override doctrines of estoppel 
and abuse of process: if the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
in the first action, but the issue was not brought forward, only because they had a 
sudden accident, were victims of negligence caused a by non-party, or because of 
inconvenience, inadequate time or funds to obtain more evidence; or because they 
omitted part of their case through ignorance or poor strategy
59
.  
Until now, the courts have accepted two exceptional circumstances. One is that 
the judge should not apply res judicata to prevent relitigation of the same subject 
matter from admission of fresh evidence, where the party seeking to challenge the 
earlier judgment is doing so on the basis of developments in the IPR law, or on 
grounds of fraud or collusion arising in the earlier suit. 
60
 The second is where, even 
though the first and the second claim might belong to same subject matter, the 
arrangement plan of the first suit would not allow or allow separately one party to 
raise the matter later raised in the subsequent proceedings; in other words where ‘the 
matter now raised could not and should not have been litigated first time round.
’ 61  
4.2 Legal Finality in China  
4.2.1 Genuine Comparison of Issues or Use of Verbatim Words? 
The rule of legal finality and res judicata are just general principles and 
concepts, and need to be interpreted to fit into the specific case situation. It is 
impossible to lay down a precise definition of same issue and res judicata, because 
their clear meaning and content can only be evaluated in specific cases after 
comparing their facts, decided content, case arrangement and its circumstances. It 
must be for trial courts to explore and decide whether the argued issues in two cases 
are identical, and whether the later issue should be bound by issue estoppel to 
maintain legal finality. 
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Chinese Civil procedure rules also require legal finality, estoppel and efficiency 
and justice, and one suit to solve all disputed interests. 
62 
In China there is no abuse 
of process provision in the civil process. Cause of action estoppel is defined in the 
main civil procedural textbook as meaning that the final decision or judgment can 
only bar reopening of the issues which have been decided in the first suit. If cases 
have the same issues, this means that they have the same subject matter around the 
same facts, the same parties, and the same claims with the same grounds. In other 
words, there is no issue estoppel to bar the subject matter from being relitigated if 
the latter case has a different cause of action or facts, or a separate issue from any of 
those previously considered.
63
 
The Chinese definition of cause of action estoppel means that in theory, 
Chinese civil litigation has at least recognised the same bottom line as England: 
‘Where the issues raised in an earlier claim are identical to the issues raised in a later 
claim, there is an absolute bar on the later proceedings’.64  
But in practice, what is identical issue in two cases? Might we judge whether a 
issue argued now is as same as that already decided in a former case? Do we 
evaluate the binding part in a former case to that in a later one? The above questions 
are mainly answered through an abstract concept and the verbatim words: same 
issues, same facts, and same cause of action. Following abstract and word for word 
interpretation of legal finality , the court will inevitably be fooled into deciding that 
there is a surface difference, when in reality, the issues are substantially the same; or 
that the surface is the same when in fact there is a material difference. When relying 
on abstract expression to measure similarity in issue arguments, the trial courts will 
arbitrarily consider variations in evidence, and bring absurd conflict results. The 
Chinese situation has vividly proved that. 
                                               
 
最高人民法院关于印发《民事案件案
由规定》的通知法发 号
姜伟主编
民事诉讼法
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
164 
In Blue Lotus Culture Company v Blue Lotus Food Company,
65
 the claimant 
brought an action against the defendant for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition in 2006. The claimant claimed that in 2002 he had registered ‘Blue 
Lotus’ as a trademark in pub service; the defendant maliciously used his trademark 
in his shop window and the business logo, which had caused confusion among 
consumers as to whether they belonged to the same company. The defendant applied 
to the court to strike out the claimant’s claim on grounds of res judicata and issue 
estoppel. He contended that in 2003 he registered ‘Blue Lotus’ as part of his 
company name and had a legal right to use this mark; in particular, in 2004 the court 
had tried the dispute on ‘Blue Lotus’ between them, and the defendant had paid 
RMB 20,000 to the claimant according to the final judgment, on ground of misuse of 
‘Blue Lotus’ in its business service. Therefore, according to the doctrine of res 
judicata, that one issue cannot be tried twice, enabling the claimant to get damages 
twice for one loss, so the court should strike out the claimant’s second suit about the 
same issue. 
66 
After repeating the definition of same issue, that ‘the same plaintiff brings more 
than one suit subsequently against the same defendant, about the same facts with the 
same grounds’, the judge refused the defendant’s contention and held that the former 
judgment in 2004 only confirmed that a trademark infringement existed in the 
service brochures and menu, and did not judge whether there was infringement in 
respect of the business logo, shop windows and awning. In particular he held that the 
former judgment did not resolve the confusion caused by defendant’s misuse of its 
company name ‘Blue Lotus’. Therefore the former judgment could not have binding 
effect on the second suit, and there was no res judicata to bar the issue in the second 
suit, because they belonged to different issues with different facts (regarding the 
logo, the windows and the yellow book). In the second suit in 2006, the judge held 
that the claimant got his trademark right prior to the defendant’s company name 
right; and that the defendant had prominently used the similar part in his company 
name in service and caused confusion among customers, thereby breaking anti-
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competition law. In the end the judge in the second suit made an injunction order 
prohibiting the defendant from using ‘Blue Lotus’ as a company name and in all 
business advertisements, no matter whether in a menu or logo.
67 
The defendant paid 
the litigation fee and damages twice (respectively RMB 20,000 and RMB 50,000), 
for the same loss (passing off and trademark infringement). 
In these two judgments, we cannot find whether the same defendant used the 
same plaintiff’s mark simultaneously or subsequently in service brochures, menu, 
business logo, shop windows, or awning before or after 2004 (the first trial). It is 
difficult to see how the judge in the second suit could have imagined that the effect 
of trademark confusion or infringement was only caused by the logo and window 
display, without considering the factors of the menu and brochure. We cannot 
imagine how the compensation would have been calculated in the first suit without 
consideration of all relative business circumstance, but only paying damages in 
respect of the window show. Can it really be that Chinese judges regard business 
reputation and goodwill separately from the logo and other physical aspect of the 
above activity? Can the injunction judgment in the first suit have only barred the 
defendant from using ‘Blue Lotus’ in some but not all aspects of his business 
promotion in food service ? 
68
 
After reading such judgments, one has to wonder whether China judges 
recognise legal finality at all. To say the least, even if the judge regarded the service 
brochures and menu, business logo, shop windows, and awning as newly occurring 
acts after the first trial, on subsequent grounds for passing off, he should first 
examine whether the subsequent evidence had existed at an earlier stage or had been 
discovered after the first trial. If the subsequent evidence had been available during 
the first trial, and the plaintiff deliberately separated the infringing acts into two 
cases, the second suit should be barred by res judicata, because they are merely same 
cause of action. The same result could also be achieved by requiring consolidation 
of the claims, or requiring the plaintiff to show fresh or additional damage for 
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second and subsequent claims. This is how effective case management ought to 
work. 
This is quite a similar situation to the Hormel case 
69
in England. The defen-
dant’s mark SPAMBUSTER had been becoming a common name in the trade in the 
second application for revocation, but the claimant was barred by res judicata from 
using the existing evidence, as further found in the second proceedings, to 
rechallenge the validity of trademark on the same ground of prior use. He was also 
barred by abuse of process from proving the defendant’s inactivity. If the subsequent 
evidences occurred in later continuous events after the first trial, and caused further 
passing off infringement, the claimant would not be bound by res judicata, and 
would freely be able to bring a second suit against the defendant. This is what 
happened in the L’Oreal case in England.  
For a comparison with similar arguments in England, we should consider 
Romer J’s rejection of a claimant’s claims in a second action against the same 
defendants for infringement of the same patent. He explained his reasons for this 
conclusion as follows:
70
 
But a further point is now taken on behalf of the Defendants. It is said that they are 
entitled, in this action, to re-try the question of validity of the patent because they say they 
have discovered fresh material for impeachment — fresh alleged anticipations — and are 
entitled to have the issue of validity re-tried as to this fresh material on the footing 
material. In my opinion, they are not so entitled. If they were held to be so entitled, I do not 
see how there could be finality upon a question of this kind as between parties such as 
these. According to this contention a Defendant might fight his case piece-meal. He might 
raise such objections to the validity of the patent as thought convenient, and when he was 
defeated on those, might raise other points at his pleasure, and might in that way, try the 
case of validity of a patent piece-meal; and, so far as I can see, extend it over as long a 
period as he chose. In my opinion, a Defendant is not entitled to do that. When a question 
of the validity of a patent is brought to trial, by reason of the Defendant challenging the 
question of validity, he is bound to put his whole case before Court, and if he does not do so 
it is his fault or misfortune. He cannot be allowed to put a part of his case, or to put his 
case in an incomplete manner. He is bound then, when that question is raised, to search 
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and to find out all that he intends to rely upon in support of his contention that the patent is 
invalid. 
The Chinese court did not give any proper consideration of the material content 
from the entire evidence used in two cases, of the intention and legal cause behind 
the claims, of the period of infringing acts, and of the remedy decided in the prior 
judgment, but mechanically followed verbatim expressions in two cases’ claims and 
results. Judicial power in China is absolutely arbitrary. 
71
 All courts, no matter 
whether first trial courts, appeal courts or the Supreme Court, can arbitrarily reverse 
or change one decision made by itself or by a higher court in relation to one issue, 
without resolving conflicts. There is a high chance of success for litigants in China 
by reopening a decided issue again if they have enough money and want to separate 
the same issue into pieces to take advantage of the arbitrary exercise of judicial 
power. 
In JinGo Adversary Company v Beijing Hai Chuan Disc Company,
72  
the 
claimant, Jingo Adversary Company, brought two copyright infringement cases 
against the defendant, Beijing HaiChuan Disk Company, for illegally producing and 
selling the music CD ‘Spring Field---BANDARI’.  
In the first case, heard in 2005, the claimant said that in Jan 2002, he had 
obtained an exclusive licence from AVC INC Switzerland, to produce, sell, offer to 
sell, rent, show or authorise others to use the series music works ‘BANDARI’ in 
China (except for Tai Wan, Hong Kong and Macao), in respect of which a non-party 
had obtained exclusive rights. He proved the above rights with documents including 
a ‘Copyrights Declaration’, ‘Exclusive Licence Letter’, and ‘Statement of Rights’ 
from Swiss AVC and the “Copyrights’ Registration Letter ” from the China National 
Copyright Administration. The ‘Copyrights Declaration’ in particular enfranchised 
the claimant in China to take legal action against any kind of infringement on behalf 
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of Swiss AVC. The claimant said that on 15 September 2004 he had found that 
illegal copies of ‘Spring Field’, produced by the defendant, and issued by JiangXi 
Video Publisher, were selling in a Chinese market. The illegal copies had similar 
packaging, and the same music tracks as the genuine copy. The genuine copy that 
the claimant claimed to compare with, were ‘Bandary--- Spring Field’, made in 
Hongkong, imported by the Books Import and Export Company of China, and 
issued by JinGo Tai Wan Company; the record lists showed in the package were 
from Swiss AVC. 
73 
The defendant admitted he had produced the disputed CD but under a licensed 
agreement with JiangXi Video Publisher. He proved that on 11 May 2001 JiangXi 
Studios Publisher had authorised him to produce 20,000 ‘Spring Field’ CDs; he 
proved the coding number,
74 
and that he had delivered all copies to the consignor on 
20 May 2001. The defendant argued above whether the claimant had an exclusive 
legal licence, because there was no evidence to prove that Swiss AVC was the 
genuine copyright owner of ‘BANDARI’. Even if the claimant had a legal licence 
from Swiss AVC, the defendant argued that he would not infringe his exclusive 
rights, because his (the defendant’s) production had taken place in May 2001, earlier 
than the claimant’s licensed rights of January 2002. The claimant could not 
represent Swiss AVC to sue for an infringement which happened before November 
2002, because the claimant was only set up in November 2002, and it was not a legal 
entity before November 2002. The defendant also argued that it was hard to prove 
the defendant‘s CD was similar and infringed the copyright of Swiss AVC, because 
the genuine copy offered by the claimant was not issued by the Swiss AVC, but by 
JinGo Tai Wan Company.
 75 
After trial the judge denied the claimant’s claims, and held that the defendant 
had not infringed the plaintiff‘s licensed rights on the ground that disputed copying 
happened earlier than the time he got the exclusive right. The judge also held that 
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the genuine copy claimed by the claimant was the product of a non-party, which 
could not be used to prove the claimant’s rights without notarisation.76 
As to whether the claimant could represent Swiss AVC to get compensation, 
the court struck out such claim and held that the ‘Copyrights Declaration’ was 
invalid in enfranchising to the claimant, an unregistered company at that time, and 
was also defective as evidence to prove Swiss AVC ‘s legal rights on the music 
work ‘Bandary’. 77 
In the second case, heard in 2007, the claimant sued the defendant again for the 
infringement with the same cause of action, making illegal copies of ‘Spring Field’ 
in the Chinese market. The claimant claimed that on Aug 17, 2004, he found in 
another supermarket (the Meilian Mei Supermarket) copies for sale of the illegal 
music work ‘New Century Light music Series---spring field’, produced by the 
defendant and published by Guang Zhou Studios Publisher. In addition to the 
evidence adduced in the former case, the claimant provided in this case a new piece 
of evidence - the certification letter from Swiss Copyright Association, which 
proved that Swiss AVC was the exclusive right owner of all the music work 
‘Bandary’. The defendant argued that he had produced the disputed CD under an 
agreement with Guang Zhou Studios Publisher, which had itself obtained 
authorisation from JingGo Tai Wan Company. The claimant had no legal ground to 
sue the defendant because China copyright law does not stipulate that parallel 
imports are illegal. Furthermore, the defendant claimed that the second case 
contravened the doctrine of res judicata, because the legal issues concerning the 
disputed copy ‘Spring Field’ had already been heard and adjudicated in 2005, by the 
same court. The claimant should be barred from bringing the second case against 
him with new evidence, which should had been exposed in the former case in 
2005.
78
 
Nonetheless the same court, (the No. 2 Intermediate People’s Civil Court of 
Beijing), denied the defence and filed the second case. The same court delivered a 
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totally different judgment, holding that the issue in the second case differed from the 
former case, because it was aimed at a different copying amount (the disputed copies 
in the second case were issued by Guang Zhou in 2001, who were not the same as 
Jiangxi in 2003). Even though the infringement had occurred in the same year of 
2001 as the first infringement, the former case neither tried nor awarded 
compensation in respect of the present infringement. So the second case was a new 
case, and was not barred by res judicata, because it had different facts. The court 
judged that the defendant had infringed the claimant’s exclusive rights. The plaintiff 
was the legal entity to sue the defendant because the claimant was the only legal 
owner in China, according to the evidence from Swiss Copyright Association and 
the authorisation letter from Swiss AVC. The court held that it was acceptable for 
the claimant to use a non-party, Gingo Tai Wan’s genuine copy, to prove his rights 
and to compare similarity with the disputed copy, because the claimant had not 
issued any works of ‘Bandary’ in China.79 The defendant appealed to the high court, 
but the high court dismissed his application and upheld the first trial judgment
.80 
 
The second suit was tried twice, by the first instance court and the second 
appeal court, which also upheld the above conflicting judgments. The first suit was 
tried once only, because neither party applied for an appeal against it. That means 
the dispute about illegal copies of ‘Spring Field’ produced in 2001and 2002, 
between the same litigants was separately tried twice as two cases, and appealed 
once, and the courts gave two totally contradictory judgments in the end. 
It is apparent that in the second suit the judge changed his opinion on whether 
the claimant could use the non-party’s copy to prove his rights. The judgment did 
not explain why in the first suit in 2005, the court held that it was unacceptable for 
the claimant to use the non-party, Gingo Tai Wan’s genuine copy to prove his rights; 
and why it was valid and acceptable in the second suit for the claimant to introduce 
new evidence to prove Swiss AVC‘s legal rights on the music work ‘Bandary’. 81  
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Without first resolving these conflicting methods of identifying exclusive 
licensing and the nature of non-party products, how can the litigants trust and 
enforce the content in these two different judgements? From the recognition that it 
was unacceptable to use non-party’s music work to prove genuine original works, 
the judge jumped to the second recognition that it was valid and acceptable in the 
second suit for the claimant to introduce new evidence to prove Swiss AVC‘s legal 
rights on the music work ‘Bandary’.  
 The courts have failed to provide any recognised authority or proper analysis, 
except for their arbitrary declaration, to account for such conflicting and self-
contradictory recognitions in these two judgments
.82 
4.2.2 Legal Finality and Binding Force Difficult to Read from 
Prior Judicial Decisions  
Legal finality means that once a case has been decided the parties should be 
bound by the decision. 
83  
The legal point, at which finality will be imposed, 
depending on the detail of conditions confirmed in the previous case, may be 
available to be referenced in a later case. Without a clear ascertainment of facts in 
each case, it is impossible to treat each case on its merits; to compare whether a later 
case is similar or different to the previous case. But as discussed in Chapter Two, the 
Chinese courts heavily rely on the defects of evidence to pick up facts. The focus is 
on picking up factors to meet one statutory provision, rather that exploring the truth 
and whole situation from both sides’ arguments. The selected, isolated evidence is 
formulated into the statutory provisions, but there are still gaps and uncertainties 
between the findings and legal decision on the argued issues. The litigants could not 
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point to a cogent and comprehensive judgment which is based on whole merits of 
their cases. It is difficult to point out whether a claim is a decided or undecided issue 
in such an isolated judgment. Therefore it is very easy and inevitable for litigants in 
China to reopen a decided issue . 
In Huangxin v Shanghai Agva Culture Company and Fortune Supermarket, 
84
 
the claimant sued the defendants for infringement of his trade mark ‘Agva’, 
registered in 2005 for electronics, in category 20. He found that the first defendant 
had used his trademark in a similar product, and that the second defendant had sold 
the infringing product in a main street shop. He claimed for an injunction preventing 
further infringement, and damages of RMB 50,000 from both defendants. The first 
defendant contended that he had obtained licence rights from a non-party company 
(Jingshen Leather Factory), and used its trademark, registered in 1999 in category 
18. The defendant applied for revocation of the claimant’s trademark on grounds of 
invalidity but failed. The judge held that the first defendant had infringed the 
claimant’s trademark rights and ordered payment of damages of RMB 10,000 to the 
claimant. In 2006 the same claimant sued these same two defendants again for 
trademark infringement in a district local court. He claimed that the second 
defendant should take collateral responsibility with the first defendant for 
infringement of his mark, damages being RMB 15,000. 
In this second suit the judge held that the disputed issues were identical with 
that of the first suit, and struck out his claims according to res judicata and issue 
estoppel
85  
There is no doubt that the merits in the second suit were the same as in the first. 
The claimant should not have been allowed to take the second suit to harass the 
defendant and waste legal resource. However, we cannot see from the first 
judgement : a transparent discovery and cross examination for litigants to argue their 
points about the damage caused by the defendants, the truth of status about the 
second defendant’s selling behaviour, or clear identification about the responsibility 
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between the first defendant and the second defendant for infringement of his mark. It 
is harsh for the judge to rely on the judgment in the first case to bind the second suit, 
to refuse more compensation, because the binding force of answering these damage 
claims cannot be found in the first suit. The claimant might have felt aggrieved that 
the case was treated so differently from Blue Lotus
86.
 He might feel that the second 
verdict in Huangxin
87 
is unjust and unfair and contrary to the doctrine of treating 
similar cases similarly. He might even imagine judicial corruption and malpractice 
because the judgement is just so arbitrary and untransparent. If we follow the 
judicial opinion in the cases of Blue Lotus
88
and JinGo Adversary Company
89
, the 
judge should support the claimant’s second suit, and might hold that it had different 
facts in the second suit, and because the first judgment did not fully support the 
claimant’s damages claimed, the former judgment might not have binding effect on 
the second suit.  
Just as the UK court mentioned, a proper evidence discovery must be seen, and 
main proper arguments on point of law and facts must exist, and it follows that later 
courts have the chance to identify as precisely as possible the extent of the discretion 
available to the judges in each case. If there is no argument on a point of law, the 
ensuing judgment may lack any weight whatsoever. Issue estoppels apply to 
particulars in such a way that the particular condition can be fitted within the rule.
90
 
4.2.3 Appeal Function Failure in Clarifying the Points of Law  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the substantive IPR provisions are very general, 
and the courts, especially the appeal courts in China have failed in ascertaining and 
developing the meaning of law under the specific situation in the manner of 
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England. English appellate courts focus more carefully than the trial court on the 
function and consistency within domestic regulations and international conventions. 
English appellate courts play a higher and wider judicial role in clarifying 
ambiguities arising out of applicable law.  
An appeal court in England mainly focuses on dealing with questions of law 
rather than questions of fact.
91
 It considers whether the judgment as a whole is 
consistent with basic principles, the purpose of law, and common sense in practical 
performance and recognised authority. The appeal court constrains the arbitrary 
discretion by focusing on questions of law and checking the trial court‘s 
ascertainment and the extent of the discretion available to the judges in each case. 
92  
The Chinese appellate courts basically repeats the trial courts role in ascertain-
ing of fact and law, but fail to give detailed consideration on discerning the statutory 
meaning, and fixing the vague loopholes in IPR regulation. The issue occurred in 
several cases on how to ascertain the reputation connecting an earlier well-known 
foreign trademark with its Chinese translation, especially when the customer and 
public have been informed of the special good quality of the foreign mark. 
In Pfizer Products Inc
93
, the special drug function and unique shape and colour 
of its products was very famous in China , but the translated Chinese wordmark ‘伟
哥’ was first applied for registration by the defendant. The trial court and appeal 
court both held that the claimant had never formally used this Chinese mark ‘伟哥’ 
in the Chinese market, and was unable to provide any evidence to prove that it was a 
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well-known trademark in China and abroad . But in Starbucks Corporation
94
, the 
reputation in the registered "STARBUCKS" and its Chinese translation "星巴克" 
were considered connected. Also in US Eastman Kodak Company 
95
, the defendant 
argued that its word mark ‘科达’ was not even a translation from the plaintiff’s 
‘‘KODAK 柯达’; they were different in visual style and used in totally different 
fields, the product of lift rather than Photographic products. The trial court and high 
court both held that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s famous trademark 
right and broke anti-competition law.
96 
 
The appeal courts in China should use the appeal stage to interpret what is a 
translation of famous foreign mark; and what constitutes an imitation of the 
translation of famous foreign marks under provision two? Should similarity 
consideration focus on the main nature of the mark in a consumer’s attention or on 
its phonetic similarity, visual appearance, or on the meaning of the mark and its 
pronounced similarity with the original famous marks?  
By addressing the problem of conflicting identification and ascertainment of 
points of trademark law, what is needed is for an appeal court is to be clear about the 
underpinning assumptions and policy consideration; it is to clarify the purpose of 
law, and to correct the wrong ascertainment of a point of law made by the trial court, 
as in Aifut Chemical Industry
97
. 
English appellate courts play a higher and wider judicial role on clarifying 
ambiguities on applicable law. The Chinese appellate court basically repeats the trial 
court’s role and fails to give consideration to discerning statutory meaning and 
preventing uncertainties and conflicts in applicable law. It fails to promote 
deliberation in interpretation and to respond to the need for consistency nationwide. 
The failure of appellate courts also worsens the phenomenon of strong local 
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protectionism in the Chinese legal regime, in which the same issue is treated 
differently in different areas
98
. 
We cannot read out a detailed cogent ascertainment of a point of law from the 
above appeals. This constitutes a huge waste of legal resource, creating injustice for 
litigants, and it is also damaging public trust towards the China judicial system case 
by case, if the grey areas and conflicting decisions are still there even after the 
second trial. The following ascertainment of damages calculation is unbelievable. It 
is very difficult to accept that the appeal courts in China had really considered the 
purpose and objectives of law for such damage assumptions and inferences: If first 
claim succeeded and the claimant was compensated, then other claims did not need 
to be considered because sufficient and effective legal protection had already been 
given to the plaintiffs' rights through the first claim. 
99
 If a defendant could provide a 
purchasing receipt then there was no need to consider the damage by selling faked 
goods, except for an injunction to stop the defendant further selling. If there was a 
dispute between parties about the method of calculating damage, the trial court did 
not need to notice both sides but directly chose an unexpected way to decide 
compensation
100
. After infringement was recognised and confirmed by trial, there 
was a need at the damages assessment stage to evaluate how high was the novelty 
and originality in a work in order to decide how much compensation should be 
given.
101
 
 Conflicting arguments sometimes are indispensable to the judicial process, 
particularly regarding the conflict of interest between both sides. In such a situation 
an appeal court needs to explore and debate the value and central directives of an 
IPR statute and its policy purpose. The appellate function should be at a national 
level to interpret where it intends to give guidance to the lower courts to avoid 
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inconsistency in the exercise of discretion.
102 
The appeal court in England would 
explore various possible solutions and try to unify and coordinate nationwide 
judicial decisions by judicial interpretations in leading precedents. 
We can see that in the UK maybe there is a degree of argument about how 
widely or narrowly the binding force should be taken.
 103
 But at least no matter how 
wide or narrow the estoppel principle is, the cases confirm and strengthen the 
bottom line of legal finality, that the scope of same subject matter is based on the 
whole story given by litigants . A decision should focus on the difference between 
material facts, rather than trifles such as person, time, place, kind and amount, which 
are all presumed to be not material unless there is good reason to the contrary. 
104 
English courts consider the scope of the finality in a prior judgment from the main 
evidence used, the issues argued in the prior case, the remedy pursued, the decided 
case management direction, and the fair opportunity for the litigant to reveal the 
issues in the first suit
105
.  
For China the basic principle of legal finality has not yet been constructed. 
Chinese legal finality still looks to the use of verbatim words to judge binding force 
and finality
106
. The Chinese appellate courts have done little to constrain themselves 
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or lower courts to apply substantive IPR laws coherently and consistently, and to 
avoid contradicting discretion on point of law. 
 The argument on issue estoppel is raised again and again in IPR cases, but 
every time the trial court and appeal court simply repeats the abstract expression of 
the legal concepts. There is no thorough examination and clarification in each 
particular case. What is the value of legal finality in Chinese litigation; in what 
situation are there estoppels to bar reopening any argument around IPR 
infringement? Such basic questions still remain in the dark.
107 
4.2.4. No Consistency or Doctrine of Precedent to Strengthen 
Finality 
Consistency is an important element of legal finality and issue estoppel. 
108
 It is 
expected that similar cases should be decided in a similar manner. In England the 
precedents provide a chance to understand its legal finality and issue estoppel. An 
English judge when deciding a case must refer to similar prior decisions of the 
higher courts and keep to the reasoning in those cases. If a previous case has dealt 
with similar facts and the same rules, then the present case has to be decided in the 
same way. This process is known as the doctrine of precedent.
109
 
The doctrine of judicial precedent helps English courts to apply IPR law 
correctly and consistently. What English judges look for is not some kind of 
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'revealed' authority that will miraculously settle the problem before them, but a 
convincing statement or application of a principle of law appropriate to the case in 
hand. Lord Jessel MR said: 'the only thing in a judge's decision binding as an 
authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was decided.' 
110
 
For example, everyone knows that it is fair dealing with copyright works, if 
their purpose is the reporting current events; this does not infringe any copyright in 
the work, provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
111
 Fair 
dealing is frequently used as a defence in copyright infringement in England and 
China. But what constitutes current events, and how to properly interpret its scope? 
Using degree and intention is always difficult and controversial. The Court of 
Appeal in Hyde Park Residence,
112 
shows us how English courts use the precedent 
in applying statue law.  
In this case, the appeal court first referred to similar prior decisions on ‘current 
events’ from the judgment of Walton J in Associated Newspapers, and that of 
Lightman J in Newspaper Licensing Agency, because clear reasons were given for 
distinguishing the earlier cases. 
113 
Having reached a view on whether this was a reporting of current events, the 
Court of Appeal went on to consider the whole issue of fair dealing. Again it 
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reviewed previous cases on the same issue, the principles elaborated in them,
114
 and 
in some cases, the principles in cases as interpreted by later cases. Some but not all 
of the decisions were binding on the court in Hyde Park Residence,
115 
which again 
made clear its own reasons for the course that it took from prior decisions. The court 
was required to apply those decisions, insofar that they were applicable to the case 
before it.
116
 Then the appellate judge described the content of the disputed article, its 
headings and how the argued picture was used underneath the headings, and the 
headlines, and in the end concluded that, the defence of fair dealing could not 
succeed. 
117 
If even after a long comparison, English courts find that the merits of precedent 
or its authorities do not fit the present case, they are not similar cases, just a surface 
similarity. It is also worth reviewing the precedents so that litigants and the court 
find the extent to which they are consistent or inconsistent, and assist the real 
arguments, then find the balance points.
118
 
The result of such process of precedents is to develop the law gradually, with 
no sudden or arbitrary changes, but nonetheless to develop it, by deciding whether to 
extend or to distinguish previous authorities, and by using a transparent reasoning 
process to explain why. A later court would therefore have the benefit of a clear line 
of authorities, and reasons for extending or not extending the reasoning in those 
authorities. This makes for greater certainty and consistency in the law. It 
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discourages radical change, while nonetheless allowing development at a detailed 
level. The transparent and detailed reasoning in Hyde Park Residence 
119
 helps to 
ensure that all subsequent lower courts and tribunals will apply the same law, as 
there stated in the Court of Appeal. Arbitrariness by individual judges and 
arbitrators in later cases is therefore discouraged. 
Further, the practice of following previous decisions results in improved 
efficiency, rather than the reverse, for the present trial, because points of law which 
have once been decided can simply be applied subsequently, without being subject 
to repeated re-argument.
120 
 
 Legal finality and issue estoppel cannot work well in China, also because 
China lacks such respect in and reference to precedent.
121
 Sometimes even if there is 
a through comprehensive reasoning on the argued issue in a prior case, a later court 
can ignore such principle without giving any distinguishing ground, by arbitrary 
declaring another meaning in applying the law. 
In Starbucks Corporation and United Starbucks Coffee Shanghai Co., Ltd v 
Shanghai Starbuck Co., Ltd. 
122
 both sides engaged in a soft drinking coffee service. 
The plaintiff in the U.S. in 1985 first registered the "STARBUCKS" trademark, and 
later the "STARBUCKS" trademark series were registered in more than 120 
countries and gained prestige around the world. The "STARBUCKS" trademark was 
registered on the Chinese Mainland in 1996. But its Chinese word mark "星巴克" 
was first registered in Chinese Taiwan in February 1999 and was recognised as a 
"well-known" mark. In December 1999, the "星巴克" trademark was approved for 
registration in China by Starbucks Corporation under Class 42. It developed 
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business by franchising and advertising use of the "星巴克" trademark in the 
Chinese-speaking regions, and was familiar to the public of the Mainland in such 
large cities as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
The plaintiffs (Starbucks) claimed that the defendants’ usage of "星巴克" 
either as a coffee cup logo or as the shortened enterprise name in business activities, 
constituted trademark infringement and unfair competition.  
The plaintiffs argued that "STARBUCKS" (Class 42) and "星巴克" (Class 42) 
trademarks should be treated as well-known trademarks and enjoyed a higher 
protection than a normal trademark, due to the international prestige of the 
"STARBUCKS" trademark series. Further, the plaintiffs' advertising and use of the "
星巴克" trademark in the Chinese-speaking regions was earlier than the defendant’s 
right to its enterprise name, and thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to the prior rights. 
The trademark series of "STARBUCKS" as an entirety should not be split by time 
and territory from Mainland China to Taiwan and Hongkong.
123 
 The defendant, Shanghai Starbuck was pre-approved and set up in Oct. 1999 
and began a coffee business in March 2000 mainly in the Shanghai market. The 
defendants argued that in terms of authorisation time, its right to the enterprise name 
was prior to the plaintiffs' trademark rights. The registered "星巴克" trademark and 
the registered "STARBUCKS" trademark should be independent from each other in 
different registration areas, and the reputations established in another area was 
irrelevant to the present case. It was unfair to use its reputation in another market as 
a standard to prove its well-known reputation in the Chinese market. According to 
the "Implementation Measures for the Registration Administration of Enterprise 
Names", an enterprise is entitled, as of the date of establishment, to enjoy the name 
right, using it in its business activity in its scope.
124 
The trial court and the High Court both held that, since Starbucks Corporation 
was the first to use the characters "星巴克" in Chinese Taiwan on Feb. 1, 1999, 
while the defendant, Shanghai Starbucks should have been fully aware of the fact 
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that the STARBUCKS and "星巴克" trademarks enjoyed a strong reputation in the 
same industry in the world. It was hard to believe that the defendants' use of the 
Chinese characters "星巴克" for "Starbucks" was merely due to a coincidence of 
originality. 
 The courts held that Shanghai Starbuck had subjective malice in registering the 
Chinese characters "星巴克 " as the trade name for its enterprise. Shanghai 
Starbuck's conduct fell under the circumstance of Article 52 (v) of the Trademark 
Law, i.e., "causing other damages to another's right to the exclusive use of the 
registered trademark", violated the principles of fairness, honesty and good faith for 
civil activities, and infringed Starbucks Corporation's right to the exclusive use of 
"STARBUCKS" and "星巴克". The defendant’s business name registration had 
obvious malice, and caused the public to misidentify or misunderstand the trademark 
registrant and the enterprise name owner, and constituted unfair competition against 
Starbucks Corporation. 
125
 
 From such fact identification and interpretation of the reputation earned by the 
plaintiff, it is clear that the Shanghai courts considered a mark’s reputation based on 
not only the local market, but also the whole Chinese speaking market and 
international market. From this judgment, it also implied a rule that rushing 
registration of a Chinese mark translated from a well-known brand name is a kind of 
malicious registration, and therefore is invalid. 
But in the following cases, facing the same issue argument about how to 
evaluate a company reputation and how to identify a Chinese word mark translated 
from a well-known world brand name, Beijing courts did not show any 
consideration to keep with the interpretation used in the precedent case of Starbucks 
Corporation against Shanghai Starbuck. We should especially notice that the 
judgment of the case of ‘"STARBUCKS" and "星巴克" ’ was included in the 
Supreme Court Annual Report of complex and typical IPR protection, to show, as 
good samples, Chinese progress in IPR protection.
126  
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In Pfizer Products 
127
, the plaintiffs tried to split the whole argument around a 
registered shaped mark into two cases to solve the overlapping claims. 
 The main story is that the plaintiffs registered a shape trademark with an 
English brand name ‘Viagra’ on a drug for erectile dysfunction in China , and sold 
their products in the Chinese market with an unregistered Chinese trademark ‘伟哥’ 
or ‘万艾可’. In 2005, they found the defendants produced the same shape drug with 
Chinese words ‘伟哥’.The plaintiffs sued the defendants for infringing the registered 
trademark rights on its three-dimensional blue rhombus-shaped trademark, claiming 
that the first defendant (Lian Huan Medicine) and the second defendant (Wireman 
Company) had illegally produced the same shape of products, and that the third 
defendant (Xing Gainian Pharmacy) had illegally sold such infringing products. The 
two plaintiffs claimed in another separate case that the defendants’ acts also 
constituted unfair competition and infringement of its unregistered well-known 
Chinese trademark ‘伟哥’. Its Chinese word mark "伟哥" was first introduced and 
advertised in Taiwan and Hongkong and was recognised as a "well-known" 
trademark. The defendant maliciously tried to register it and used it on the same 
shape product as the plaintiff’s, which had caused confusion to the customers and 
damaged its good reputation in the same kind of drug market. The plaintiffs claimed 
an order requiring the three defendants to stop producing or selling the illegal 
product, to destroy all products in stock and the production model, and to pay 
damages of RMB 50,000. 
 The claimants (Pfizers) filed two separate cases successively in 2005, against 
the three defendants for registered trademark infringement in case No.11350 and 
unregistered trademark infringement and unfair-competition in case No.11351. They 
said, in 2003 they got a three-dimensional blue rhombus-shaped registered 
trademark, with brand name ‘Viagra’, as a pharmaceutical product, in category 5. In 
2005 they found that the third defendant had sold a drug in the form of a pill of the 
same shape and colour, produced by the first defendant (Lian Huan), while the brand 
name ‘Weige 伟哥’ and ‘TM’ sign on the drug package and on the pill, were 
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licensed by the second defendant (Wireman). The claimants also found their three-
dimensional blue rhombus-shaped trademark, together with the sign ‘Weige 伟哥’ 
and ‘TM’, occurring prominently in the second defendant’s website and 
advertisement brochure. The claimant provided seven newspaper articles and the 
document evidence of the drug sale in foreign and Chinese markets to prove that 
their unregistered Chinese trademark ‘伟哥’, and the brand name ‘Viagra’ along 
with the special registered three-dimensional blue rhombus-shaped trademark , had 
been well-known in China, Hongkong and Tai Wan
.128  
 The key defendants (Lian Huan and Wireman) contended that the claimant’s 
three-dimensional trademark had no distinctive character, and the registered mark 
should be revoked because of lack of distinctive character.
129 
They had applied to 
the Administrative Bureau for revocation of the registration, and requested the court 
for a stay, pending the revocation result. They also argued that No.11351 case, was a 
repetition of the filed cases, No. 11350, concerning the same period undertakings 
between the same litigants. The defendants argued that filing this case broke the 
principle of issue estoppel and the principle of ‘one damage one remedy’ (against 
repetitive suit for one damage). They requested striking out this repetitive case. In 
the hearing of case No.11351, the defendants especially stressed a public notice in a 
newspaper from Pfizers' lawyer, which declared that ‘Viagra’ was the registered 
trademark, and that its Chinese name was also once used, ‘万艾可’, owned by Pfizer 
Products Inc. The second defendant contended that in 1998 he had applied to the 
Registrar for the trademark ‘Weige 伟哥 ’’ in medicine, and that in 2002 its 
application had entered into opposition procedure pending final declaration. So they 
were legally using their mark pending registration as ‘Weige 伟哥 and TM”. The 
third defendant (Xinggai Nian) contested that it had no duty to pay any damages to 
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the claimants. He argued that the legal purchasing receipt proved that he did not 
know they were an infringing medicine.
130
 
 In the first suit No. 11351, the trial judge supported the plaintiff and gave 
compensation for the effects of the infringement, of RMB 30,000. He also issued an 
injunction against the three defendants, requiring them to stop producing, and selling 
infringing products.
131 
In the judgment No. 11351, the first trial court held that the 
defendants had infringed the claimant’s unregistered mark and broken anti-fair 
competition law, on the basis that ‘Viagra’ and ‘three-dimensional blue rhombus-
shaped trademark’ were well–known, and that the defendant’s use caused confusion 
among consumers, leading to their failure to recognise the original genuine drugs of 
the claimant. But in the other suit judgment No.11350, the same court, but with a 
different judge, took a different view, and held that the defendants did not infringe 
the claimant’s registered or unregistered mark right and did not break the anti-unfair 
competition law. Both cases were appealed to the High Court, who maintained the 
No. 11350, but reversed the No. 11351 first trial judgment. 
Comparing these judgments, in No. 11351 first trial judgment, the trial court 
did not mention the evidence handed in by the defendant and a warning notice to the 
public against the faked ‘Viagra’ in newspapers from Pfizers' lawyer. But in No. 
11350 judgments, the same court clearly used this lawyer’s notice as the main 
evidence to support its decision on the argument of the Chinese word ‘伟哥’，or ‘
艾哥尔’ as the translation of ‘Viagra’. 
 The High Court of Beijing reversed No. 11541 judgment and affirmed the 
other trial judgments on grounds, first that registration rights were separate in each 
independent legal area. The success of the registration of ‘Weige 伟哥’ in Tai Wan 
and Hong Kong did not guarantee its recognition in the Mainland of China, because 
each company was a separate independent entity in each of these regions. Secondly, 
it held ‘Viagra’ was an English word mark and it had been translated by the media 
into several Chinese words: ‘偉哥’, ‘威哥尔’，’伟哥’，’艾哥尔’. There was no 
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direct existing recognition between ‘Viagra’ and ‘伟哥’. The Official anti-faking 
action was intended to protect genuine ‘Viagra’ products in the Chinese market, not 
to prove its Chinese name, especially as the claimant had confirmed its Chinese 
name through its lawyer’s notice in a newspaper. The defendants did not breach 
anti-unfair competition law because the defendant’s product package, the blue shape 
drug pill also had clear marks ‘weige 伟哥’ and ‘TM’ on the surface, and could not 
be confused by customers with the claimant’s blue shape and ‘Viagra’ mark.132  
 The respondent in the appeals argued that the trial court did not consider its 
request to recognise whether its mark was a well-known unregistered trademark in 
China. The trial court did not properly consider its goodwill abroad and did not 
consider its registration in Hong Kong and Taiwan, nor arguments that the 
defendant’s action amounted to malicious registration and bad faith in business 
against the anti-unfair competition law, ‘a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices’ and against prior use.133 
 As to the avoidance of making a decision whether the claimant’s mark was 
well-known or not, the High Court of Beijing held that the claimant did not formally 
use this Chinese mark ‘伟哥’ in its products except in media articles, and was 
unable to provide any evidence to prove that the mark ‘伟哥’ was a well-known 
trademark abroad. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a Chinese word mark could 
become well known in other countries. It is unpersuasive separately to interpret the 
plaintiffs’ business reputation and consumers’ confusion on ‘Viagra’ in the China 
market and in abroad. From ‘Viagra’ sales abroad and in China, its specific shape 
and colour, from China administrative official anti-faking action and the warning 
notice to the public against the faked drug etc., all had strongly implied that the 
defendants would try their best to copy the plaintiff’s drug, to create a direct 
connection that its drug had the same quality as ‘Viagra’ for erectile dysfunction. 
The defendants’ action was highly likely to cause consumer’s confusion about the 
originality of such genuine kind of drug, and further put high risk to public safety.  
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Such interpretation in the present case is in opposition to the judicial recogni-
tion and interpretation of the Shanghai High Court in ‘STARBUCKS’ and "星巴克
". Without comparing any precedent cases or inferring any confirmed rules and 
authority, Beijing courts declared their interpretation about business reputation being 
limited to its registered area; their identification of rushing registration of a Chinese 
word mark translated from another’s well-known world brand name, was legal and 
in good faith, unless the Chinese name of this well-known brand name was also 
well-known abroad.  
 Here the prior decision in Starbucks already covers the main issue as in 
Pfizers. The only difference from Starbucks is how to identify the argument that 
Pfizers had also used ‘万艾可’ not just ‘伟哥’ as its Chinese translation name in 
business promotion. But the Beijing trial court and appeal court did not answer this 
question in their judgments; rather a different decision was set up. The courts in 
China have done little to compel themselves to apply substantial IPR law coherently 
and consistently. Legal finality and issue estoppels remain based on surface 
examination rather than from transparent and detailed reasoning in specific 
judgments. 
In England, a judgment which goes against a precedent without a good ground 
is a wrong decision which will give rise to an appeal process.
134 
A court cannot just 
arbitrarily change the precedent decision without any authority to justify it. The 
courts must point out the difference in the present case and distinguish those prior 
decisions as appropriate, before taking a different decision from the formal findings 
and recognition. 
135 
As the judge said in Cilfit 
136 :
 
 the questions of interpretation posed in this case are identical with those 
settled...no new factor has been presented to the Court,.. in these circumstance the court 
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must be referred to the previous judgment... even though the question at issue in present 
case are not strictly identical....since it is difficult to see any basis for this statement other 
than that ,the court would simply follow its own previous decision, it constitutes further 
evidence that the court assumes that it will follow its own decision.  
Without a precedent rule to ensure consistency in applying the law, Chinese 
legal decisions not only cause chaos and conflicting results among similar cases , but 
have also lost a chance to gradually develop and enrich the understanding of the 
statute law on a case by case basis as in England. For example, questions of about 
how to judge similarity and confusion in a trade mark, trademark law itself in article 
52 and the Supreme Court interpretation in Article 11, both give quite decent context 
to clarify its meaning,
137 
but after reading their judgments in trademark infringement 
and passing off, it is still difficult for us to understand what an inner connection in 
China would constitute infringing confusion through using a similar trade mark. the 
judgments repetitively state the provision as follows: ‘the defendant uses similar 
marks on similar goods; such use would cause general consumers to make wrong 
associations or misunderstanding, consequently bringing harm to the plaintiff’s right 
to exclusively use the trademark’138; or ‘the Defendant (Han Zhong) did not sell the 
plaintiff’s ‘Hekey garments’, and hence it is impossible to dilute the trademark of 
the plaintiff and cause confusion to consumers.’139 
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4.3. Conclusion 
Legal finality, in the protection of overlapping intellectual property rights, is 
facing more challenges than in protection of other tangible civil rights. Through case 
by case development, English court has set up a basic relationship between cause of 
action estoppel, issue estoppel, res judicata and abuse of process. English courts 
firmly and consistently confirm and strengthen the threshold of legal finality, so that 
where the issues raised in an earlier claim are identical to the issues raised in a later 
claim, there is an absolute ban on the later proceedings. The courts have accepted 
two exceptional circumstances. One is that the judge should not apply res judicata to 
stop relitigating the same subject matter from admission of fresh evidence, where 
the party seeking to challenge the earlier judgment is doing so on the basis of 
developments in the IPR law, or on grounds of fraud or collusion arising in the 
earlier suit. The second is where, even though the first and the second claim might 
belong to same subject matter, the arrangement plan of the first suit would not allow 
one party to raise the matter later raised in the subsequent proceedings. The basic 
success of English judgment lies in treating similar cases similarly; any inconsistent 
and changing discretion and interpretation should be justified and accounted for 
from a more contextual and deeper understanding of the multiplicity of 
interpretative legal sources. 
Compared with English position, legal finality and issue estoppel in China is 
merely based on use of verbatim words to enforce the binding force in a decided 
case. Legal finality and estoppel is difficult to analyse from prior judicial decisions 
and judgments. The appeal function has failed in clarifying the points of law. There 
is no consistency or precedent rule to strengthen finality and bind later litigation. Its 
legal finality and binding force in a decided case is still uncertain and changeable 
within the concept of issue estoppels. The application of law lies in a trial court’s 
instant statement and declaration of statutory provisions, rather than a consistent 
ascertainment based on precedent. 
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Chapter Five: Legal Justice and Evaluation of IPR 
Judgments 
In UK judgments, there is continuous consideration about how wide or narrow 
the binding force of a judgment should be; how limited or unlimited judicial 
discretion a court should exercise, how positive or normative should be the method 
taken towards application and adjudication of law. But IPR cases confirm at least, 
and strengthen the threshold of legal finality, that where the issues raised in an 
earlier claim are identical to the issues raised in a later claim, there is an absolute 
ban on the later proceedings. The bottom line of case management and evidence 
discovery, we have seen, reflects an open equal arrangement, known to participants 
in advance of every judicial decision; it is possible to see clearly how a judge has 
come to arrive at a decision. The bottom line of ascertainment of facts and 
interpretation of law is consistent with precedents, and is fitted into the merits of 
each specific case. Through the cases, English courts maintain and strengthen such a 
bottom line standard. The basic success of English trial lies in a firm and continuous 
insistence on an open transparent process and accountability. Proper discovery of 
evidence is undertaken, and the main arguments from both sides are heard. The 
basic success of the UK judgment lies in treating similar case similarly; any 
inconsistent and fluctuating discretion and interpretation is justified and accounted 
from a more contextual and deeper understanding of the multiplicity of 
interpretative legal sources. 
In contrast, IPR enforcement in China has not set up such bottom lines. A 
common phenomena existing in China IPR cases shows that its case management 
and discovery of evidence are not transparent enough, and do not enable us see 
clearly what has happened in trial. Judicial decisions do not reveal clearly how a 
Chinese judge has arrived at his conclusion if both sides’ arguments had been 
treated equally. The legal finality and binding force in a decided case remains 
uncertain and changeable as regards the concept of issue estoppel. The application 
of law is a trial court’s instant statement and declaration of statutory provisions, 
rather than a consistent ascertainment based on precedents and recognised legal 
authority. Chinese legal decisions not only cause conflicting results within similar 
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cases, but China has also lost a chance to gradually develop and enrich the 
understanding of the statute law, case by case as in England.  
From the above case analyse in former chapters, I concluded that English 
judicial result is much clearer, more consistent and more transparent. Its equality of 
treatment is superior to the Chinese position
1
. Can we see transparency and equality 
of treatment, and that consistency with precedent is justice, is therefore better than in 
China? If so why we should pursue this as norm and standard to evaluate a just 
judicial decision? 
Before proving whether this is the practical end in pursuit of justice, I must try 
to explore how the jurisprudential theories develop in order to find a just and fair 
judicial assessment. An investigation into the nature of law can be seen as being an 
attempt to answer the question of what is a just and fair judgment. 
5.1 Legal Justice According to Jurists  
 To evaluate a judgment is a process of exploring what value and interest are 
regarded as being vital in a legal system and society
2
. Law, as a device for 
promoting the desired good, should reflect the model of what law ought to be. A 
judgment can be judged as being invalid if it substantially deviates from the 
requirements of such principles. In a civil society people and society put their hope 
on court to get final justice about their argument. They expect the court has a just 
weapon to achieve a fair result. The underpinning foundation of any judgment is the 
theory of jurisprudence. As Thomas Acuinas, points out, the essence of law is to be 
just. ‘lex injusta non est lex’ --an unjust law is not law. 
Countless jurists have tried to provide a reliable and persuasive theory for us to 
evaluate what is a just and fair judgment. There are several famous jurists in 
different periods who have been forming their ideas and theories to design the best 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
193 
dispute settlement and answer basic questions--- what is a good judgment or bad 
judgment, how to identify a just result, even though this question might be asked in 
a different way, such as legal value, legal norm or natural justice. To achieve a way 
of better, justice, and practical purpose in law has probably always served as the 
central standard with which to evaluate judicial acts. A legal system is necessarily a 
reflection of a society’s philosophy of justice.3  
 The most significant contribution to the debate over justice in Twentieth 
Century was made by the philosopher John Rawls, he agrees that any conception of 
social justice must comprise the notion of impartiality---that if the principles on 
which a social system is based are biased towards a particular group (a social class, 
or a political party), that system is automatically rendered unjust. 
John Rawls saw justice in terms of freedom and equality, and expressed an 
intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice. Describing it as the first virtue of 
social institutions, and inviolable in the same way that truth is to systems of thought, 
he said: 
4  
Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the 
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social 
interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a 
better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even 
greater injustice. Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromis-
ing.  
John Rawls not only talked about individual liberty, but also argued for a 
method of moral reasoning, reasoning about justice, that he calls reflective 
equilibrium. What is the method of reflective equilibrium? The general point is this 
by Rawls,
5
 ‘A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises. 
Its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together into one coherent view.’ Rawls accepted that idea and 
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advances the notion of reflective equilibrium into the question of justice. He thinks 
the method of reflective equilibrium can generate shared judgments about justice 
and right.
6
 We can see equal treatment as the primacy of justice, originating from 
Rawls’ justice pursuit in social institutions. 
 Natural law theorist, JM Finnis, in his restatement of natural law, put out 
‘common good’ as humans to attain the objective value. He lists seven objective 
good which he regards as being irreducibly basic: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic 
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. A legal system should 
facilitate the common good. Enforcement of law should work for the common good. 
7 
Hart's position was concerned more with the morality of law, his intention 
being to establish a 'rule of recognition':
8 
 
 Behind every legislative authority (even the supreme legislature of a legal system) 
there must be rules specifying the identity and qualification of the legislators and what they 
must do in order to make laws. ... I used the expression the rule of recognition in 
expounding my version of the common theory that a municipal legal system is a structure of 
open-texture rules which has at its foundations a rule which is legally ultimate in the sense 
that it provides a set of criteria by which in the last resort the validity of subordinate rules 
of the system is assured. This rule is not to be characterized as either legally valid or 
invalid though it may be the subject of moral criticism, historical or sociological 
explanation, and other forms of inquiry.  
 By contrast, Christopher Columbus Langdell had a concept of 'absolute rights'. 
He designed his 'absolute rights' [fixed doctrines] theory to reflect the relationship 
between legal rules and the nature of judicial decision making. In his Brief Survey 
of Equity Jurisprudence, he said 'absolute rights’ are either personal rights or rights 
of property. Every personal right was born with the person to whom it belonged, and 
died with him. Personal rights, therefore, could neither be acquired nor parted with. 
The court basically discovered and declared the pre-existing law in the case. 
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Langdell accepted the declaratory theory of judicial decision-making: the law pre-
exists the case, and the principle of legal growth is that of logical development out 
of fundamental doctrines and concepts.
9
  
 The idea of justice develops from at beginning a singular institutional model, 
derived from abstract principles (John Rawls’ freedom and liberty), to a multiple 
plurality model (to meet individual desires and interests). Jurists put more and more 
factors from people's claims and needs into this model, because they have found that 
no singular meaning of justice can fully coherently explain the legal phenomena 
existed in society.  
 The theory of social interests is at the heart of Pound's sociological jurispru-
dence. Pound identified himself with a “social engineering” approach to the law 
which reflects a notion of justice as “such an adjustment of relations and ordering of 
conduct as will make the goods of existence ... go around as far as possible with the 
least friction and waste”. Pound named six classes of social interests [individual 
interests], under which fall into subclasses: general security, security of social 
institutions, general morals, conservation of social resources, general progress, and 
individual life. These interests were designed to give coherence to the requisite 
policy judgments with the weighing and balancing entailed in satisfying them. His 
individual interests were claims, demands, desires, which were distinguishable from 
public interests (asserted in title of organized society as a legal entity).
10  
Summarising the views that were available to him at the time, Rudolf Stammler 
was able to do little more than describe justice as a fundamental idea, arguing that 
the purpose and final aim of the law is to find the justice value in the law: 
11 
 Our investigation must aim to discover the fundamental principle of law, and we 
must work out a theory which will enable us, by an unbroken chain of reasoning, to pass 
from the principle of law, to specific questions. We thus arrive at the definition, that a just 
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rule of law is that rule which, in a given case, agrees with the fundamental idea of law in 
general'.  
Rudolf Stammler defined just law as follows, 
12
 ‘Just law is positive law, the 
content of which possesses the quality of justice; … just law is positive law whose 
content has certain objective qualities’. But it is difficult to find here, or in what 
follows, anything either substantial or objective,
13 ‘In all social deeds and human 
institutions is concealed a feeling and a longing for justice; even though this 
tendency is sometimes described differently and in a roundabout manner.’ He later 
attempted to explain why finding an objective definition is so elusive:
14
 
 This follows inevitably from the quality of the law as a specific and conditioned 
means... It is true that people are guided by subjective desires and cannot get away from 
their personal interests. This is the very reason why the problem arises of finding a right 
adjustment among the opposed desires and demands. The question now arises, under what 
conditions is the decision in such a dispute objectively just? And by what method can we 
prove that it is just? 
Justice is a subjective concept, then. This leads him to fall back upon the 
manner of its determination, requiring a formal means of doing this:
15
 'justice is a 
quality of certain positive law. Its concept must be determined in a formal manner’.  
Later jurists’ works have also considered the manner of creation of individual 
rights in law, more than their substantive content. Thus, in admitting Pound's 
pragmatic and social engineering view of law had its uses, Ronald Dworkin 
introduced political policies to be supplemented with permanent constitutional 
principles and a doctrine of natural rights, as a protection against the 'hurricane' of 
social wants and demands. In situations where different and conflicting 
interpretations of the rules themselves are possible, and facing discretionary space 
which is left over even after all the rules have been taken into account, Ronald 
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Dworkin set up a hierarchical priority of rights and principles, from constitutional 
principles, the highest bound to government policy, the lowest being guidance. 
16 
Since the collapse of cold war, human rights are being elevated and become a 
more important justice factor. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was first 
adopted by UN in its founding Charter in 1948, ‘Recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. With conflict at the most 
basic level of definition and widespread abuse on the ground, a persistent complaint 
has been that the idea of human rights is culturally biased in the Western liberal 
tradition and fails to take sufficient account of regional differences. 
In the words of Costas Douzinas:
17 
 
 the principles of human equality and freedom and their political corollary—the 
claim that political power must be subjected to the demands of reason and law---have now 
become part of the staple ideology of most contemporary regimes and their partiality has 
been transcended ... human rights are the fate of postmodernity, the energy of our societies, 
the fulfilment of the enlightenment promise of emancipation and self-realisation. Human 
rights are the ideology after the end. 
But Douzinas doubts the fundamental nature of human rights. He argued that 
pursuing a dream of simplicity and one account of the all diverse justices or good 
values in the world is becoming more and more unpractical in this highly complex 
global society, because there is no blind faith or fundamental axioms existed as solid 
foundation for us to conquer everything.  
 He is unconvinced by pursuit of human rights as a final end, doubting their 
objective reality. Their protection in litigation becomes a paradox, and had less 
persuasive force with its continuous flight of meaning and groundlessness and 
world-making power of freedom on a moral foundation. He stated that:
18 
 
 Human rights do not belong to humans but they construct humans; human rights are 
the public proclamation or legalisation of individual desire. Their action expands the 
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boundaries of the social and introduces undecidability, but it also dismembers the 
subjected subject… There cannot be the universal ‘man’ of liberalism or the abstract and 
formalistic ‘subject’ of law.  
Douzinas, in a postmodern principle of justice, emphasised the relative nature 
of all rights, and pointed out the direction of human rights: 
19 
 
 Rights exist only in relation to other rights; right-claims involve the acknowledgment 
of others and their rights and of trans-social networks of mutual recognition and 
arrangement. There can be no freestanding, absolute rights, because such a right would 
violate the freedom of everyone except its bearer. There can be no positive right, because 
rights are always relational and involve their subjects in relations of dependence on others 
and responsibility to the law ... Human rights are the recognition of the world-making 
power of groundlessness which turns the experience of ontological freedom into a principle 
of law and politics…Humanity is an indeterminate concept which cannot become the 
source of normative value...The action of human rights expands the boundaries of the 
social, but it also dismembers the subjected subject. Only if we conceive of human rights as 
dependent on the other can they return to their original end and become the postmodern 
principle of justice. 
Richard A. Posner tried to use economic efficiency as key standard of justice. 
He analysed an economic approach to develop and evaluate a justice result. He put 
forward economic methods based on an assumption that the people involved with 
the legal system act as rational maximisers of their satisfactions. He is right that all 
legal system face limited legal resource to achieve a justice satisfactory end, so it is 
inevitable and widely accepted that, no matter in what jurisprudence, judges will 
adopt utilitarianism to make decisions, which means they will use economic theory 
of the optimal efficiently distribution within limited cost: 
20 
 A second meaning of "justice," and the most common I would argue, is simply 
"efficiency." When we describe as "unjust" convicting a person without a trial, taking 
property without just compensation, or failing to require a negligent automobile driver to 
answer in damages to the victim of his carelessness, we can be interpreted as meaning 
simply that the conduct or practice in question wastes resources. It is no surprise that in a 
world of scarce resources, waste is regarded as immoral. 
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There may be more to notions of justice than a concern with efficiency, for 
many types of conduct widely condemned as unjust may well be efficient. Herman 
Oliphant tried to emphasise fact sensitive methods to avoid arbitrary decisions, and 
to find the real philosophy decisive behind a specific case, rather than a general 
theory. He wanted to turn legal study toward ‘how judges actually decide cases and 
away from the reasons that judges give for their decisions, to stare decisis.'
21 
 He agreed there were cases governed by rules, extracting a rule from a prior 
decision for application to the facts of the instant case. But this approach, he 
maintained, is beset by the logical difficulty that any set of facts is classifiable in an 
indefinite number of ways. Moreover, a logical analysis of decision making shows 
that, where there is no clearly applicable statute or clear precedent, one can 
formulate a number of plausible competing general principles as major premises and 
get conflicting results - a diminution of the stock of pre-existent governing rules and 
principles. Oliphant said
22
:  
 each precedent and each case rests at the centre of a vast and empty stadium, the 
angle and distance from which that case is to be viewed involves the choice of a seat ... the 
judge cannot escape the fact that he can and must choose; the decision is not a matter of 
logical coercion.  
It nevertheless is possible to determine 'what courts have done in response to 
the stimuli of the facts in concrete cases before them.' Careful attention to judges' 
'responses to fact situations will reveal more clearly than a study of the vague and 
shifting 'rationalizations' given in opinions the patterns of decision that make 
prediction possible'.
23 
 
 Now we have found that more and more claims of justice collide with each 
other as this model to pursue justice becomes bigger, and more factors are involved. 
We find that we have lost in the fugitive ideal of justice pursuit since there are so 
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many different justice views based on different grounds. We begin to doubt whether 
there is a justice standard exists. 
5.2 What Matters in Pursuit Of Justice 
 For modern society we have evolved and confirmed a multiple set of values or 
social interests, for example, dignity, happiness, well-being, equality and liberty. 
They are equally important to human beings. What we want or desire is not a 
formula in general, or an absolute rights priority or hierarchy.
24 
The main task is 
how to find and achieve the specific value or interest in individual cases. There are 
always values or moralities conflicts existing in any case; there are always different 
justice views. For example, egalitarians stressed that IPR rights should be protected 
first over aggregate welfare of social institutions, but others hold that IPR practices 
are unjust in that they harm society while providing undue benefits to undeserving 
individuals. 
Facing the conflict challenge of various values and philosophies, Rudolf 
Stammler summarised a tendency in pursuing natural justice, in which law becomes 
more and more caring of the importance of due process and obeying rules, following 
the disappearance of any final absolute morality in law. He said: 
25  
Science of law assumed that all legal precepts were potentially in the jurist’s head 
and were discovered by a purely logical process. With the breakdown of this notion of the 
absolute finality of legal premises and logical existence of all legal precepts from the 
beginning, much of the significance of the distinction in application between legal precepts 
and moral principles disappears ... Precepts for human conduct, precepts determining for 
what conduct one shall respond in civil proceedings and how he shall respond, may admit 
of a wide margin of individualized application [on their individual notions of what is fair 
and reasonable in the particular case]. Indeed, in this connection, the law often employs 
standards rather than rules.  
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In a multiple value society, there is often no clear moral position; the law 
cannot look to morality as any kind of absolute guide: 
26 
… in order to maintain the social interest in the general security, to prevent conflict, 
and to maintain a legal order in place of private war, the law must deal with many things 
which are morally indifferent. In many cases in the law of property and in the law of 
commercial transactions the law might require either of two alternative courses of action 
or patterns of decision with equal justice, but must choose one and prescribe it in order to 
insure certainty and uniformity. In such cases developed legal systems often exhibit the 
greatest diversity of detail.  
This review has indicated disparate and probably incompatible views about 
theories of justice. The problem is also described by Sen, who followed John 
Rowal’s basic idea that, the problem a theory of justice has to solve is how, in the 
face of these conflicts, effective social co-operation can come about on terms that 
are justifiable to avoid the worst injustice.
27 
 Such interpersonal justification is only possible if we start from some common 
ground, finding shareable principles of justice, shared convictions about fairness. In 
John Rawls’ view, in a civil society citizens share a firm and well-considered bottom 
justice in specific cases--- that slavery and religious intolerance are wrong.
28
 Judicial 
decisions should start from maintaining such bottom line to develop and extend the 
range of existing consensus. 
‘We do not begin by asking what a perfectly just society would look like, but 
asking what remediable injustices could be seen on the removal of which there 
would be a reasoned agreement.’ A sense of justice, or more particularly a 
consciousness of injustice, appears to come naturally, almost instinctively, to 
humans: it may not be easy to define what justice is, but we seem to know it or the 
lack of it, when we see it. Beneath this sensitivity injustice there is often an 
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awareness of incongruity, of a dislocation between what people suffer and what we 
feel they deserve or have a right to expect. 
29 
 Sen quotes Bernard Williams, who wrote that “disagreement does not 
necessarily have to be overcome”. More immediately, the search for a perfect set of 
arrangements for society can distract us from tackling real-life, immediate injustices 
such as access to education for women in the developing world or action on climate 
change. ‘The perfect becomes the enemy of the good.’ Sen asks what is that the 
pursuit of justice should actually advance. Can we agree on a measure by which to 
judge when a society, in its quest for justice, is getting closer or drawing further 
away from it? The possible categories he considers include liberty, “primary goods” 
from against being hungry to being tyrannized.
30
 
 What emerges clearly from the foregoing is that the issue is not so much to 
find an absolute standard of justice, but to develop a threshold in which to guarantee 
avoiding the worst injustice in a judgment. This becomes essentially a problem of 
procedure. No matter whether we adopt Pound’s social engineering view, Dworkin’s 
natural rights under constitutional principle, or Posner’s economic efficiency, the 
legitimacy of these jurisprudence theories are founded on a transparent 
understanding of the context of the statutory text and of legislative purpose. They 
can only be applied and proved under the correct acknowledgment of their 
theoretical debates surroundings in order to resolve the worst injustice issue a 
society faced. In order to find its application surroundings, there is a common basis 
behind all these jurisprudence theories -- how to start and make the justice journey. 
This minimum natural justice threshold demands transparency, equality of treatment 
and keeping consistent in construction. Such standard goes beyond but also unites 
each jurisprudence ethic or method, which has achieved a platform for objective 
legal end in different situations. As Rudolf Stammler mentioned:
31
 
 The question of the justice or injustice of a certain content of our will cannot be 
settled and shoved aside simply by pointing to its psychological origin. The solution must 
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be effected in accordance with certain formal characteristic marks which permit or forbid 
the inclusion of the content in question in the class of just content.’ …It deals with a 
fundamentally formal process by means of which we may be able to apply universal 
predicates to empirical material  
The emphasis on natural justice and due procedure was once summarised by 
Nancy Fraser, who reflected on the need for an equal chance to participate in the 
process
:32 
 When the basic parameters of justice are contested, we lack authoritative standards 
for assessing the merits of justice claims. Effectively thrown back on procedural criteria, 
we have no alternative but to envision scenarios in which all the parties can engage one 
another on fair terms. In such cases, we must ask: do all concerned have equal chances to 
participate fully, as peers? Or are some excluded or marginalized as a consequence of 
unjust social arrangements? … Thus, the principle of participatory directs us to interrogate 
social arrangements, to uncover, and criticize, entrenched obstacles to fair engagement.  
Ronald Dworkin has paid attention to substantial natural justice, but also 
stressed that procedural justice is the basic foundation towards substantial justice, 
emphasising the need to develop: ‘ independent procedures governing how judges 
are to be appointed, how their decisions may be appealed and reversed, and how 
they may be removed from office if this should appear necessary.’ 33 
At a legislative level, the task may well be to decide between, or at least 
reconcile different value theories. At the judicial level, where the main issue is 
between two parties, and where circumstances may not fall clearly within the 
legislation, theories may take on less importance, and due process more. It may be in 
any case the reality that under the principle of transparent equality of treatment and 
consistency, there is no huge influence on the outcome of particular cases, when 
judges pursue differing theories of statutory interpretation.  
In the US, Farber has examined this issue by comparing the outcome of 
judgments by Posner J (a pragmatist) with those of Easterbrook J (a textualist). 
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Farber concluded that theoretical differences seemed to have only a marginal 
relationship without outcomes: 
34 
 Thus, our case studies do not establish any strong connection between theory and 
outcome. (They also show that pragmatist arguments can support apparently formalistic 
results, and vice versa) … Posner and Easterbrook’s starkly conflicting jurisprudential 
views do not lead to any great disparity in their votes.  
 Farber also acknowledges that ‘labels’ are not always consistent with 
practice:
35  
 Reading these opinions makes it clear that the conventional view of their theories is 
an oversimplification: Posner is capable of being quite “formalistic” while Easterbrook’s 
version of textualism is sometimes quite “pragmatic”.  
 If it is correct that theoretical interpretative differences are not a good predictor 
of outcomes, then this raises important practical and jurisprudential issues, and 
shows the necessity of making more transparent and coherent the interpretive 
sources for the adjudication of IPR disputes. 
Duncan Kennedy also suggested that, compared with choices in jurisprudential 
model or methods, a clear fair judicial procedure and coherent reasoning is more 
important and influential to a just outcome. Unreasoned inconsistent interpretative 
and understanding the role of law in the regulation leads to more confusion and 
chaos in the justice outcome than the opposing methods taken. The approaches 
frequently described as opposing actually invokes similar reasoning and 
interpretative models on closer inspection.
36
 
It means that a judge‘s preference as to which value or jurisdiction counts is 
very limited. Judicial discretion on facts, weight, and interpretation of law is limited 
under a transparent process of fact recognition, and on equal distribution and 
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consideration of arguments
37
. Legal participants can see clearly how judges develop 
an understanding and how the judge has come to arrive at his conclusion. 
Jurists may have different views about how to go about solving particular 
problems and have different solutions with different goals in pursuit of the problem. 
But once they are facing the exact same facts and same issues under the same 
procedural threshold, their difference become less influential on the final outcome. 
It is quite often the case that even taking a different approach, the judges will 
arrive at the same conclusion if they follow prescribed procedures, and in making its 
decision a judicial body must not take into account matters which it has not been 
directed to take into account; so the greatest difficulty and risk in pursuit of justice 
outcome is to limit arbitrary discretion:
38  
 The adjudicator who follows sound general rules and principles of procedure seems 
likely to do more justice to the merits of claims in the run of cases than the adjudicator who 
follows a policy of determining the appropriate adjudicative steps to be taken in each case. 
Moreover, if an adjudicator follows general rules and principles made known to 
participants in advance, they and their lawyers can know better what to expect and can 
therefore prepare better for appearances. Determinations of deviation can be more 
objective and justice is to be seen to be done. 
Stressing natural justice in open, equal procedure and consistent reasoning to 
avoid the worst injustice result has become a common recognition in the evaluation 
a judgement.  
Facing so many disagreements about justice and morality, how are we going to 
find our way to a society that accords respect to fellow citizen with whom we 
disagree? Recent jurists researching on justice, after a long searching journey from 
Jeremy Bentham, Hebert Hart, Hobbs, Aristotle, Kant and John Rawls, have taken a 
natural justice attitude. Michael Sandal suggested that there is no guarantee that a 
politics of moral and religious attention and human rights will lead in any given case 
to agreement. There is no guarantee it will lead even to appreciation for the moral 
and religious convictions of others. Facing the ultimate plurality of human goods, it 
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is always possible and the most plausible way, is to respect our fellow citizen moral 
and religious convictions, not by ignoring but by engaging them, by challenging and 
contesting them consistently and learning from them to remove injustice. 
39 
Sen said that the central point in dealing with justice thought is to deal with 
prejudices, weak and arbitrary reasoning: ‘the administration of justice can be more 
effective if judges are seen to be doing a good job, rather than botching things up; if 
a judgment inspires confidence and general endorsement , then very likely it can be 
more easily implemented.’ What matters most is the examination of what reasoning 
would demand for the pursuit of justice. The basic issue is the need to recognize 
analytical formalities. 
40 
5.3 Natural Justice in English Cases  
English appellate courts have developed clear principles of the grounds on 
which they will interfere and from early times a strong principle of natural justice in 
due process. This principle has a number of strands, for example nemo iudex in 
causa sua: ‘no man may be judge in his own cause’,41 and audi alteram partem: ‘let 
the other side be heard’; ‘Listening fairly to both sides has aptly been described as 'a 
duty lying upon everyone who decides anything'.
42
  
However, there is also a transparency aspect that justice must be not only fair 
but also open, that it is not something to be done in the dark. In the well-known case 
of R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, Lord Hewart said that:
43
 ‘ It is not merely 
of some importance but is of fundamental importance, that justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ There was no 
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evidence of actual bias in this case. The appearance of bias was, however, clears, 
and was sufficient to impugn the proceedings:
44 
 the question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear 
to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an 
improper interference with the course of justice. 
The principle from R v Sussex Justices is well-established in English law. In 
Leeson v General Medical Council, two members of a panel of 29 were members of 
the Medical Defence Union, a body whose object was to defend medical 
practitioners and to prosecute unauthorised practitioners. The proceedings 
impugned, brought by the panel, alleged that the plaintiff had assisted and enabled 
an unqualified person to carry on the business or profession of a medical 
electrotherapist, and to practise as if he was duly qualified. In the end a majority of 
the Court of Appeal upheld the proceedings, taking the view that the two persons 
had taken no part whatever in the prosecution, either by themselves or by their 
agents. Had they so taken part, their apparent bias would have been sufficient to 
impugn the proceedings. 
 There was no evidence of actual bias, but Bowen LJ observed that:
45 
I think it is to be regretted that these two gentlemen, as soon as they found that the 
person who was accused was a person against whom a complaint was being alleged by the 
Council of a society to which they subscribed, and to which they in law belonged as 
members, did not at once retire from the Council. I think it is to be regretted, because 
judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion, and in the minds of strangers the 
position which they occupied upon the council was one which required explanation. 
Fry LJ was of a similar opinion:
46 
 I think that it is a matter of public policy that, so far as is possible, judicial proceed-
ings shall not only be free from actual bias or prejudice of the judges, but that they shall be 
free from the suspicion of bias or prejudice: and I do not think that subscribers to 
associations for the purpose of carrying on prosecutions can be said to be free from 
suspicion of bias or prejudice in the case of prosecutions instituted by the associations to 
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which they subscribe. It is needless for me to disclaim any intention, in arriving at that 
conclusion, of holding that the two gentlemen in question were in fact influenced by any 
bias. That appears to me a point which is not really open to us, because I put my decision 
on the ground of public policy, and I disclaim any right to inquire whether in fact they were 
or they were not biased. I need hardly say that I do not believe they were. 
The test is however one of apparent bias. It is not necessary to show actual bias. 
The tribunal must not merely be above reproach, it must also be transparently so. A 
similar plea for transparency can be found in Ambard v Attorney-General for 
Trinidad and Tobago:
47
 “Justice is not a cloistered virtue.”  
Transparency, equality of treatment and consistency are the central standards in 
long-standing UK case law, which displays this tendency in full sets of law reports 
dating back to at least 1865, when the official reports series started. Consistency, 
then, is a central tenet of the precedent system, whereas transparency is a central 
tenet of natural justice. 
It can be seen that the principles of natural justice, due process
48
, and consis-
tency in reasoning have a long history in English law, and that they are emphasised 
as the principles of the rule of law. Lord Bingham in his famous book, ‘the Rule of 
Law’ stated that the right to a fair trial is a cardinal requirement of the rule of law: 
first, it must be recognized that fairness means fairness to both sides, not just one; 
secondly it should be consistently evolving with times and situations; thirdly a 
judicial decision-maker must be truly independent of all influences other than the 
legal and factual merits of the case. He must be impartial in the exercise of his own 
judgment, and must not allow his personal predilections or prejudices to pervert his 
judgment
49
. The basic success of English judicial judgement lies in firm and 
continuous reliance on open transparent process and accountability, equal treatment 
to both sides arguments and consistent accountability for its judicial reasoning. It 
has achieved better that, as justice must be seen to be done ; similar cases are treated 
similarly; any inconsistent and fluctuating discretion should be justified and 
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accounted from more contextual and deeper understandings of the multiplicity of 
interpretative sources. 
5.4 Special Jurisprudential Theories in IPR Cases? 
 When it comes to IPR law in particular, the general jurisprudential theories 
play only a limited role, and the role they do play is rarely explicit. The Lockean 
idea that a man is entitled to the fruits of his labours might have led to a very 
different form of intellectual property protection than that which now exists, 
justified as it is to a large extent on principles of economic efficiency.
50
 Economic 
efficiency accepts the desirability of remunerating authors by monopoly, but 
regarding monopoly as an evil, also limits its duration, protection scope and 
compulsory license. In the area of intellectual property, the law strives to reach a 
balance between conflicting interests, to reach a justifiable compromise on the 
grounds of protecting private interests and investment while providing benefits for 
society at large in terms of increased wealth, knowledge and employment.
51
 
A good illustration is the Grokster 
52
 litigation in 2005, concerning the legality 
of a peer-to-peer music distribution operation, could easily have come down to a 
battle about economic efficiency.
53
 On the one hand, the content producers, 
primarily the music industry, claimed to have lost billions of dollars in lost CD 
revenues. Copyright should act as a gatekeeper, it was said, achieving "its goals 
through enforcement against specialized intermediaries — those capable of 
distributing creative works on a mass scale.”54 Apart from disputing the content 
providers' main economic claims, the defence also argued that, if copyright holders 
are able to prevent the development of products with alternative beneficial uses, just 
because they can also be used to infringe copyright, this would impede innovation. 
The peer-to-peer distribution systems at issue there, used lawfully, can be very 
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beneficial. They reduce distribution costs, and allow relatively unknown artists, who 
would not be able to obtain distribution through normal channels, to be published. 
55 
The economic arguments were played out during oral argument before the 
Supreme Court, the justices apparently being divided between the need to protect 
new technologies for social benefit and the need to provide remedies against 
copyright infringement. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia expressed concern that 
inventors would be deterred from entering the market by the threat of litigation, 
while Justice Souter questioned how the interpretation of the law proposed by the 
content providers would affect devices such as the iPod.
56
 
the more artistic protection is favoured, the more technological innovation may be 
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off. 
... The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim that digital 
distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before, because 
every copy is identical to the original, copying is easy, and many people (especially the 
young) use file sharing software to download copyrighted works. This very breadth of the 
software's use may well draw the public directly into the debate over copyright policy .. 
The issue in the case of Grokster seems to present about an economic 
efficiency as a background, but in the end, the decision was based on comparison 
with previous case law, in particular referencing the decision in the Sony case. 
57
 
Defendants are to be held liable, not because it is in the interests of the economy to 
hold them liable, but because their behaviour (a major factor in Grokster) creates an 
instinctive feeling of justice that they should be liable, and because to hold them 
liable is in line with previous precedent.  
Even in Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, a Posner judged case,
58 
We find, 
transparency and keeping consistency with formal decision is more fundamental and 
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persuasive than his jurisprudential view of economic efficiency rationale. 
Jurisprudential difference appears to have no influence on the decision of the court. 
Judge Posner was influenced instead by an analysis of the safe haven rule in Sony, 
and a consideration of whether it was influenced by actual or only potential non-
infringing use.  
In summary, while broad jurisprudential theories may inform the general 
direction of IPR law, and to some extent, perhaps, the legislative process, they 
appear to have little influence on specific cases. Insofar as judges have discretion, 
then, cases are decided on a strong and consistent desire to treat like cases alike. The 
latter is built on a full and open and transparent legal trial and on law reporting.  
5.5 Basic Justice Standard towards an Acceptable Fair 
Judgment 
So an acceptable and bottom line of justice criteria should at least include three 
factors, transparency, equality of treatment and consistency. 
Transparency, means the observed degree of clarity, openness, measurability, 
and verifiability in filing case , case management, trial, making interim orders and 
judgment etc. all of the key litigation stages .
59 
 
Equality of treatment means fairly arranging and interpreting legal resource to 
both sides’ view, and making proper and balance consideration against any bias, 
ignorance and discrimination in the whole litigation process. ‘audi alteran partem’, 
hears the other side. Equality of treatment guarantees that any discrimination in the 
whole process stage should be objectively justified by legislations in order to avoid 
manipulation of the facts of cases or give more weight to some facts over others.
60
  
Consistency stresses respect for precedent rules and principles confirmed by 
former cases, and require that similar cases lead to similar treatments and results. 
Without strong facts and reason to justify deviation from precedent cases, the court 
must follow decided notions and rules in similar situation. So deviation is 
exceptional to consistency. Consistency, by way of comparison and reasoning can 
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keep the end of law to the path of substantial justice, against departure from the long 
standing rules. 
61 
These three factors should exist and be reflected together at the same time in 
each case. These three factors constitute the bottom line preconditions for judges to 
justify their judicial discretions. Only when all the conditions are in place, ensuring 
that all outcomes are reflected these factors, will these preconditions produce results. 
So a justice outcome is both procedural and substantive. A case judgment with this 
basic standard is just and fair.
 
Such a standard also provides a solid platform for us to understand the 
differences between each theory, and find the grounds of each, and why it is 
available to a specific case. No matter how different judges’ concepts of justice are, 
this standard support to achieve the purpose by finding and developing from a base 
of similar precedent cases. Such a standard overcomes the obstacle of different 
economic, culture and ethics backgrounds to achieve a justice outcome for 
individual cases. It provides a basis for unconditional standard statements of the 
process to achieve objective legal ends, no matter what specific value or interest a 
judge has. Whatever specific culture litigants live in, and whether or not in reality a 
litigant holds on equal position in terms of money or power, this standard focuses 
open procedure and equality of treatment in attempting to find what the substantive 
law and precedent cases applying to the argued issues. This basic standard asks a 
judicial officer to guarantee its judgment as acceptable .  
Sen gives us an example in his book.
62
 Imagine three children quarrelling over 
a musical instrument - a flute. The first claims the flute is his because only he knows 
how to play it; the second demands it because he, the poorest of the group, lacks 
toys of his own, and this will give him something to play with; the third notes that he 
has laboured for months in making the flute, and it would therefore be unjust for him 
not to have it. The claims of justice collide here: and no singular meaning of justice 
will help us. Here obviously any one of claim might be generally logical and sound. 
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Relying on such general principles to make decision in a specific claim case is 
unpersuasive because all of them have some ground to justify any choice.  
 The first child might be awarded it under the principle of full use of property; 
the second child might establish the ground of full need of property; the third child 
also might get it under the rule of major labouring contribution. Every principle in 
itself is sound and just, but we cannot say any one is a just result in this specific 
case. A justice result is based on the merits, after a transparent and equal historic 
reasoning to reflect the purpose and intention in previous cases and legislation about 
property arguments. There is a need to find what the real argument is about this 
property---whether it is based on ownership or user right. The issue is likely to 
concern choice of distribution theories, rather than the arbitrary application of any 
single theory in particular.  
 In this example, the most injustice result comes where a judge fails to offer a 
transparent process and equality of treatment to disputants who try to prove the way 
how the flute is related to them. If the judge fails to interpret what the statue or 
precedent case applies to this kind of property, but blindly declares that fully use of 
property is what the law stipulates and awards the flute to the first child. We might 
doubt this justice. As Sen said, the crucial point about the fable of the flute is that 
there is no answer that is absolutely and objectively ‘right’, a decision that is fair and 
acceptable to all cannot be reached at the level of principle alone, in the absence of 
fair process and reasoning.
63
  
This is the main reality which Chinese legal decisions and final judgments are 
reflecting --- based on general definitions and principles to tell us right and wrong. 
In chapter one, the introduction compared notions of erroneous judgment as between 
England and China
64
: there is error in application of the law; there is error in the 
ascertained fact; there is fault in the judge’s exercise of discretion; there is 
outstanding procedural error, which may affect the correctness of the judgment; 
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there is malpractice by the judge, who has acted for personal benefit and perverted 
the law. But in the absence of fair process and reasoning in specific cases, we cannot 
evaluate and understand the meaning of ‘erroneous judgment’ in Chinese legal 
practice
65
. 
5.6 Evaluation of IPR Judgment under Basic Justice Standard 
The standards of transparency, equality of treatment and consistency does not 
constitute an explanation of what social interests and values underlie a judicial 
decision. Its function is to provide fair and just criteria to penetrate conditions 
behind an acceptable judgment. So as long as a judgment stays within the bottom 
boundaries and criteria, it is acceptable and just. That is to say, a judgment is just if 
and only if it is in fact the result of the application of all these criteria. Thus a 
decision that happens to have the correct outcome but is made without equal 
treatment and transparent process and clear consistent reasoning, is not a just 
decision, but an arbitrary exercise of discretion. Our expectation of justice in an 
acceptable judgment should reflect transparency, equality and consistence.  
 Without transparency, there is no basis to account and inspect the grounds and 
facts of a case. Judges are also men or women who are inevitably coloured by the 
values, interests and customs they happen to have. So if a litigation process is not 
transparent and clear enough for us to observe what happens in trial and what trial 
discretion steps are taken, it is an unjust trial. Without equal treatment, some 
evidence or facts might be easily ignored or hidden; some interpretation might be 
biased or overweighed.  
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 In Pro Sieben Media A.G. v Carlton U.K. Television Ltd, 
66 
on the plaintiffs' 
claim for copyright infringement, the trial judge rejected the defences that the use of 
the extract constituted “fair dealing” either “for the purposes of criticism or review”. 
But the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court judgment, based on the trial judge’s 
error in evidence recognition which affected his decision on fair dealing as a 
defence. 
This case vividly reflects that there is no other way to evaluate the justice of a 
case without a wholly transparent process and equality of treatment to both sides’ 
argument. In this case the clear transparent trial recording gave the appellate court 
the chance to find error, and the equality of treatment principle give the appellate 
court the chance to correct the trial judge’s prejudice towards the intentions and 
motives of a witness. The error was so serious that it misdirected the judicial 
assessment of the nature of the defendants' programme. As the appeal court 
mentioned, the judge's prejudice was sufficiently strong to affect the outcome of the 
case, but it was made obvious by the transparent nature of the trial record:
67 
  In this case [the trial judge's prejudice to the statement of witness] did make a big 
difference, because the judge clearly formed a very unfavourable view of the evidence of 
[the witness]. ... I have formed a quite different impression ... that chequebook journalism 
is deeply inimical to truth.  
I ask myself how and why the judge, who is very experienced in all matters relating to 
intellectual property, came to form such a very different impression ... I consider that the 
judge erred in principle in focusing too much on the actual purposes, intentions and 
motives of [the witness] and the others who were involved in the planning and production 
of the programme, and in focusing too little on the likely impact on the audience. I can only 
think that it was the judge's unfavourable view of [the witness's] evidence, and in particular 
the marked disparity between the strident criticisms which she expressed in her oral 
evidence, and the much more muted criticisms of [a] report expressed or implied in the 
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programme, which led the judge to reject the defence of fair dealing for the purpose of 
criticism or review.68 
It is well recognised that the trial judge has discretion in such cases, where his 
ruling should be respected, and will not be reversed simply because an appellate 
court disagrees with it. There are generally four grounds which can give rise to an 
appeal: the decision is unsupported by relevant evidence as found or agreed; or no 
reasonable tribunal could have arrived at that decision on the facts; or there has been 
a sufficient breach of procedural requirements to impeach the decision under the 
Human Rights Acts 1998 or the rules of natural justice; or the reasons for the 
decision were inadequate in form and in content. 
69 
All of these grounds are based on 
transparent and consistent. If there is no clear transparency and equality of treatment 
in the trial judgment, the first trial result can be easily set aside by the appeal court, 
no matter how sound the outcome looks. 
In Guild v Eskandar ,
70
 the trial court gave judgment for the claimant in part on 
design rights in respect of sweater, and the defendant contended that the judge's 
conclusions were not justified by the facts he found and were, in several instances, 
mutually inconsistent. Even though the trial court had given a long and detailed 
judgment, the appellate court judge held that the trial judge had erred in finding that 
the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s design rights:71 
It is unfortunate that the judge did not explain his process of reasoning. He could 
only infer copying if he rejected the contrary evidence of Mr Nabavi. But the cross-
examination of Mr Nabavi was directed only to the opportunity to copy. He was not cross-
examined on the issue whether he had copied in fact. On all other occasions when the 
credibility of Mr Nabavi was in question the judge accepted his evidence. On this occasion 
the judge makes no reference to Mr Nabavi's evidence on the point and gives no reason 
why, if he did consider it, he thought fit to reject it.  
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Furthermore, the judge's decision on copying was vitiated by the fact that he had 
employed the wrong comparator … the judge did not, in terms, reject the evidence of Mr 
Nabavi that he did not copy Mrs Guild's designs. Generally he appears to have found Mr 
Nabavi to have been a reliable witness. He acquitted him of any intention to mislead the 
court. No doubt the judge was entitled to draw an inference adverse to Mr Nabavi. But his 
principal reason for doing so was similarity. … In relation to the cardigan and shirt he 
never considered whether they were natural progressions from the sweater or whether the 
similarities were sufficient to discharge the considerable burden of proof he recognised.72 
Even though the reasoning process was not fully explained, from this case we 
can see why the appeal court could find the problem existing in the trial judgment, 
because it better reveals the whole trial process and the relevant issues and evidence. 
From reading the whole arrangements and trial process, as a reasonable judge, the 
appeal court found it could hardly arrive at the same conclusion. They were errors 
occurring in inequality of treatment to Nabavi’s evidence without any reason to 
doubt these statements, together with the error in fact recognition so irregular that a 
reasonable judge could not arrive such conclusion if the defence of surface 
similarities had been equally checked. This led to the appeal court setting aside the 
final judgment. 
Only under a transparent judicial arrangement, has every main issue the chance 
of an open discussion and equal participation. No matter what methods or principles 
a judge applies, he must express his understanding of the IPR principles to be 
applied in the context of the statutory text and of legislative purpose. This means to 
achieve same insight into the situation, through transparent equal treatment, the 
judge tentatively generalize findings into a general rule and uses the latter as an 
explanatory principle in accounting for the actions of the persons involved. ‘Only by 
putting yourself in the agent’s position can you find out why he did what he did’. 73 
Without consistency, a legal decision or judgment just becomes an arbitrary 
declaration, which does not need to consider the specific merits of a case, 
appropriate precedent rule or coherent purpose of IPR law. An arbitrary judgment 
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may, of course, easily meet the popular present and frequently changing policy made 
by government.
74
 
As Lord Diplock said ,
75 
'courts of justice do not act of their own motion. In our 
legal system it is their function to stand idly by until their aid is invoked’. 
Consistency basically relies on the previous case to find the decided principles or 
rules on the similar issues as a reference point for the present cases. Jurists have also 
concluded that
76
:  
The need for precedent case to arise is not to draw a conclusion from previously 
given premises, but to find statements of general principle and of particular fact, which are 
worthy to serve as premises in present case. These premises emerge from a total analysis of 
the given situation, and tested by examining what the probable consequences of following 
them would be. The general legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to 
be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete situations. 
Grounds or a judge's exposition of the decision are set forth so that the decision should not 
appear as an arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for use in similar cases in 
the future. 
Applying a particular legal rule one way rather than another in a case, there 
must be discretion in the application of principles and policies. Discretion is 
unavoidable in legal interpretation and in the application of rules when facing gap or 
ambiguous or choice of rules. Once the first task to discover the facts and situation 
in a given case is completed, then the next stage is to set up a connection between 
the facts confirmed and the law applied to the requirement of its principle. 
77
The 
basic justice standard helps a judge to find the background and condition or 
‘stepping-stone’ for judicial discretion and to set up a coherent judicial interpretation 
in applying the law to facts. 
For example, both in China and England, there is no guidance or clear 
regulation about what is same issue in issue estoppels. It is impractical to design one 
definition of same issue estoppels which can be used in each case without 
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consideration of case specific condition. From Henderson v Henderson in 1843 to, 
Coflexip SA v Stolt Offshore , Yat Tung v Dao Heng, Thoday v Thoday,  Parmenter v 
Malt House Joinery, T-Mobile v O2 Holdings, Hormel Foods v Antilles Landscape, 
and Special Effects v L'Oreal SA etc., the courts have been construing issue estoppel 
through developing the meaning of ‘same issue’ based on the earlier cases. 
The courts in England have recognized and maintained a coherence and 
consistency in reasoning the common sense of whether the issues are the same in 
later proceeding as the previous cases, is based on the whole story given by litigants 
and case management; exceptional circumstances are judged on a reasonable 
diligent standard exercised by litigants in telling the whole story, or whether there 
are specific proceeding arrangement by the statute or trial courts. In contrast, in 
Chinese IP cases, the courts just repeatedly use a definition of same issue, ‘same 
facts, same legal relationship, same litigants, and same claims together’. There is no 
any construction and development through transparent case process to form up a 
common sense about what really it is in judge’s declaration. As I have analysed in 
case JinGo v Beijing, HaiChuan and Blue Lotus Culture v Blue Lotus Food , 
Huangxin v Shanghai Agva and Pfizer Products Inc , etc. These abstract definitions 
used to judge similar issues cannot prevent litigants from dividing the whole story 
into different claims and demanding further remedies in new litigation. Lack of 
transparency in the trial process further prevents a later court relying on previously 
decided principle to draw comparisons with the present claims. In the end there is no 
way to ensure legal finality.  
 Basic bottom justice excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or 
even of wide discretionary authority on the part of those charged with interpretation. 
For example, the Copyright, Design and Patent Act (1988 Act) gives the owner 
of design right on the original designing works the exclusive right to reproduce the 
design for commercial purposes. The Act also excludes certain features of design 
from protection in order to strike a balance between the public interest in allowing 
fair competition and the need to protect and encourage designers. Section 213 (4) 
provides that “a design is not ‘original’ for the purposes of this Part of the Act if it is 
‘commonplace’ in the design field in question at the time of its creation”. There 
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should not be no doubt that ‘commonplace’ means not new or original. In C & H 
Engineering
78 , Aldous J. first tried to interpret ‘non commonplace’ as ‘a 
consideration akin to novelty’ in the arguing a design right incorporated a roll bar on 
the top of an commonplace pig fender. Such interpretation gave a quite high 
standard to evaluate ‘commonplace’ which looks similar to a utility patent. The trial 
court stressed that careful consideration should be paid to identifying whether 
publicly available equivalent designs by other manufacturers existed or not at the 
time of its creation. In Ocular Sciences
79
, the argument was about whether the 
features on a lens--- the design on front and rear surfaces and its edge with specific 
diameter, thickness and the optic radius, was protectable or ‘commonplace’. How to 
construct the consistency in such cases with the decided recognition of ‘a 
consideration akin to novelty’ or ‘publicly available equivalent’ is at the same time a 
question of how to access the degree of novelty in design rights.  
 In this case, Laddie J. did not redefine or add another special meaning to 
‘commonplace’, even though the facts of this case are not totally similar with C & H 
Engineering. He respected decided principle and felt that it would be inappropriate 
and a waste of resource to attempt to redefine the word “commonplace”. He 
constructed the consistency and connection of present facts with prior recognition. 
Laddie J. Stated that a “new and exciting design could be produced from the most 
trite of ingredients combination, trivial, common-or-garden, hackneyed or of the 
type which would excite. But to secure protection [under design right], the 
combination must not be commonplace”. On the facts of Ocular Sciences, the 
combination did not produce anything out of the ordinary. The plaintiff's designs for 
lenses were each largely indistinguishable from the designs for numerous other 
lenses available on the market. All that the defendants had done was to take some of 
the dimensions (such as those for the diameter thickness and the power of the lens) 
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and to feed them into their own spreadsheet so as to produce their own design. This 
did not amount to the copying of the plaintiff's design.
80 
As to how courts reach decisions by reference to precedents 'the problem here 
is not to draw a conclusion from previously given premises, but to find statements of 
general principle and of particular fact, which are worthy to serve as premises'. 
These premises emerge from a total analysis of the given situation, and they are 
tested by examining what the probable consequences of following them would be. In 
the judicial situation this means that general legal rules and principles are 'working 
hypotheses,' needing to be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in 
application to concrete situations. 
Judicial discretion always exists in cases where there is a margin of discretion 
in the application of legal rules and facts recognition. There is always some 
discretionary space in which the judges have freedom of movement, freedom to 
decide that the case before him calls for the application of one principle or policy 
rather than another. The challenge for decision-makers is to increase transparency of 
the foundation and sources of their ultimate decisions. The identification of 
legislative objectives is crucial to the formulation and interpretation of the rules 
governing the conduct which IP law seeks to regulate.
81 
 
Judicial recognition should give parties a reliable and clear procedural basis 
with which to proceed. Any determination of deviation of standard procedure should 
be more objective. Judges should draw a particular distinction to justify the 
departure or flexibility on the basis of earlier precedents. Judicial discretion must be 
constrained in a proper tolerable extend. Once it is out of control, the whole process 
becomes an abuse of discretion. In Delno v Market Street Railway, the judge gave a 
statement of abuse of discretion: 
82 
‘Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or 
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no 
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could 
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differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that 
the trial court abused its discretion’.  
We are not afraid that judges have legal reason to value or weigh some facts in 
trial; we are afraid of judges abusing their discretion to direct a desired result. 
Without specifying a set of sufficient conditions, it is unbelievable to answer the 
question why this rule will not be accepted. After referring to precedent cases and 
comparing the rules relate to the present case, a judge can find the real situation and 
merits similar or different from precedent cases, then reach a conclusion to follow or 
depart from the binding force of the precedent case. When a judge insists on the 
development and maintenance of legal principles which the prior cases have set up, 
it will help to exhibit a very substantial degree of coherence. The consistency 
principle requires that consequences in present case should reflect similar decision 
for similar situations. 
Even after a long comparison, the court may find that on the merits the 
precedent does not fit the present case, as they are not similar cases, but just have a 
surface similarity. It is also worth reviewing the precedents so that litigants and the 
court can find how it is distinguished and how far the deviation is from the previous 
cases. 
For example, in Hyde Park Residence Limited v Yelland and Others,
83 
the High 
Court gave judgment for the defendants and held that using of the driveway still 
pictures was a kind of fair dealing for reporting of current events, and also served a 
public interest against copyright protection. But the appeal court held a different 
interpretation on the nature of stills and public interest defence. 
In the trial part and appeal part, both sides’ arguments and claims based on 
previous cases were fully revealed. There were no disputes about the facts and 
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decided conclusion in previous cases. Through analysis the former principles 
decided on public interest and fair dealing, 
84
 the appeal court also confirmed what 
the trial court had found: 
85 
‘There have been a number of cases where the courts have refused to enforce copy-
right as the works in question were considered libellous, immoral, obscene, scandalous or 
irreligious….In my view a court would be entitled to refuse to enforce copyright if the work 
is: (i) immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life; (ii) injurious to public life, public 
health and safety or the administration of justice; (iii) incites or encourages others to act in 
a way referred to in (ii). ’ 
 The different view between the trial court and the appeal court lies in what 
interpretation on public interest defence and fair dealing is a better and correct way 
of reflecting the principle of the precedent cases. 
 The trial court reached a conclusion from the precedent cases in which the 
courts in England had recognized that principle of public policy could prevent 
copyright enforcement completely, even though there was no such legislation. The 
trial judge Jacob J held that: 
86 
 It seems to me that judicial authority in England and Wales over the years up to the 
1988 Act had, albeit with little basis, been tending towards the recognition of this defence. 
Whether or not what was said before the 1988 Act was right, I think the better view is that 
that provision was intended to recognise a defence of public interest—either by way of 
refusing to recognise copyright altogether (“preventing enforcement”) or by way of a 
defence in the particular circumstances of the case (“restricting enforcement”) 
But the appeal court reached a conclusion from the precedent cases that public 
interest defence was a limited, rather than a complete defence, in cases where 
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enforcement of the copyright would offend against the public policy of the law. The 
appeal court held that: 
87 
Mr Bloch's submission that no public interest defence exists, starts with an analysis 
of the 1988 Act is correct. As he correctly pointed out, copyright is an intellectual property 
right provided for by the 1988 Act. That Act contains detailed provisions in the 51 sections 
… towards achieving a proper balance between the protection of copyright and the wider 
public interest. They would therefore appear to set out in detail the extent to which the 
public interest overrides copyright. I agree. The 1988 Act does not give a court general 
power to enable an infringer to use another's property, namely his copyright in the public 
interest.  
The trial court recognised the defendant’s publishing as fair dealing that: 88 
I think The Sun was in the position where it was close to necessary to publish the 
photographs to refute what Mr Al Fayed said in The Mirror and elsewhere. Mr Bloch said 
The Sun could have said they had interviewed Mr Murrell and seen the photographs 
without actually publishing them. Or it could have first told Mr Al Fayed that it had the 
pictures and challenged them to withdraw his statement. But the former course would not 
have had anything like the same impact and force as actual publication of the stills. A 
picture says more than a thousand words. 
But the appeal court held the defendant’s publishing was misappropriation and 
unfair dealing: 
89 
The suggestion that the use of the driveway stills was a fair dealing for the purposes 
of reporting the events of 30 August 1997 is, an attempt to dress up the infringement of 
Hyde Park's copyright in the guise of reporting an event. … The 28 minutes at the Villa 
Windsor—did not establish that the Princess and Mr Dodi Fayed were not to be married. 
To describe what "The Sun" did as fair dealing is to give honour to dishonour. Further the 
extent of the use was excessive. The only part of the driveway stills relevant to the alleged 
purpose was the information as to the timing of arrival and departure. That information 
could have been given in the articles by Mr Thompson stating that he had seen the 
photographs which proved the Princess and Mr Dodi Fayed only stayed at the Villa 
Windsor for 28 minutes. … Whatever "The Sun" said in its articles, these stills had in 
reality no significance save as recording information as to timings. In my view the judge 
                                               
 
LI HUA: Enforcement of IPR in England and China Judicial Regimes 
 
225 
came to the wrong conclusion and the allegation of fair dealing by the defendants could not 
provide them a defence to the action.  
 These cases vividly demonstrate how to keep consistency with the principles 
of precedent cases and statute rules, and how to follow or part follow or divert from 
the binding force of precedent case. We have strongly sensed that the trial judge 
took a very wide discretionary authority on the part of interpretation of public 
interest defence without enough cause, when he stressed the point that in principle 
public policy could prevent copyright enforcement completely, even though there 
was no such legislation. As the trial judge commented: 
90 
 Such cases are rare, of course. And there can certainly be dispute if the courts go 
too far in appointing themselves as moralists ….. But that does not matter for present 
purposes. Some might say it is a remarkable thing for the courts to take away that which 
has been given by Parliament. Yet that is what the courts have done in extreme 
circumstances. No one suggests that they were wrong to do so or that one could go back on 
that now. It is far too late.  
Such conclusion might easily face the risk of contravening section 51 of the 
1988 Act and also be against the basic legal principle on interpretation of preferring 
the rule deriving from the Parliament where possible. In particular, the appeal court 
conclusion, is more persuasive, consistent and respected than the trial court’s 
conclusion, when the appeal court tried to set up a coherent interpretation between 
case law development and the general purpose of IPR law: 
91  
The 1988 Act does not expressly provide a public interest defence to a claim for 
copyright infringement. Section 171(3), which contains a saving provision for "any rule of 
law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest", 
should be interpreted as referring, not to any pre-existing common law public interest 
defence, but to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to refuse a claimant relief where the 
work concerned is contrary to public policy because, for example, it is immoral or contrary 
to the public interest. 
In this case, the appeal court not only arrived at conclusion consistent with 
precedent cases but also with higher legal system structure of respect for Parliament 
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power and its legislation. There was no chaotic conclusion in which cases law 
develops faster than legislation. 
 Transparency, equality of treatment and consistency must remain together to 
evaluate a case judgment. Without transparent and equal treatment, consistency is 
based on declared ideology and policy value rather than the merits of the case. 
Without consistency, transparency and equality of treatment becomes an 
accumulation of separate evidence and there is no coherent cogency in reasoning 
and interpretation. The final judgment appears in the absence of compatible 
principle reconcilable with the general purpose and value of the IPR legislation. 
 In Hyde Park Residence Limited v Yelland and Others, the trial court held that 
the defendant publishing was fair dealing, and pictures could more vividly reflect 
the relationship between Diana and F. But the appeal court refuted such recognition 
from the context of the pictures and regarded such use as an attempt to dress up the 
infringement of Hyde Park's copyright in the guise of reporting an event. Moreover 
if we put what the trial court had reminded us that: 
92 
 
There is a public interest defence available in principle… It is difficult to imagine the 
defence arising except in the context of the communication of what is essentially 
information—information clothed in copyright. Before it can arise it must be shown that 
there is a genuine public interest in that information being disclosed…  
We can sense that trial court judgment has achieved transparency and equality 
of treatment to both sides’ claims but failed in keeping coherent logic between case 
merit and its reasoning. The appeal court found in the absence of any necessity, here 
was a kind of excessive use to publish the stills, rather than a fair dealing.  
 The appeal court‘s conclusion on fair dealing for reporting of current events 
was followed in a later case of Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 
93 
thought its final judgment was contrast to that in the Hyde Park 
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Residence . The trial court repeated the binding force drawn from the Hyde Park and 
other precedent cases: 
94 
 If some degree of use would be fair dealing, excessive use can render the use unfair; 
In assessing whether the dealing is fair the court can have regard to the actual purpose of 
the work, and will be live to any pretence in the purported purpose of the work; … The real 
question here is whether this is a trivial programme dressed up as criticism or review so as 
to provide an ostensible justification for showing copyright material under some pretence, 
or whether it is genuinely critical and reviewing. Objectively speaking it is the latter, as I 
have already found, and nothing in the evidence suggests that anyone behind the scenes 
had any other, more sinister, intention. 
5.7 Basic Justice Standard as Workable Path to Achieve IPR 
Enforcement in China 
Improving IPR enforcement in China requires us to be concerned with the 
complexity of the justice system. The problems it deals with are complex and the 
solutions are never simple.
95 
Many legal scholars have mentioned and agreed the 
problems existing in the enforcement , such as disorder and arbitrariness; strength of 
political policy influence in trials and lack of judicial independence
96,
 Common 
malpractice and bending the law for personal gains, corrupt and bureaucratic 
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practices;
97
 ; local protectionism to local interests, and government interference in 
particular cases involving key industrial sectors, a sharp inconsistency on the 
application of the substantial law to individual cases in practice, etc.
98
 
Much of the research has considered achieving a fair and just trial in China 
through changing and improving the social or political surroundings. Without 
changing the background of the legal system, it is difficult to transplant more 
western countries’ judicial methods to solve the China problems. Through the 
comparison with English situation on a case-by-case basis, the systemic shortfall in 
legal structure becomes apparent: trial court and appeal court serve the same 
function; and there is no instance review on arbitrary judicial decision. A case result 
should always be located within a wider judicial setting; matters concerning 
background fairness may often be pertinent to issues arising within the legal system. 
In considering the question of judicial justice, we should concentrate not only on the 
justice of particular cases, but also on the fairness of the basic structure of legal 
system.
99
 A legal system is necessarily a reflection of a society’s philosophy of 
justice. It is hard and difficult to get a just outcome for individual cases without 
maintaining the justice of whole legal system. 
100  
But we must also admit that, the difference in culture, ideology and political 
structures will never disappear, and especially, litigants and lawyers in China have 
to accept the jurisdiction and judgments from Chinese courts. Whatever problems 
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are identified by experts in the existing system, these should not operate as a 
blockage to achieving a basic standard justice.
 101
 Even if later China sets up an 
independent legal system and a separation of power structure, this will not to 
guarantee in each case a fair and just judgment, because a better system is still just a 
general structure, not a live transparent interactive process to guarantee that each 
case has arrived at a designated standard, so as to guarantee a fair result. ‘Building 
law through adjudication is a sound and necessary process to justice’.102  
Transparency, equality of treatment and consistency are the basic break-
through threshold to efficiently enforce IPR protection in China. Such criteria will 
help to remedy the close, arbitrary, partial and inconsistent ascertainment of facts 
and law. The basic success of the UK in IPR enforcement lies in its natural justice 
and the application of precedent. Through the analysis of the situation and results on 
issue estoppels, case management and interim measures, legal finality and via the 
main jurisprudence on legal justice, I have sought to demonstrate that only the 
transparency and equality of treatment process can greatly curb the exact problems 
and issues arising from individual cases, to make clear why and on the basis of what 
merits, the judge in a specific case chooses one legal theory rather than another, in 
the judicial reasoning.  
All the comparison cases in England and China has also shown that a partial 
judge must make the arbitrary decisions by a messy process, by giving inequality of 
treatment to parties, by distorting facts and applicable laws. Under transparency and 
equality of treatment, the Chinese trial process would become traceable in allowing 
or denying interim orders, in fair procedure guidance to both sides. All relevant facts 
would be on view and considered in the process of decision-making. Any 
inappropriate malpractice and impartiality in the decision making would be 
undeniable and unconcealable in the reasoning. 
Under a consistency principle, Chinese court must at the very least, like the 
European Court of Justice, take precedent cases as least persuasive authorities in 
legal interpretation. Chinese trial judgment would at least respect precedent cases 
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and follow their force to achieve a similar result in a similar situation, guaranteeing 
the applicable law to its facts, and consistently with former precedent, would avoid 
overlapping hearings in issue estoppel. A Chinese judge would, like a UK judge, 
have to follow a binding precedent result unless he can distinguish it, and then 
depart from it. In this way a Chinese judge's arbitrary discretion would be very 
limited. Therefore litigants and later courts can find where the distinguishing 
principle is, and the permissible deviation from the previous cases.  
Transparency, equality of treatment and consistency also provide a solid 
powerful standard, from bottom to top, to promote and reform the structure of 
Chinese legal institutions. Only under a transparent and equal judicial treatment may 
we find and realize where and how a basic structure of legal system is suitable or 
unsuitable to a just outcome. Only where cases consistently apply precedents may 
we clearly confirm why an institutional legal system needs to maintain or reform. 
Only under the basic justice standard may we justify whether there is any other 
alternative way to solve problems without reforming institutional arrangement.  
5.8 Conclusion: 
No matter how beautiful and sound IPR legislation is, it is impractical and 
unhelpful to achieve IPR enforcement if the cases results do not reflect an 
inseparable connection between the means of enforcing rights and the written rights 
themselves. The less the effort that is given to laying down or copying general 
principles of IPR law by legislators, the more important and difficult it is to enforce 
them efficiently and justly. Chinese IPR enforcement is facing such a situation, as 
mentioned in Chapter One: substantive IPR law was quickly passed under a general 
structure and principles to meet the WTO requirement, but IPR enforcement, 
especially over serious matters such faking goods and infringing brand name, is still 
weak, and IPR owners and companies continue to lack confidence and trust in IPR 
enforcement.  
Such enforcement failure in IPR litigation is a slippery slope: ineffective case 
management leads to unclear and uncontrolled preliminary issues and directions for 
trial. This leads to casual procedural treatment. The courts’ reliance on formal 
defects in evidence to decide relevance and credibility, lack of judicial notice about 
court’s inference on findings, and unequal treatment to both sides’ interests, brings 
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about arbitrary and blinked discretion and judgment. This is further worsened by the 
lack of precedent for consistency. Arbitrary and blinkered judgment leads to 
difficulty in inferring rules from prior judicial decisions, which further damages 
legal finality and causes relitigation and retrial of the same issues. The use of 
verbatim words and abstract concepts to check the same issue in relitigation gives 
rise to conflicting results and to similar situations being treated differently, or 
different situations similarly. The success of English judicial regime tells us that the 
effective way to stop such slippery slope is to apply the basic standards of 
transparency, equal treatment and consistency into every aspects of the judicial 
process. 
There is also no doubt that structural reform of the social and legal system is 
urgently needed in China,
103
 but this thesis has shown that, even in the current 
situation, a Chinese court should render IPR protection better, in the sense of being 
more open and fair. It showed to take a transparent, equal treatment and consistent 
approach towards the trial of the issues. The thesis has proved that the validity of 
intellectual property protection depends heavily on judicial performance. 
104  
The 
Chinese court should play a significant role in enforcement of IPR through 
improving the judges’ professional skill to manage a case and hear it in a transparent 
manner, 
105
 rather than taking advantage of systemic problems as excuses to make 
cursory and arbitrary decisions.  
I hope my thesis has achieved the main tasks, to discover: how, and to what 
degree, IPR protection from a similar substantive law base varies between China and 
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England, and what is the practical standard for China to move towards acceptable 
IPR enforcement.  
The difference in IPR enforcement between China and England is analogous to 
Dicey’s comments, and his comparison between the written continental constitution, 
and that of England. I want to end my discussion by quoting, from a hundred years 
ago, A V Dicey’s comments on the unrivalled power of UK constitution law as a 
living path, in providing the means to enforce a practical right, and as the best way 
to secure the substantive rights declared by IPR law in China:
106  
if it be allowable to apply the formulas of logic to questions of law, the difference in 
this matter between the constitution of Belgium and the English constitution may be 
described by the statement that in Belgium individual rights are deductions drawn from the 
principles of the constitution, whilst in England the so-called principles of the constitution 
are inductions or generalisations based upon particular decisions pronounced by the 
courts as to the rights of given individuals.  
‘there runs through the English constitution that inseparable connection between the 
means of enforcing a right and the right to be enforced which is the strength of judicial 
legislation.’  
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